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Special issue on ‘North Korea: ‘Crisis as an Opportunity’ and the Unintended Consequences of Engagement’

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Hyug-Baeg Im
Exceptional Difficulties of Peace Building in Korean Peninsula: An Eclectic Approach

Robert Winstanley-Chesters
Examining Emergent Environmental Strategies in the Era of Kim Jong Un

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Education, International Cooperation and Future Challenges for the DPRK

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Special issue on ‘North Korea: ‘Crisis as an Opportunity’ and the Unintended Consequences of Engagement’

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North Korea: ‘Crisis as an opportunity’ and the unintended consequences of engagement

Youngmi Kim*

Widely regarded as an anachronism in the current international system, and having surprised observers for the longevity of its regime, North Korea has carved out for itself a seemingly durable niche. To do so it has vehemently resisted any pressure for reform, Chinese-style or otherwise. Placing politics above economics (through the Songun/military-first policy) Pyongyang’s leadership has ‘stayed the course’ on the path of economic bankruptcy. Repression is relentless inside the country, and isolation-plus-sanctions have contributed to create and maintain a surreal microclimate in which North Korea operates and survives.

At the same time, as Kwon and Chung note (2013), North Korea is not really a mystery. Much is known about the country, especially about the regime and the political and economic system. Less so about what its citizens think, although the firewall of information isolation is gradually breaking down, and also reducing the country’s isolation from the world. This special issue investigates how Pyongyang has turned a crisis, or indeed a series of crises, into an opportunity not for renewal but for survival. Paradoxically, the capacity-building efforts, designed with an eye to a future post-Kim era, have also served to boost regime capacity and legitimacy. This is the first way in which the policy of international engagement has led to unintended consequences. Reluctantly replacing the Soviet Union as one of North Korea’s main sources of financial support, the international community offered a policy of ‘aid with no strings attached’ (no conditionality). This international aid has provided the North Korean regime with both an alternative life-line and an instrument for its authoritarian survival. Longevity is not, however, coterminous with being ‘frozen in time’. Instead, as the contributions to this journal show, educational exchanges, environmental cooperation and cross-border economic interaction with China are yielding profound changes in North Korean society. While international aid and the informal economy serve as both safety nets and valves for an otherwise moribund economy, they are critically altering the domestic information environment. North Korean citizens are no longer as cut off from the rest of the world as they once were.

This special issue consists of five papers which set out to examine the ways in which North Korea has changed in recent years. And change it has indeed, and just not in the ways the international community often hoped. Quite the contrary, some of the international efforts to open up the country, rescue it from its self-inflicted predicament, and build capacity have resulted, paradoxically, in enhancing state capacity and regime legitimacy. The root causes of this lie partly in the ‘law of unintended consequences’ – extending the rule of the Kim dynasty is most likely not a policy priority of the international community when it comes to the Korean peninsula – and partly, as Im Hyug-Baeg notes in his contribution, in the mixed –

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indeed conflicting – signals coming out of Washington and Seoul. The papers are quite diverse in nature, being written by political scientists, sociologists, geographers, and area studies specialists, thereby contributing to a nuanced and multifaceted picture of the North Korean state and society.

Im’s paper on the ‘Exceptional difficulties of peace building in Korean Peninsula: an Eclectic approach’ asks why peace building in the Korean Peninsula has failed to create the foundation for the reunification of the two Koreas, in contrast to what the West experienced at the end of Cold War, with the political re-unification of Germany (Im, 2014, p. 16). Since the launch of the Sunshine Policy by former President Kim Dae-Jung, the two Koreas have undertaken mutual exchanges, and economic cooperation, including large cash inflows and investment in the North from the South (Kim, 2011). At the same time, there was no spillover into the political realm, and politically inter-Korean relations never took off (in fact since there was no peace treaty at the end of the Korea War, the two countries remain technically at war). In his search for the factors accounting for North Korea’s longevity despite all odds, Im looks at both domestic and external factors as sources of (in)stability. He downplays the importance of the possession of nuclear weapons by the North. While it does indeed add to Pyongyang’s blackmailing power, owning – or suspicion of ownership - of weapons of mass destruction did not prevent Saddam Hussein’s demise, he notes. Neither did giving up the Soviet era-inherited nuclear warhead arsenal lessen the chances of survival or lead to diminished state capacity in the cases of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. In the end, ‘nuclear status’ might have more to do with prestige than regime survival. The economic crisis might have brought widespread suffering and hundreds of thousands of deaths during the famine, but has not caused cracks in the regime either. No unrest has spread, although sporadic riots and protests have been sparked in response to particularly unpopular government actions, such as the re-denomination of the North Korean won in the late 2000s.

Domestically a high level of repression, combined with the consolidation of a ‘neopatrimonial dictatorship’ – the second factor leading to a high level of institutionalization even in a highly personalistic regime – has kept open the space of political opportunity for any change ‘from below’ virtually to nonexistent. This means that any Arab Spring-like scenario or even a sudden breakthrough such as Myanmar’s is unlikely to occur in the country any time soon. While cell phone usage might be spreading in the North, and cross-border flows (to/from China) might be enabling North Koreans to see that the propaganda-fuelled paradise inside the borders is a fiction, little change, if any, should be expected. Society remains divided into strata (three social classes), one of which is bought off by the distribution of rent, remaining apathetic and thus reluctant to become politically active.

External factors are just as important, Im notes, when accounting for the regime’s durability. The inconsistent policies of South Korea and the United States towards the North are also an important piece of the whole ‘durability puzzle’. In his paper, he focuses especially on the failed and inconsistent policies toward North Korea on the part of South Korea and the US. During the Clinton administration, the US launched its ‘soft landing’ policies, while the Kim Dae-jung administration in South Korea offered the North engagement from 1998 onwards via summits,
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investment and economic cooperation, and more generally financial support to the DPRK. The ‘Sunshine policy’ was in full swing when the 9/11 terrorist attacks prompted a stark revision of US foreign policy. East Asia was also affected as North Korea was included in the ‘Axis of Evil’ by then President George W. Bush, alongside Iran and Iraq. Western engagement practically came to a halt, and South Korea and US began to sing out of tune with each other. Pyongyang started to receive mixed messages and drew the conclusion that it was faced with an existential threat (See table 1 below).

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(Source: Author)

During and in the aftermath of the Iraq War, the Six-Party Talks from 2003, 2005 and 2007 came across as little more than a ‘talking shop’ (Im, 2014, p. 21). Im refers to the failure of the Six-Party Talks as the product of ‘benign neglect’ (Ibid, p. 22). This neglect allowed North Korea to focus on nuclear testing and provocation. When President Obama sought to reverse the unpopularity inherited by the Bush administration and made a gesture to a number of US foes, his offer was abruptly rebutted by then-leader Kim Jong II. Im argues that the functionalist approaches followed by the Kim and Roh administrations did not achieve any positive spill-over effect, but deepened mutual distrust and also enabled, inadvertently, continuous military provocation. According to Im, Kim Jong II was not really interested in such a spill-over effect but rather exploited the opportunities in the international environment to maximise financial support for the aim of regime sustainability, a point also made in Winstanley-Chesters and Spezza’s papers. Economic benefit from the Gaesung Industrial Complex and Geumkang Mountain tourism did not prevent the North from engaging in instances of military aggression, such as in the Chunan Ship sinking (2010) and bomb attack at Yonpyong Island (2011) episodes.

Although engagement remains a ‘mixed-bag’, he concludes that the Lee and Bush administrations are responsible for the failure over spill-over effect, which could not be continued due to the different and inconsistent policies between the two military allies, the US and South Korea. Finally, China’s patronage, despite the lack of mutual respect between Beijing and Pyongyang, contributes to explain the economic durability and political posturing of the North. While Beijing’s leverage on Pyongyang might be limited, a collapse of the North or even a South-led unification (which would expand the geographical spread of US troops on the
The survival of the DPRK remains the least bad policy option for Beijing’s policymakers. In essence, Im finds the current predictions about the North’s alleged ‘imminent collapse’ misguided. In addition, the dominant theoretical frameworks are, he argues, of limited use in making sense of the country’s survival. Rather, he suggests, scholars would benefit from adopting a hybrid ‘eclectic theoretical framework’, so as to open a way to more insightful explanation and understanding of North Korean exceptionalism, while also suggesting creative ways to engage the country and effect possible change in the long term. According to Sil and Katzenstein (2010, p.419 cited in Im, 2014, p. 33) ‘analytical eclecticism seeks to trace the problem-specific interactions among a wide range of mechanisms operating within or across different domains and levels of social reality’. According to Im, eclecticism could balance by combining unilateral, bilateral and multilateral approaches to North Korea, paving the way for a final breakthrough.

The following two papers focus on two case studies of externally-driven and financed capacity-building efforts. Winstanley-Chesters’s contribution on ‘Examining emergent environmental strategies in the era of Kim Jong Un’ examines continuities and changes in North Korean environmental policy-making. This is a rather unusual empirical focus in the scholarly conversations about the DPRK. Like the next paper on education cooperation it sheds light on how Pyongyang used the opportunities made available by the international community in the post-Cold War era to boost its own legitimacy, while also engaging in activities aimed at strengthening state capacity. Broadly speaking, Winstanley-Chesters explores the logic and making of environmental politics under Kim Jong Il’s rule as a case study to see how the country has adapted to the new realities of the post-Cold War period (Winstanley-Chesters, 2014, p. 41). The author argues that Pyongyang’s developmental plan had to change abruptly because of the known reasons of the drying up of Soviet aid due to the collapse of one of the country’s two main patrons. Subsequently the DPRK had to radically reorganize its economic policies in response to the changes and crises of the 1990s, and this entailed an environmental strategy. Countering the received wisdom on North Korea, Winstanley-Chesters argues that the country responded to environmental failure with new institutional strategies showing a good degree of innovation in thinking (Ibid, p. 41). He briefly revisits the Cold War period when the DPRK sought to play off the Soviet Union and China against each other (Ibid, p. 41). Even as the DPRK faced the prospect of greater international isolation matched with significantly reduced financial support, its triangulatory strategy continued. The country sought help from external aid agencies such as the World Food Programme, the UN Developmental Program, and the Food and Agriculture Organisation. It took advantage of this aid without conditionality to maintain a good public image of the regime (domestically), blaming economic hardship on the famine and the economic crisis aggravated by the US and US-backed economic sanctions. Aid helped alleviate the suffering, there is no doubt about that. At the same time it came with unintended and yet not surprising consequences. Since there were no strings attached, international aid not only relieved the famine but also contributed to enhance the country’s institutional capabilities. Winstanley-Chesters sees such institutional development as critical to surviving geo-political and environmental crisis. Pyongyang managed to
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Successfully replace Soviet aid with international aid. In the process, however, it also displayed a degree of institutional and policy innovation (Winstanley-Chesters, 2014, p. 42). It utilized this opportunity to mitigate the regime crisis and recover its infrastructural and institutional capacity. The study of environmental policy-making and environmental projects serves as an interesting prism through which to observe the regime’s ability to boost its own legitimacy even at a time of crisis. The coastal tidal land reclamation project served multiple purposes such as extracting sea salt, using the land for aquaculture, and hydro-electric power.

More of this should be expected, Winstanley-Chester argues, from the new leadership, for example in the development project in South Hwanghae province, or with regard to investment in conservation and renewable energy. The installation of seven wind generators with the aid of the US energy specialist team is a case in point; so is the expanded capacity of wind turbines received from Vestas in Denmark. This promotes engagement between external actors and the elites, lessening the country’s energy vulnerability and external dependence while also boosting its capacity, institutional and technical. He concludes that the DPRK’s strategy of focusing on conservation fits both the regime’s needs to address its energy vulnerability and cope with energy insecurity, as well as its own narrative on the ‘sacred’ nature of the environment on the northern half of the Korean peninsula (Winstanley-Chesters, 2014, p. 49).

International capacity-building efforts are also the focus of Spezza’s paper. The field under investigation here is that of education. As noted in the other papers as well, the economic crisis induced by a multitude of factors, domestic and international, meant that starting from the 1990s North Korea found itself in great need of international aid. While seeking to help the country to cope with the immediate consequences of famine – which was of course welcome – it is structural and institutional issues that plunged the country into such a predicament and that still hinder policy change today. Thus, the international community also embarked on attempts to enhance capacity building. The rationale for these endeavors was that educational exchange focused on vocational training would foster the emergence of a new elite better equipped to deal with the economic policy challenges the country was (and still is) confronted with.

From 2001 onwards, some small instances of cooperation between the DPRK and the West took off. A small number of NGOs were allowed in to build technical capacity in the country. The reasons behind cooperation were very different: the international community, the West primarily, hoped that such efforts would help open up the regime. The ruling elites in Pyongyang, in contrast, saw in educational exchanges an opportunity to secure both funding and training to stay in power for longer. The matter was far from uncontroversial since as Spezza notes, critics of engagement saw in these projects a tool that would enable the regime to hang on longer and enhance its military capacity, while ignoring the people’s basic needs (Spezza, 2014, p. 54).

The paper begins with some useful contextual information to understand why the availability, or lack for that matter, of experts became an issue in contemporary North Korea. Spezza traces the roots of this problem to the early state-building period of the DPRK. Back in the late 1940s the land reform eradicated ‘undesirable’ social classes such as landlords and businessmen. With a key element of society
turned virtually overnight into a hostile class, the poorest but loyal (supporting the anti-Japanese guerrilla forces) social strata became part of the core class (Spezza, 2014, p. 56). Since social mobility could only be downward in North Korea, social stratification was not just a socio-economic issue in the DPRK but a deeply political one, with members of the hostile classes facing virtual social exclusion and marginalization for three generations. As Spezza illustrates, the revolutionary social changes led to the poorest and least educated being elevated to the status of ‘core class’ (i.e. the loyal elites). In this early state formation period, North Korea had to overcome three challenges: first, to build its educational system from scratch, second to avoid external influences which could undermine the ruling ideology, and finally to guarantee economic development (Ibid, p. 57). Spezza argues that the country partly achieved the first and second aims, but failed to attain economic development through the existing educational system. Comparatively speaking, the North Korean educational system was as ideological – and thus flawed – as the Soviet one, but additionally it failed to train a skilled labor force. The abrupt changes of the 1989-1991 period made this situation even worse. To maintain regime durability over three generations, maintaining the support of a loyal, uneducated people through ideological indoctrination at the expense of effective training, resulted in erroneous, arguably disastrous economic policy choices, an economic nose-dive, and ultimately famine and dependence on foreign aid. The spartan but viable economy of the early 1960s had given way to economic collapse and the erosion of the social fabric. North Koreans needed skills, but opportunities to acquire them were nowhere to be seen. Rather organizational life continued to accompany life spent at non-producing factories. This left a very narrow circle of elites, rewarded for their political loyalty rather than their expertise (Ibid, p. 58).

Access to education became increasingly unequal, a situation worsened by the fact that the education system had a deeply ideological component. The quality of higher education varies between schools in different regions, and the good ones are mostly based in Pyongyang. The educational establishments are, in any case Spezza notes, ‘factory of cadres’ (Ibid, p. 58). With the combined geopolitical and economic crisis of the 1990s, North Korea started to recognize, belatedly, the need of high quality education for economic and technological development. International organisations and firms made gestures to offer training opportunities for North Koreans. This is not to say that North Korean students had never before visited foreign countries and experienced education abroad. In the 1960s a small number of North Korean students spent time in East Central Europe, but that was of course at the time when brotherly relations meant that there was little to fear about the students’ possible exposure to foreign ideas (Kim and Harbord, 2014). Even in the 1980s many North Korean students had visited Norway, Denmark and France with the support of UNESCO projects to improve their language skills and knowledge of science. Spezza examines how the DPRK used the Western disposition to engage and provide aid with a series of case studies on the educational realm. He examines three educational projects: a training program at the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology (PUST), one by Chosun Exchange, and the training officials and academics by a team of European specialists. While none of them can be categorized as a ‘real exchange’ (both training and mobility went in one direction only) these programs did bring a small pool of international trainers and North
Koreans together, allowing the former a rare glimpse into North Korean society and the latter a rare opportunity to receive some training in various fields. PUST is an international education project funded by private donors based in Pyongyang under the supervision of North Korean Ministry of Education. It is the only university with full internet access, where English is the main language of tuition, although students still have to attend classes in Juche ideology (Spezza, 2014, p. 62). Chosun Exchange and the EUS cooperation are organized by NGOs and academic institutions willing to train officials and young professionals. Chosun Exchange has mainly carried out its projects outside the DPRK (e.g. Singapore) and delivered MA-level short-term academic programs. The EU specialists (EUS) were approached by the DPRK itself and set up five educational programs. These focused on international economics, trade, globalization, and practical training, with a duration of two to three weeks. Drawing on interviews with participants among EUS or PUST professors, Spezza’s paper offers valuable insights on these rare examples of capacity-building projects, bringing those voices to the fore. He concludes that EUS cooperation brought ‘positive interaction and a mind-opening’ of the North Korean participants (Spezza, 2014, p. 68).

Marinescu and Balica’s paper on ‘Kim Jong II’s death and legacy: Media frames and myths in Romanian Media’ reminds readers of the combined effects of a self-imposed isolation and media stereotyping on public perceptions of North Korea. We know little, and even the little we know is filtered and reconstructed so that reliable information remains at minimal levels. This paper differs from the others in this special issue in that it examines how the Romanian media dealt with Kim Jong II’s death in December 2011, and how the Romanian public, specifically its media users, perceived the way the message was conveyed. Drawing on framing theories in sociology and media studies, the authors show how Romanian public opinion was influenced by the way in which the media framed the issue. Romania and North Korea make for a suitable comparison as they shared a history of a totalitarian variant of socialism during the Cold War era, during which both countries developed an extreme cult of personality built around the leader and his family.

Romania opened up in 1989, and it is interesting to gauge how much the local media still dwell on the continuities, in ideological terms, between past and present. Stereotyping in the international media was accelerated by North Korea’s inclusion in the ‘Axis of Evil’ in 2002 by then US President George W. Bush. Depicting the country in similar terms was supported by US public opinion (Marinescu and Balica, 2014, pp. 77-78); western media presented North Korea as a quintessentially ‘bad’ or ‘mad’ country (Smith 2000, quoted in Marinescu and Balica, 2014, p. 75). The DPRK’s self-imposed isolated nature itself facilitated such stereotyping (Hemmings, 2013, quoted in Marinescu and Balica, 2014, p. 75). Using quantitative content analysis and qualitative discourse analysis, the authors set out to test three hypotheses. The data disprove two of them, namely that ‘Kim Jong II’s death and his legacy are more likely to be framed in terms of their informative elements, the emotive and/or psychological elements being minimized by the Romanian media’ and that his ‘death is more likely to be framed in an episodic manner by the Romanian media, while contextual framing will prevail in the stories covering Kim Jong II’s legacy’ (Marinescu and Balica, 2014, pp. 81-83). Empirical evidence supports a third hypothesis, according to which public reaction to articles published
about Kim Jong Il’s death is more likely to be more minimal where articles present the mythology referring to North Korea’s leaders’ (Ibid, pp. 81-83). In sum, Kim Jong Il’s death in December 2011 received a good deal of attention from the Romanian media, however it remained ‘minimally informative’ with a simple, in fact simplistic, emphasis on the ‘terrorized’ and ‘brainwashed’ nature of the North Korean people (Marinescu and Balica, 2014, p. 91).

Fumagalli’s review essay brings together the two themes of durability and authoritarian survival on the one hand, and that of societal resilience and change on the other. Despite all attempts to resist pressure from outside to adapt to a different geopolitical environment, and radically mutated economic circumstances Pyongyang has stubbornly and proudly resisted all calls. The regime’s longevity might have much to do with repression and isolation, but the policies, domestic and foreign, of the DPRK are all but irrational, this contribution shows. A logic of survival accounts for most policy choices, however misconceived they proved to be. And yet, all this notwithstanding, the country is not buried in a timeless zone. Instead North Korea is in transition. This is not a top-down process (as the elites are too preoccupied with their rent and fears for their own physical security, as well as certain retribution in case of a political opening). Instead, it is driven from below, even in a country where the population is politically apathetic and still too fearful of openly contesting the ruling elites.

At the same time, the emergence of informal markets and an important parallel economic sphere enabled by the economic flows across the Tumen River is sowing the seeds for an emergence of capitalism from below. The flow of goods is bringing with it new possibilities for ordinary North Koreans to know more about the outside world. Is economic change bringing about value change? It is too soon to tell, Fumagalli concludes, but domestic surveillance faces critical challenges as the information environment crumbles. The impression is that of a country in transition. This transition, Fumagalli notes, lies at stark odds with the change expected, even hoped for, from outside of the country. North Korea is changing, but the path the country takes continues to surprise observers and contradict expectations.

In conclusion, North Korea is currently subject to tremendous and potentially wide-ranging pressures. Economically unsustainable and politically obsessed with mere survival, the country stands at the crossroads. Yet we do not know which path it will eventually follow, as transitions and policies in the country have too often taken unexpected turns. Knowing more about this country necessitates, as the various contributions have shown, a rather eclectic and multidisciplinary effort.

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References


This paper will address the problems in conflict resolution and peace-building in Korean Peninsula. Peace building in the Korean Peninsula has been exceptionally difficult because concerned actors could not find feasible solutions to the complex problems surrounding conflict resolution and peace building in Korean Peninsula such as North Korean nuclear issues, inter-Korean confrontation, and the rising competition of hegemony in East Asia between the U.S. and China. This paper explores feasible solutions for inter-Korean conflicts and peace building in Korean Peninsula with an eclectic approach. Existing theories have focused on “exceptionalism” and “impossibilism” in resolving inter-Korean conflicts and building peace in Korean Peninsula. First, they have discussed exceptional durability and survivability of North Korean regime despite many serious hardships. Second, they have explained why conflict resolution and peace building had been exceptionally difficult despite more favorable international security landscape in post-Cold War era, focusing on policies of the U.S., China, and South Korea toward North Korea and inter-Korean peace. Using an eclectic approach I will, first, analyze why existing theories can neither explain Korean exceptionalism nor provide feasible solutions for inter-Korean conflicts and peace-building. Then, I will explore “possible” solution for “impossible” inter-Korean conflict resolutions and peace building in Korean Peninsula. Analytical eclectic approach” tries to overcome “impossibilism,” to identify what is possible under complex local circumstances, and to propose feasible solutions with problem-solving power and problem-specific research mechanism. The purpose of this paper would be expected to explore the possibility of “impossible” or “exceptionally difficult” tasks to resolve inter-Korean conflicts and to build peace in Korean Peninsula. This paper is also purported to help to design international or regional governances and institutions to assure inter-Korean peace as well as Northeast Asian regional stability.

1. Introduction: Main Puzzles

The main puzzles of this paper is why peace building in Korean Peninsula has failed to create the foundation for the reunification of the two Koreas despite the disappearance of many international and domestic barriers to peace. Since the end of Cold War in 1989, while peace has been restored elsewhere, Korean Peninsula has remained an island of internal conflicts between two divided countries and of international conflicts between major powers. In this paper, I will address the problems of conflict resolution and peace-building in Korean Peninsula. Peace building in this part of the world is exceptionally
difficult because the actors concerned have been unable to find feasible solutions to the complex problems surrounding conflict resolution and peace building in such as North Korean nuclear issues, inter-Korean confrontation, and the rising competition of hegemony in East Asia between the U.S. and China. In the post-Cold War period, inter-Korean relations have shown features strikingly different from Cross-Strait relations. Although the two Chinas have not recognized the other’s sovereignty and have very rarely talked officially, nonetheless, massive trade, exchanges, visits, investments and communications have taken place. In contrast, despite many official talks, agreements, joint declarations, summit meetings between the two Koreas, and de facto recognition of sovereignty by joining the UN simultaneously in 1991, trades, visits and exchanges have scarcely increased. To make things worse, inter-Korean exchanges have not generated functionalist “spill-over” from economic exchange to political cooperation and reconciliation. On the contrary, there has been “spill-back” to distrust, animosity, and even military confrontation as the two Koreas accumulated talks, trades and exchanges (Im and Choi, 2012). Compared with East Asian countries, peace building in the Korean Peninsula has proven particularly difficult. Vietnam and China restored peace in 1999, twenty years after the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War; India and Pakistan made positive progress toward peace through bilateral talks starting with “cricket diplomacy” in March 2011 even though they had engaged in violent war four times since 1947; and China and the ASEAN countries have tried to peaceful resolve territorial disputes over the South China Sea through talks for peace and regional community building rather than military confrontation. In many respects, then, the protracted conflicts in the Korean Peninsula prove to be the exception of failed peace building in East Asia, the most conflict-ridden region in the post-Cold War era.

It is therefore important to analyze why conflicts have persisted unresolved in the Korean Peninsula. It is necessary to elucidate the causes of this protracted, stalemated conflict. This is the purpose of the present paper. Uncovering the causes offers the possibility to find workable solutions to conflicts and thus achieve, genuine peace.

First, I discuss the exceptional persistence of the North Korean totalitarian regime. Second I explain why conflict resolution and peace building have been exceptionally difficult despite a more favorable international security landscape in the post-Cold War era, focusing on failed policies of the U.S. and South Korea toward North Korea. Third, I analyze why existing theories can neither explain Korean exceptionalism nor suggest feasible solutions for inter-Korean conflicts and peace-building. Finally, I explore feasible solutions for inter-Korean conflicts and peace building using an alternative "eclectic approach".

2. The persistence of the North Korean Dictatorship

The ‘North Korean question’ not only remains unresolved but also has become the most important source of instability in Korean Peninsula as well as in Northeast Asia in the aftermath of the sinking of the Cheonan Ship, the artillery strike on Yeonpyeong Island, and the missile launch, and nuclear tests by North Korea. Since the end of the Korean War various unsuccessful attempts have been made to end North-South military confrontation and to restore peace.

Since the socialist dictatorships in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
collapsed peacefully by themselves between 1989 and 1991, optimistic theories of the “imminent collapse of the North Korean dictatorship” prevailed among academics and policy circles. However, since 1989 the North Korean regime has shown exceptional persistence. The regime has lasted 65 years, surviving despite the post-modern SNS (social network service) revolution, a global wave of democratization, mass famine, security vulnerability, and a succession crisis.

Even though the “Arab Spring” of 2011 showed that neo-patrimonial dictatorships in Islamic North Africa and Middle East were no longer immune to democratization, the scent of the “Jasmine Revolution” did not reach North Korea and there was no “Pyongyang Spring” (Shirky, 2011; Khouri, 2011; Zinin, 2011). Since the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia North Korean authorities have tightened control over the use of internet. As Chinese authorities overreacted to the threat of another “Jasmine Revolution” with harsh intimidation, repression and immediate arrests, North Korea responded to any civil protest with even harsher repression.

Demonstrators in the Arab Spring brought about the democratization of pre-modern patrimonial dictatorships with the use of post-modern social media in organizing, mobilizing, and communicating among demonstrators in the face of repression. By combining modern offline demonstrations and post-modern online communication devices, demonstrators ended the immunity of pre-modern neo-patrimonial dictatorship to the spread of democracy from other relatively modernized countries (Snyder, 2004; Howard, 2011; Haisam, 2011).

Surviving non-democratic regimes in other regions, alarmed at the failure of Arab regime’s immunity to the waves of democratization, tightened control over the internet and social media. China banned the term, “Jasmine Revolution” while Iran made a blacklist of websites. In the two countries, 34 journalists were sent to prison in the last year, the highest figure in history. North Korean neo-patrimonial socialist dictators, too, prevented the postmodern wave of SNS-mediated democratization from reaching North Korea.

First, North Korea has proved in reverse the hypothesis that "the more developed SNS and social media are, the more likely postmodern democratizations are to take place in neo-patrimonial socialist dictatorships." SNS and social media in North Korea are too under developed to make the regime vulnerable to SNS-mediated democratization movements. In contrast, the hypothesis was disproven in socialist China where the internet and SNS are relatively well developed. As the wave of the Arab Spring spread to East Asia, a group of people tried to replicate a “Jasmine Revolution” in China using SNS and social media, but the police immediately cracked down on the movement. Therefore, taking the North Korean and Chinese cases together, we can infer that postmodern SNS-mediated democratization not only relies on the development of the internet and social media, but is hindered by the bureaucratic and coercive capability of neo-patrimonial dictatorships to clamp down on democratization movements.

Second, the exceptional persistence of the North Korean regime can be explained by the China factor. As long as China protects North Korea as a patron state because of the latter’s vital strategic value to China, the regime can survive despite crises. Since the creation of the divided state in the Korean Peninsula, the DPRK has been a key ally of Communist China as well as the main buffer state protecting it from aggression and containment by the U.S.
Third, the longevity of the North Korean dictatorship can also be explained by its ability to institutionalize dictatorship (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006; 2007). North Korean dictatorship is classified as a “neo-patrimonial dictatorship,” instead of a “patrimonial dictatorship” because it is a hybrid in which patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination are combined. It is this modern bureaucratic domination that distinguishes North Korea from traditional patrimonial dictatorships. It is also a socialist dictatorship in which the Communist Party plays a major role in ruling the country. Because it is more institutionalized than both traditional patrimonial dictatorships and neo-patrimonial dictatorships in North Africa and the Middle East, the authoritarian institutions in North Korea lengthen the dictator’s tenure, broaden his support base, and deter the threat of rebellion by orderly distribution of rents among the top ruling elites, lower echelon bureaucrats, and army officers.

Fourth, North Korean dictators have argued that the regime can survive because their success in developing nuclear weapons has protected the country both from external aggression or externally-imposed regime change and from domestic anti-regime demonstrations, and palace coup attempts. Nevertheless, this explanation turns out to be unsubstantiated if we apply their hypothesis to similar cases in other countries. In the Soviet Union, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Pakistan, nuclear weapons have rarely protected autocracies from collapse. The late Kim Jong Il justified his rationale for developing nuclear weapons by mentioning that Qaddafi’s renouncing of a nuclear program led to his ouster by the West, which reneged on his deal with Bush on “no regime change in exchange of turning away from WMD program.” But Qaddafi’s demise was in fact caused by his brutal suppression of his own people and their economic suffering, not by his abandonment of the WMD program.

Fifth, liberalism the West and South Korea have failed to explain the persistence of the North Korean regime because their predictions have been based on liberal or "modernization" assumptions about regime breakdown which argue that the economic failure of totalitarian regimes and the ensuing economic hardship of the masses lead to mass uprising and eventual regimes breakdown (Cho, 2005). The logic of the liberal theory of totalitarian regime breakdown is that the poor economic performance can induce protests which raise the costs of coercion, thus limiting coercive capacity in times of economic crisis; and, secondly that, economic hardship reduces the dictator’s ability to distribute material benefits to his allies as well as to the ordinary people. An economic crisis can thus create tensions and conflicts among ruling elites and ultimately increases the likelihood of palace coups and ruling elite-initiated rebellions. However, historically little empirical evidence has been found to support this hypothesis. Economic crises in general and mass famine and poverty in particular do not necessarily guarantee revolution or the collapse of a dictatorial regime (Gurr, 1970; Maxwell, 2012).

The North Korean case runs counter to the liberal theory of regime breakdown. Even though the North Korean people have suffered since the 1990s, and 3.5 million have died from starvation and hunger-related illnesses, the neo-patrimonial dictatorship has survived and the transfer of power from Kim Jong Il to his youngest son, Kim Jong Un had been successfully done. Hereditary power transfer is indeed a key element of the neo-patrimonial dictatorial regime. Poverty does not guarantee
regime breakdown but rather has impeded SNS-mediated popular protests and rebellions because people are too poor to buy digital communication devices or to have access to internet and social media.

3. The Failure of U.S. Policy toward North Korea

The persistence of the regime shows that the U.S. policies toward North Korea have failed with regard to deterring aggression, achieving reconciliation, crafting democratic transition, preventing nuclear arms, or even maintaining the status-quo.

When the socialist dictatorships in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union collapsed between 1989 and 1991, the newly elected democratic government of Roh Tae Woo took the diplomatic offensive towards the Soviet Union and China in the name of "Nordpolitik" to open the road to reconciliation and eventual reunification, while the U.S. maintained a passive stance. While the U.S. played an active role in brokering and instituting democracies in Latin America, Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, the Philippines and South Korea, it showed little interests in bringing peace and democracy to North Korea. Bush's foreign policy gave greater priority to the Middle East and the Gulf War, neglecting North Korea.

Nonetheless, U.S. policy shifted from defensive to offensive when Kim Il Sung announced his withdrawal from the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) and his intention to develop nuclear weapons. The Clinton administration reacted sharply to Kim Il Sung’s breach of the agreement. Former president Carter intermediated to bring the two countries to negotiating table and the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework was signed in October 1994. The key point of the Framework was North Korea's freezing of its existing plutonium enrichment program in exchange for the construction of a light water reactor by 2003 with the U.S. providing crude oil in the meantime.

After the Agreed Framework, Clinton's policy toward North Korea was known as the "Soft Landing" of North Korea in international society. Former Secretary of Defense, Dr. William Perry, reviewed U.S.-North Korean relations and the U.S. launched new negotiations in May 2000 known as the Agreed Framework Implementation Talks.

However, agreements made in the Agreed Framework were not implemented faithfully by the succeeding Bush administration. Even though George W. Bush promised to oppose the Agreed Framework during his presidential campaign, his administration, after reviewing its policy toward North Korea, decided to continue dialogue with North Korea on June 6, 2001 on the full range of issues including conventional force posture and missile programs.

From its inauguration, the Bush administration pursued a harder line towards North Korea than its predecessor. The Bush administration did not faithfully implement the agreements. The construction of light water reactors did not proceed as scheduled, and crude oil was not delivered on time. Neoconservatives were primarily acting to establish distance from the previous administration, a policy of “anything but Clinton” (ABC). They had quite a different perception from advocates of Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine policy, who saw the erratic and hostile behavior of North Korea as stemming from its sense of insecurity, and believed that engagement should be directed at soothing its perception of the U.S. threat. On the contrary, the neoconservatives argued that engagement with North Korea could do
nothing but extend Kim Jong Il’s dictatorship, and that the regime was basically incompatible with Western values; thus it would never give up its hostility toward the U.S. even in exchange for guarantees of its survival. According to the neoconservatives, removing Kim Jong Il and his cronies is the only lasting solution. They called for intensified diplomatic pressure focusing on military and human rights issues, ending foreign subsidies, including the U.S. supply of crude oil that was part of Agreed Framework, encouraging the exodus of people from North Korea, encouraging anti-regime within the country, and intensifying deterrence against military threats.

After September 11, 2001, Bush’s policy toward North Korea changed from "soft landing" to "hard landing" (Cha, 2002). Bush chose the strengthened unilateralism of the neoconservatives over Colin Powell’s defensive realist policies. Accordingly, the relationship between U.S. and North Korea deteriorated rapidly. In his State of the Union address in 2002 Bush included North Korea as one of the "Axis of Evil" countries. A hawkish containment policy was implemented after the revelation of a new North Korean nuclear program. When direct dialogue resumed, U.S. representative James Kelly disclosed the existence of a uranium enrichment program and the U.S. denounced North Korea for its violation of the Agreed Framework, demanding the complete dismantling, of the program. When Kim Jong Il refused, the U.S. retaliated by suspending shipment of oil.

The neoconservatives could not always carry through their hawkish policy toward North Korea, however. It was another paradox that Bush administration as the champion of unilateralism was the first to adopt more institutionalized multilateralism to the North Korean question. As the situation in Iraq worsened, Bush eventually turned toward dialogue with North Korea in response to pressure from South Korea, Japan, China and Russia, vowing to resolve issue diplomatically in his 2003 State of the Union Address. Since then the U.S. and South Korea have suggested multilateral talks called the Six Party Talks to resolve the nuclear issue with the help of China. The first talks were held in Beijing in August 2003, and since then six more have been held. The Six Party Talks have an historic importance as it is the first attempt at multilateralism in dealing with East Asian regional security issues.

Multilateralism emerged as a mechanism to resolve the nuclear issue because it is an “endogenous threat” to Northeast Asian security as well as to the maintenance of the Pax Americana in East Asia. It has been a stumbling block to the advancement of Northeast Asian regionalism, intensifying animosity, and distrust, threatening the peace.

However, the Six Party Talks remained little more than a “talking shop” until the fourth round, which generated multilateral solutions to North Korean question. In the fourth Six Party Talks in 13-19 September 2005, North Korea agreed to abandon its quest to become a nuclear power. The breakthrough came after a policy reversal by Bush.

In autumn 2005, the Bush administration changed its position from North Korea’s surrender of all nuclear weapons as a precondition to negotiation to engagement with North Korea in a substantive give and take. With this change of posture, the fourth round Six Party Talks resumed and created a six-point Joint Statement on 19 September 2005. This breakthrough agreement included 1) a
verifiable and peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; 2) a return of North Korea to the NPT and IAEA inspection regime; 3) guarantees by the U.S. not to attack North Korea, to respect its sovereignty, and the U.S. commitment to negotiate a permanent peace regime on the peninsula; 4) the promotion of economic cooperation by six parties on bilateral and multilateral basis; 5) South Korea’s reaffirmation of providing 2 million kilowatts of electricity if North Korea abandoned its nuclear arms program; and 6) the Korean Peninsula peace treaty to be negotiated separately.

The multilateral agreement did not last long, however. Because the East Asian region has been characterized, unlike EU, by asymmetry, heterogeneity, and mutual feuds, to be effective and sustainable, multilateralism must be complemented and guaranteed by bilateral agreements between North Korea and the U.S., as the hegemonic country in East Asia.

After the breakthrough of the Joint Statement of September, 2005, the Talks soon stalled again with the U.S freezing of North Korean funds at Banca Delta Asia (BDA) and North Korea reacting by launching missiles on July 4 and 5 and testing nuclear bombs on October 9, 2006. A breakthrough was made when the U.S. agreed to meet North Korean negotiators outside Six Party Talks framework.

Aided with complementary bilateral talks between U.S. and North Korea, the fifth round of Six Party Talks in February, 2007 produced meaningful progress toward resolving the North Korean question. North Korea agreed to shut down the Yongbyon nuclear facilities, to dismantle its nuclear program, and to refrain from transferring nuclear technologies to third parties in exchange of fuel aid, the removal of North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and move towards the normalization of diplomatic relations.

However, these agreements have not been kept by North Korea and the U.S. The U.S. and South Korea initiated pressure United Nations Security Council to condemn North Korea for its failed satellite launch on April 13, 2009, North Korea responded with pulling out of Six Party Talks, resuming its high-enriched uranium (HEU) nuclear program, and expelling nuclear inspectors. Therefore the Six Party Talks have proved neither a stable nor an effective mechanism for resolving security disputes and brokering an institutionalized peace settlement.

The failure of Six Party Talks and the "benign neglect" of North Korea by the U.S., which concentrated its efforts on Middle East, led North Korea to provocative action to gain the attention of the U.S. In August 2008, it seemed to resume its nuclear activities and conducted a second nuclear test on May 25, 2009. Inter-Korean hostilities resurged due to the military provocations of the North, including the sinking of South Korean naval ship Cheonan in May 2011 and the artillery attack on Yeonpyung Island. Since then U.S.-North Korea relations further deteriorated when the latter conducted the third nuclear test in February, 2013 during the power transition from Lee Myung-bak to Park Geun Hye.

Now U.S.-North Korea relations are at their nadir since 9/11. Relations during the Obama administration are worse than in the Bush administration after 9/11. Despite many opportunities, the Obama administration did not respond effectively by transforming threats, intimidations, and internal instability caused by power succession into opportunities for building peace.
4. China’s Strategy of Maintaining the Status Quo: Defensive Realism

The events of 9/11 revived the idea of the “Great Crescent” of Dean Acheson, the warrior of Cold War. The U.S. did not create a brand new order in East Asia but remodeled the old order under changing circumstances. Basically the U.S. perceives Northeast Asia as the region with the most potentiality of large scale military conflicts, maintaining the capability to intervene militarily in the region with U.S.-Japan alliance as the central force. Growing Chinese military power may reinforce the perceived need to strengthen alliances with Japan, the Philippines, Australia and South Korea (Lampton, 2004).

In response to America’s containment policy, China has tried to check the expansionist policy of the U.S. China set up the main objectives of security policy to prevent the independence of Taiwan, blocking the build-up of MD, maintaining the stability of Korean Peninsula, dealing with disputes in East and South China Sea, protecting Chinese interests through bilateral and multilateral institutions, preventing Japanese military build-up, and securing military supremacy in Northeast Asia. To achieve these policies, China strengthens its friendly relationship with great powers, modernizes its armed forces, actively participates in multilateral security forums and adopts active military defense strategy.

However, since 9/11, China has tried to improve its relationship with the U.S. by cooperating and supporting the Bush administration’s war on terrorists. In response to Chinese cooperation, Bush stated that China should no longer be as an adversary and sought a cooperative and constructive relationship. China, in return, obtained the Bush administration’s consent to add Uigur Islamic movements in Xinjiang to the list of terrorists. This change in the Sino-American relationship reflected the need for both slides to cooperate on terrorism after 9/11. China needed to respond to domestic threats from secessionists and, anti-regime dissidents, while the U.S. was worried about the after-effects of China’s opposition to the war on terror. Yet the conflict structure with regard to the independence of Taiwan, MD, and competition in ASEAN market still remains intact. Thus we cannot exclude a possibility of the clash between the U.S. containment of China and Chinese expansionism for active defense.

In the post-Cold War era China has been pursuing a two-Koreas strategy through which it maximizes economic and diplomatic profits from South Korea by preserving the division of Korean peninsula and using North Korea as leverage. In addition, it uses North Korea as a shield against the potential expansionism of the U.S. It also tries to check the massive inflow of refugees from North Korea into Manchuria and worries about the instability in Manchuria caused by potential Korean nationalism and the separatist movement of Korean-Chinese and North Korean refugees in Manchuria. Thus it certainly has interests in the ongoing tensions and in maintaining a divided Korea. While in the short term it is in China’s, interests to resolve peacefully the North Korean nuclear issue, in the long run it has, conflicting interests with South Korea, which has also ambitions to be a hub state in the region by unifying Korea.

China’s strategic interests in Korean Peninsula go back more than a thousand years. Many great Chinese strategists since the Sung Dynasty called the relationship between the two countries “lips and the teeth” (脣亡齒寒) with the implication that
“when lips are gone, the teeth feel sensitive and cold.” Mao Zedong explained the mass dispatch troops to North Korea during Korean War, with the same logic. The strategic value of North Korea has risen as China becomes one of G2; hegemonic competition in the security area between the U.S. and China intensifies, as the U.S. strengthens its containment policy toward China. North Korea’s rising strategic value to China is the regime’s most powerful weapon.

For this reasons, China has not sought to change the security landscape in East Asia since the end of Korean War. This explains why China has consistently pursued maintaining stability and the status-quo in Korean Peninsula and has been reluctant in seeking solutions to North Korean question despite hosting the Six Party Talks. Currently it strongly opposes North Korea's nuclear test and supports UN Security Council's sanctions against its military provocations. Nonetheless, China's state-run Global Times also claims it "should be resolute in maintaining the independence of North Korea, protect the country's transition of power from external interference, and ensure its freedom to choose its own path." (The Global Times, 2011 cited in Shin, 2013).

5. Inconsistent South Korean Policies toward North Korea

South Korea has not been consistent in its policy toward North Korea. While this inconsistency was partly caused by ideological differences of different governments with regard to North Korea, it was mainly generated by misperceptions. While North Korea has been unchanged, the South’s policy toward it has been changed from hawkish under Kim Young Sam’s presidency, based on the premise of sudden collapse of North Korean dictatorship after the end of the Cold War through the “Sunshine Policy” and soft-landing under Kim Dae Jung’s presidency, based on the premise of modernization theory while the functionalist integration theory, while the current Lee Myung-bak government has returned to a hawkish policy cutting economic aid, prohibiting tourist visit to Keumkang Mountain and increasing military pressure through joint military exercises with the U.S. It has become clear that the stop-go policies of South Korean governments are due to misperceptions about the true face of North Korea, thus the outcome of the present research offers the opportunity to help the South Korean government to enable to see the true face of North Korea and implement better policies with regard to its democratization, as well as stopping its nuclear program and, creating an inter-Korean economic community of 70 million population that can compete with Japan in terms of size.

5.1. Roh Tae Woo's Nordpolitik: Inter-Governmentalism

After the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Kim Il Sung faced a serious security dilemma. He thus made concessions to South Korea by agreeing to be jointly admitted to the U.N. in September 1991 and signed the Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchange and Cooperation with the Roh Tae Woo government. On December 31, of the same year. The Agreement went into effect on February 19, 1992, along with the Joint

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1 Many parts of this chapter are the revision and complement of Im and Choi, 2011.
Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. North Korea thus preferred to secure peace and survival as an independent political entity when it no longer had power to absorb South Korea by force.

Kim Jong II, the son and successor of Kim Il Sung, adopted his father’s confederal approach to unification. After the Basic Agreement in 1991, he proposed the North-South confederation, while South Korea aimed at eventually building a loosely unified Korea named the “Korean Commonwealth,” similar in structure to the British Commonwealth. This would mean that the two Koreas agreed basically on the form of the unified state as loosely confederal.

5.2. Kim Dae Jung’s “Sunshine Policy”: Unconditional Engagement and Blossoming of (Neo)-Functionalism

The agreement on the form of a unified state was confirmed at the Inter-Korean Summit on June 15, 2000. The two leaders jointly declared a five-clause agreement; the second clause acknowledging the common elements of the unification policies in the South’s proposal for a confederation and the North’s for a loose federation. The remaining clauses contained functionalist elements. After the June 15 summit, North-South talks were activated at various levels. The two Koreas agreed to connect roads and railroads that were cut off during the War; separated families met for the first time since the division; top military officers met to reduce border tension; an agreement was made guaranteeing the safety of investments from South Korean businessmen and preventing double taxation; and South Korean firms started to produce non-durable consumer goods at the Gaesung Industrial Complex located just seven kilometers from the demilitarized zone and 60 kilometers from Seoul (Im, 2006, p. 175).

The Inter-Korean summit was the outcome of functionalist spillover because accumulated exchanges and mutual confidence building enabled the two leaders to move towards and eventual unification. It was also the real start of neo-functionalism because, after the summit, the two sides signed institutional agreements, began dialogue, and set up joint organizations.

Kim Dae Jung promoted unconditional economic engagement with the North in order to encourage internal political change in a closed and opaque society (Kahler and Kastner, 2006, p. 528). After the summit, the Kim Dae Jung government made diplomatic efforts to elicit cooperation from allies, notably the United States, Japan, China and Russia. The support of South Korea’s patron state, the United States, was the key to the success of the Sunshine Policy. Kim Dae Jung’s bid for cooperation was not difficult because the Clinton administration’s strategy of a soft landing for the North Korean regime shared many similarities with Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy (Im, 2006).

5.3. Roh Moo Hyun’s Neo-functionalism collides with Bush’s Offensive Realism

The neoconservatives in the Bush administration, however, had a quite different perception of North Korea from the advocates of the Sunshine Policy. The latter saw the erratic and hostile behavior of North Korea as stemming from its sense of insecurity and believed that engagement would help to reduce its perception of
threat and vulnerability. On the contrary, neoconservatives argued that engagement with North Korea would do nothing but extend Kim Jong Il’s dictatorship and asserted that the North Korean regime was basically incompatible with the Western values and would never give up its hostility in exchange for its survival. According to neoconservatives, the option of removing Kim Jong Il and his cronies was the only lasting solution to end the North Korean threat.

Soon after North Korean officials revealed to U.S. Representative for North Korean Nuclear Issues James Kelly its uranium enrichment program in October 2002, the Bush administration stopped providing heavy fuel oil to North Korea, seized a North Korean ship that tried to deliver missiles to Yemen on December 12, 2002, and redeployed U.S. forces in Korea forward.

However, neoconservatives could not always carry through their hawkish policy toward North Korea. In response to the worsening situation in Iraq and pressure from South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia for talks to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis, President Bush turned toward dialogue with North Korea. President Bush made public his intention to resolve the North Korean issue diplomatically in his 2003 State of the Union Address. After the State of Union Address, the United States and South Korea suggested multilateral talks to resolve North Korean nuclear issues. The first Six Party Talks (United States, South and North Korea, China, Japan, and Russia) were held in Beijing in August 2003. The Six Party Talks have historic importance because they were the first test of multilateralism in dealing with East Asian regional security issues.

The Bush administration, in its second term, emphasized the diplomatic approach to resolve North Korean nuclear issues. The constructive outcome of bilateral talks between North Korea and the United States showed the existence of an implicit consensus between the two parties that the United States should not allow North Korea to develop and possess nuclear arms, but keep the resort to a military solution as the last option; this view was also shared by the Roh Moo Hyun government.

In the fall of 2005, the Bush administration changed its position from North Korea’s surrender of all nuclear weapons as a precondition to hold negotiations to engagement with North Korea in substantive give and take negotiations. With the change in the U.S. position, the fourth round of Six Party Talks resumed and created a six-point joint statement that produced a breakthrough in the long-stalled process. The joint statement included the following principles: 1) a verifiable and peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; 2) a return of North Korea to the NPT and IAEA inspection regime; 3) guarantees by the United States not to attack North Korea, a respect for sovereignty, and the commitment to negotiate a permanent peace regime on the peninsula; and 4) promotion of economic cooperation by the six parties on bilateral and multilateral basis, etc.

5.4. Lee Myung-bak's Conditional Engagement and Disengagement: Offensive Realism

The functionalist and neo-functionalist approach of the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun governments was not extended in the conservative Lee Myung-bak government. The nuclear test carried out by North Korea on Oct, 9, 2006 helped ensure Lee Myung-bak’s election by a landslide majority. Popular anxiety at the test
favored a strong leader who would take a firm stance toward provocations. The change in popular perception toward North Korea made Lee Myung-bak the frontrunner and the final winner in the election of December 2007.

The Lee government believed that the functionalist approach of the Kim and Roh governments had failed to overcome the security dilemmas the country had been facing. They have thus strengthened the alliance with the U.S., which had been playing a key role in “external” balancing vis-à-vis North Korea, and emphasized denuclearization as a prerequisite of resuming economic cooperation. The Lee government intensified its conditional engagement policy as Kim Jong Il responded with repeated misbehaviors and persisted with nuclear developments. The mutual confidence built between two Koreas under previous governments was depleted fast and Lee government imposed stricter sanctions.

Lee’s policy was based on his “Vision 3000: Denuclearization and Openness” campaign promise in 2007, in which he proposed that South Korea would help the North improve its per capita income up to $3,000 within the next 10 years if it gave up its nuclear weapons program and opened its economy (Jung and Rector, 2009); denuclearization was included in the key preconditions for engagement.

The new policy is a fundamental break with Lee’s predecessors’ friendly and unconditional engagement with North Korea. Methodologically, it marks the end of the functionalist and neo-functionalist approaches to reunification and a return to Cold War realism.

Lee’s “Vision 3000” proposal was rejected by North Korea, which saw it as a pro-United States and anti-unification declaration (Jung and Rector, 2009). As a consequence, the North and South talks halted. Mount Kumgang was closed to South Korean tourists. Even the possibility of closing the Gaesung Industrial Complex was discussed among specialists on North Korea. Inter-Korean relations deteriorated even further after the Cheonan incident and artillery strikes on Yeonpyeong Island in March and November 2010 respectively. After the sinking of the Cheonan, Lee’s conditional engagement shifted to harder line policy of disengagement, and turned “the clock of reunification” back to the Cold War era.

In short, the failure of the Sunshine Policy was regarded as a failure of functionalism. Functionalism can develop into neo-functionalism only by institutionalizing economic and social exchanges and cooperation through political package deals and building organizations for functionalist exchanges. The Basic Agreement in 1991 and the two summit meetings in 2000 and 2007 were critical moments to move forward from functionalism to neo-functionalism. However, since the inauguration of Lee Myung-bak, no progress has been made in functionalist exchanges and cooperation and neo-functionalist political package deal between the two Koreas. Instead, Cold War realism has been revived

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2 Pape argues that states can cope with expansionist threats of rival states “through either ‘internal’ balancing (i.e., rearmament or accelerated economic growth to support eventual rearmament) or ‘external’ balancing (i.e., organization of counterbalancing alliances)” (Pape, 2005, p. 15).

3 Kahler and Kastner have argued that the functionalist Sunshine Policy proposed and implemented by Kim Dae Jung failed because, first, “the North Korean government was not a passive target of South Korean strategies, […] but did its best to extract the maximum economic benefit from economic exchange with the least amount of political change,” and, second, “coordination with allies and other potential economic partners of the North was difficult to achieve” (see Kahler and Kastner, 2006, pp. 532-533).
dominating the Lee government’s policy. There are several factors that can explain this turn in inter-Korean relations.

First, functionalism failed mainly because functionalist exchanges and cooperation under the Kim and Roh presidencies generated very few positive and tangible spill-overs to political cooperation and reconciliation, instead, bringing spill-backs of deepening mutual distrust and even military confrontation.

Second, Kim Jong Il was the key figure responsible for the failure of inter-Korean functionalism. He never really accepted functionalist integration but exploited it opportunistically. He gathered money from Kumgang Mountain tourists and Korean businessmen in Gaesung Industrial Complex. Nonetheless, whenever it was necessary for his regime’s security and survival, he provoked militarily for domestic as well as external consumption, such as the sinking of Cheonan and the shelling at Yeonpyeong Island, continuing the development of a nuclear bomb. In response, the Lee government denounced Kim Jong Il repeatedly for breaking agreements and promises.

Third, the vulnerability of the North Korean regime has hindered the success of functionalist approach. Kim Jong Il’s “Military First policy” (先軍政治) has two objectives. The first is to intimidate the North Korean people and protect the unstable regime from popular uprising and palace coups. The second is the escape from the security dilemma by “internal” balancing through military build-up and nuclear arms development. Therefore, on the North Korean side too, realism has prevailed over functionalism and neo-functionalism.

Fourth, both Lee Myung-bak and George W. Bush were responsible for ‘spill-back’ rather than ‘spill-over’ of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation. Although mutual trust building had proceeded consistently among Clinton administration and Kim and Roh governments, the succeeding Bush administration and Lee government discarded their predecessors’ engagement policies toward North Korea and instead adopted a hard line of “hawkish” and conditional engagement. Lee and Bush’s break with their predecessors’ made Kim Jong Il withdraw his trust and respond with military provocations. As a consequence, inter-Korean relations reached a nadir since the Basic Agreement in 1991 and spilled-back to the distrust, hatred, and military confrontation of the Cold War.

The security landscape around Korean Peninsula is now precarious, fragile, and thus dangerous. The entry of a U.S. nuclear aircraft carrier into the West Sea (Yellow Sea) for the first time threatened not only North Korea but also China. Moreover, the discussion of Korean-Japanese military cooperation raises Chinese and Russian concerns that it could be the first step toward a trilateral alliance between the U.S., Japan and South Korea.

Therefore, at present the return to realism under Lee Myung-bak has clearly increased rather than reduced the security dilemma by escalating military tension between two Koreas as well as in Northeast Asia. While NATO (No Actions, Talks Only) led Korean leaders back to realism, realism has in fact deteriorated inter-Korean relations and deepened the security dilemmas it tried to solve.

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4 For the notion of “internal balancing” (see Pape, 2005, p. 15).
6. Contending Perspectives on Korean Security and Peace

6.1. Realism: Defensive and Offensive Realism

After World War II, the realist paradigm prevailed in the field of international politics and provided basic assumptions and insights for analysis. This paradigm has several characteristics: First, international societies are under anarchy, and states pursue power and securities naturally while competing or building feuds each other, which prevents them from cooperating despite common interests. In this sense, states fall into a “security dilemma” in which they aim at expanding power for their own security. This, however, leads to the increase of power of other countries, and, as a result, the situation becomes more unstable, contrary to the original intention of the expansion of power; second, realism is the most state-centric paradigm in which the state is assumed to be unitary, rational, and even omniscient. Finally, power is the effective tool for policy making and policy implementation.

Realism has predominated in explaining the inter-Korean conflict with the concepts of the security dilemma, external and internal balancing, and “bandwagoning” to the hegemon in the Cold War years. Nevertheless, realism did not foresee intermittent talks between two Koreas despite opposition from the hegemon country, the U.S. that wished the regional status quo to be sustained. Realism proved a poor predictor of the agreements, summit meetings, and pacts between North and South Korea after the collapse of the socialist dictatorships in Eastern Europe and Russia. It could not explain inter-Korean and multilateral talks such as Basic Agreement in 1991, multilateral Agreed Framework in Geneva in April 1994, two summit meeting in 2000 and 2007, and multilateral Six Party Talks despite the advent and deepening economic hardships and massive famine in North Korea.

Even though Clinton and Bush shared basically realist perception about international society, their perception of North Korea was fundamentally different. The Bush administration considered it an irrational, and aggressive expansionist state with which the U.S. was unable to negotiate, and thus adopted a hawkish policy. In contrast, the Clinton administration did not view North Korea as unpredictable revisionist state and understood its bad behaviors through its security fears and dilemma, and thus engaging in negotiations to resolve its threats and provocations (Hwang, 2004).

The perception gap between the Bush and Clinton administrations resulted in two different approaches: "offensive realism" (Mearsheimer, Schweller, Labs) and "defensive realism" (Jervis, Glaser, Van Evera). Offensive realists argue that international anarchy causes states to maximize power because it is the best way to maximize security. Defensive realists, in contrast, contend that the best way to maximize security under anarchy is to preserve the status quo.

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5 Many parts of this chapter are the revision and complement of Im and Choi, 2010.
6 Contrary to offensive realists, David S. Maxwell argues that North Korea's Kim family regime is very "rational" in the sense that it knows what it wants and works tirelessly to achieve it. It knows that the survival of the Kim family regime as the vital national interests, and the reunification of two Koreas under the control of DPRK would ensure long-term survival of the regime by getting U.S. forces off the Peninsula and international recognition of North Korea as a nuclear power (Maxwell, 2012).
6.2. Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism

Functionalism was the mainstream theory in the post-War Europe explaining regional integration. It emphasizes international activities in non-political areas such as economy, society, and culture, and attempts to change the way to maintain peace. Mitrany emphasized an indirect way to achieve political integration through cooperation in non-political, functional areas by establishing of functional international organizations (Mitrany, 1975). Park (2008) explains that functionalism is a formula for political integration through increasing and strengthening cooperation in nonpolitical areas at low level.

But functionalism has several problems. First, because it is possible to separate technical from political issues, it could be somewhat naïve to subordinate political affairs to technical matters. Second, although functionalism is often presented as a universal, non-political approach to regional integration, it is in fact based on liberal utilitarian political values. Therefore, its merits are limited to those parts of the world that share welfarist values. If cultures and governments are not infused with similar values, they cannot be drawn into the functionalist web of integration simply on the basis of their alleged benefits. Third, functionalism is based on an optimistic view that the benefits of technical cooperation will generate ‘spill over’ effects in other issue-areas (Griffiths, O’Callaghan and Roach, 2008, p. 119).

Neo-functionalism developed out of functionalism and became widespread in the 1960s and 1970s. It is a more moderate conceptual tool with regard to the effects of functional cooperation, more explicit on how spill-overs will occur, and acknowledges the problem of separating issue areas. Unlike Mitrany, Haas recognized potential problems in functionalism with regard to the distribution of gains from collaboration, where unequal gains would risk leading to conflicts and would be difficult to separate technical from political issues. Consequently, it is important to establish formal institutions that can impose and uphold agreements made by state. Such bodies have to enjoy some autonomy from national governments if they are to be effective, and the whole process cannot work unless states accept both the rule of law and the principle of majoritarian decision making (Griffiths, O’Callaghan and Roach, 2008, p.120). Unlike functionalism which considers private and non-political groups as main actors, neo-functionalism regards political and bureaucratic groups as main actors. Neo-functionalism insists that political groups are not simply technical experts but act as a bridge between technical integration and political integration. Yet, their political choice is based on benefits and they are pursuing practical benefits over justification. Neo-functionalism is “functional” in the sense that it depends not only on formal organizational integration method, but also on functional integration actions. Nonetheless, it is very federal in the sense that it has and pursues the goal of institutional integration, in which the state is the core actor.

In conclusion, despite distinct differences between functionalism and neo-functionalism, they share a fundamental assumption on the role of “spill-over,” assuming that sectoral integration of the economy will necessarily lead to the

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7 It is the collection of autobiographical and scholarly writings of David Mitrany's some previously published on functionalism.
integration of other economic and political activities. In this respect, if the integration is recognized as public bads, not as public goods, actors would likely cancel their commitment of bilateral cooperation and return to former circumstances of disassociation. The spill-over is just one possible result of (neo)-functionalist exchanges, cooperation, and political deals, the possibility of the spill-back always exists (Schmitter, 1970; Im, 1992).

Functionalism and neo-functionalism blossomed for 10 years since progressive Kim Dae Jung took over power in 1997. However, the conservative Lee Myung-bak government returned to realism, emphasizing the security dilemma and external balancing by strengthening U.S.-Korea alliance, and refusing talks with North Korea unless it gave way to the South’s demands for denuclearization and economic opening up. Thus, the premise of “spill-over” in liberalism in general and (neo)-functionalism in particular in inter-Korean relations was not realized. The increasing talks, economic exchange and cooperation, visits of separated families did not spill over to political and security talks and cooperation, but instead led to a “spill-back;” the accumulation of exchanges and talks generated mutual distrust, hatred, betrayal of promises, and animosity, contrary to functionalist premises.

6.3. Constructivism

In the 1980s, constructivism became a core approach to regional integration. Constructivism insists that actors can change their preferences by learning new norms and value systems and building new identities through the socialization process and learning. The core of the constructivist approach emphasizes the significance of ideology, norm and identity as opposed to material elements. In this respect, constructivism is helpful in describing international political phenomena which are not explained by distribution of power or existing of material benefits.

Wendt, who is a representative scholar of constructivism, considered the structure of international system as a social structure which, in turn, is a product of social relations (Wendt, 1992). Such a social structure is composed of material resources, shared knowledge, and practices, of which constructivism regards shared knowledge as the most important element. For example, supposed that a security community is organized by shared knowledge, that such a knowledge is a result of ideas of states and has an effect on actions of states; then states trust each other in resolving conflict. In other words, constructivism, assuming that the structure of international system depends on ideological forces rather than material forces, also argues that the identity and interest of actors are socially composed shared ideology, not given transcendentally. In this context, constructivism posits that the members of group constantly change their roles and values through discourse with each other. Thereby social law is changed, and by extension, social changes occur. Thus, unchanged laws do not exist, change constantly through the discourse.

Constructivism is a suitable approach for understanding the relative peace in the Southeast Asian region. The focus of most constructivist studies has been on the creation and development of the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) and ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum); at the same time, it underlines the ideal of a regional identity and the ASEAN-way. Regional identity seemed to be created and reinforced by the socialization process between government leaders and regional elites through Track-Two diplomacy, and other inter-personal interactions that have
been going on since ASEAN’s foundation in 1967. Constructivists consider this socialization process very important for regional community building and for the institutionalization of peaceful interactions among the ASEAN members. Consequently, regional community building is considered as regional identity building (Acharya, 1991).

Constructivism has been rarely applied in the resolution of inter-Korean conflicts and peace building in the Korean Peninsula. Besides studies on constructing a regional identity with “ASEAN-way,” few applied constructivism to Northeast Asia. In the case of the two Koreas, however, constructivism will become very important concept in analyzing “nation-destroying” and the loss of a homogenous national identity after the national division in 1948, and in exploring the rebuilding of Korean nation through the process of peace building and national reunification.

7. Alternative Approach: Analytical Eclecticism

The existing literatures have limited explanatory power because they are partial theories to explain partial regimes with regard to conflict resolution and peace building in Korean Peninsula. Therefore to grasp clearer feature of Korean exceptionalism in peace and security and to prescribe proper solution for inter-Korean conflicts, the gap left by existing theories must be filled with an eclectic approach to peace and security.

The reason why I adopt an eclectic approach is because it has problem-solving power with problem-specific research mechanism. With a hybrid theoretical framework, it is possible to draw substantive findings and analyses about Korean exceptionalism with regard to conflict resolution and peace building in Korean Peninsula.

In order to explain difficult peace building in Korean Peninsula, I have to travel across the sides of triangles representing unilateralism, bilateralism and multilateralism. I offer a solution to empirical puzzles such as the infeasibility of inter-Korean peace by combined explanations built by realism, liberalism, functionalism, constructivism, inter-governmentalism, and democratic peace theory.

I adopt an eclectic approach for peace building because, first, conflict resolution and peace building in the Peninsula have been a very complex issues and processes, in which many actors have been involved including not only two Koreas, but also the global super power, the U.S., the rising G2 power, China, and Russia and Japan which have vital strategic interests in the area. These diverse actors with different interests and strategies have compounded the complexities of conflict resolution and peace building. Because of its geopolitical and geostrategic importance, the Peninsula has been the main battle ground of great powers for more than two thousand years, including the Korean Goguryeo Kingdom-Chinese Sui/Tang Empire War (AD 598, 612,645, and 662), Ming Empire-Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s Japan War (1592-1598), the Sino-Japanese War (1894), the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), and the U.S.-China War(1950-1953), all of which took place there. For maritime forces like Japan and the U.S. it is the key bridge to continental mainland China and Russia, and for continental powers like China and Russia, it has been regarded as a gateway to and a launching board to advance toward the
Japanese archipelago and the Pacific maritime powers. That is why a prominent Meiji leader, Yamagata Arimoto (山縣有朋) in 1890 called Korea “a dagger aimed at the heart of Japan”.

Analytical eclecticism does not privilege any one type of combinatorial formula or seek to build a unified theory encompassing each and every variable identified in competing research traditions. According to Katzenstein and Sil (2004, pp. 16-20), analytical eclecticism detaches explanatory sketches from the competing meta-theories and offers an opportunity to draw upon clusters of empirical observations. Eclecticism is distinguished simply by the articulation of more complex problematiques that emphasize connections between outcomes stipulated in puzzles investigated in different research traditions, and by the construction of explanatory sketches that incorporate data, interpretations and casual logics from at least two distinct traditions.

Analytical eclecticism regards existing research traditions fluidly and is willing to borrow selectively from each to construct accounts that travel across the sides of the triangles representing bilateralism, multilateralism, and unilateralism. 8

While traditional specific analytical approaches have “particular ontological and epistemological assumptions,” they “implicitly or explicitly focus attention on certain types of mechanisms while ignoring or defining away others. Analytical eclecticism, by contrast, offers complex causal stories that incorporate different types of mechanisms as defined and used in diverse research traditions. That is, rather than privilege any specific conception of causal mechanism, analytical eclecticism seeks to trace the problem-specific interactions among a wide range of mechanisms operating within or across different domains and levels of social reality” (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010, p. 419).

The most important advantage of analytical eclecticism is to cast into question some of the basic presuppositions of different explanatory sketches (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1998; Kawasaki, 1999; Midford, 2002, pp. 11-16). Therefore, analytical eclecticism tries to cope strategically with the existing scholarly debate in a field in which competing perspectives may be reasonably identified as discrete research traditions. It explores new combinations of assumptions, concepts, interpretations, and methods embedded in explanatory sketches generated by competing research traditions.

What, then, are the virtues of analytical eclecticism in finding solutions to the North Korean question? First, the question is a very complex phenomenon in which diverse actors have been involved domestically as well as internationally. Second, while power politics predominated (“Power over Plenty” in Katzenstein’s words), economic interests (famine, food aid, economic development etc.) and identity politics (North Koreans’ nationalistic hatred of “American imperialists,” competing nationalisms among Korea, China, and Japan) have made very difficult to solve the question through the exclusively realist mechanism that has been the dominant paradigm in international relations. Third, bilateralism predominated in the security landscape in Northeast Asia until the end of the Cold War in 1991. Since then, while

8 Nonetheless, Katzenstein and Okawara have actually tried to solve many empirical puzzles by wisdoms and insights from combined explanations built by realism, liberalism, and constructivism. Even though they discuss the eclecticism of bilateralism and multilateralism, it is not their main focal point of analytical eclecticism (Katzenstein and Okawara, 2001/02, pp. 158-166).
bilateralism has declined as the hegemonic mechanism that governed security politics in Northeast Asia, it did not die out but remained a strong managing mechanism of power politics in Northeast Asia and was even resurrected splendidly after 9/11 which gave most countries in Northeast Asia so called “security dilemmas” and pressed to strengthen bilateral alliances with the U.S. Allies feared more the risks of “abandonment” by the U.S. than that of “entrapment” (Cha, 2000, pp. 261-291).

Multilateralism in East Asian regional economy has blossomed since the rise of Japan as a global economic power house in the 1970s and the opening of China to the world by Deng Shao Ping. Thus, since the 1980s, supranational regionalism or a regional community emerged, and East Asian regionalism was accelerated by the end of Cold War, the spread of globalization and the IT revolution in East Asia. The future prospects for East Asian regionalism in economic sense are bright as the core of the global economy has shifted from the Trans-Atlantic world to the Asia-Pacific world.

In contrast, multilateralism in the area of the Northeast Asian regional security community lagged far behind East the Asian regional economic community. Nevertheless, the North Korean question paradoxically gave Northeast Asian countries and the U.S. opportunities to explore multilateralism in the security area. When the first nuclear crisis broke out due to nuclear development and withdrawal from the NPT by North Korea concerned actors (the U.S., South Korea, Japan, Russia, China, and EU) found a multilateral solution in Agreed Framework in Geneva in 1994 and after 9/11. When North Korea directly challenged Bush’s unilateralism with the resumption of nuclear development, the U.S. China, South and North Korea, Japan, and Russia found more institutionalized multilateralism to get out of the impasse between the U.S. and North Korea regarding nuclear development, via the “Six Party Talks.”

Therefore, the current security landscape in Northeast Asia is characterized what Gramsci called “the old is dying, the new cannot be born” (Gramsci, 1971). Bilateralism based on the U.S.-built “hub and spokes system” in East Asia dominated the security landscape in East Asia until the end of the Cold War and the rise of China, but has ceased to be the single dominant security mechanism in East Asia. Multilateralism emerged in the East Asian regional economy, and then spread out to regional security area by the “hammer” of North Korean nuclear development. Northeast Asian countries, including the U.S., discovered the virtues of multilateralism as alternative framework for resolving the security dilemma generated by North Korean nuclear development when the existing bilateralism proved ineffective in resolving the issue.

Multilateralism has not yet, however, produced tangible, feasible, and sustainable solutions to the North Korean question. The agreed Framework and KEDO stopped working when North Korea reactivated the Yongbyun nuclear reactors and disclosed to Special Envoy Kelly that they already developed high-enriched uranium in reaction to Bush’s unilateral pressure for “regime change.” The bilateral confrontation between the U.S. and North Korea crippled the multilateral mechanism that prevented the latter from developing nuclear power in exchange for providing crude oil and building a light water reactor in the Najin-Sunbong area. Since then, the multilateral mechanism of the Agreed Framework and its instrument,
KEDO stopped working. But bilateralism no longer worked as effectively as it did during the Cold War years. South Korea’s Roh government did not follow Bush’s unilateralism but tried to open talks with Kim Jong Il. Bush had to reactivate multilateral mechanism through the Six Party Talks with China’s initiative. Yet the Talks did not produce tangible results until the fourth round in 2005, which first attempted to combine multilateralism and bilateralism. Eclecticism appeared in 2007 when the U.S. and North Korea negotiated and compromised bilaterally beforehand and then all actors in the fifth round of Talks multilaterally guaranteed these bilateral agreements. Eclecticism, by balancing bilateralism and multilateralism, produced for the first time tangible agreements and generated hope for the institutionalization of the agreement and the upgrade of the Talks to a Northeast Asian security community.

As I have shown, the North Korean question is a complex and complicated case that involves many elements of realism, liberalism, and constructivism, and thus cannot be explained by single framework. Analytically one explanatory framework complements the other, and a combined framework incorporating different approaches with eclectic manner can better explain the causal mechanism of resolving conflicts and building peace in the Korean Peninsula.

In addition to diverse actors, conflict resolution and peace building in the Peninsula has also been complex because the issues and processes have been intermingled, compounded, and ridden with “co-determination,” “over-determination,” and “determination at the base.” Because these are international as well as domestic and national issues and processes, we need to analyze Korean issues with the logic of international and national “co-determination” (Hintze, 1975). Sometimes, especially during the Cold War years, because of the vital strategic value of the Korean Peninsula, major powers have prioritized strategic and political interests over economic interests when dealing with Korean issues, i.e., what Katzenstein called, “power over plenty” prevailed in major powers’ policy. Thus we need the logic of “over-determination” in analyzing complexities and problems in conflict resolution and peace building in the Peninsula. Nonetheless, we should not throw away the conventional Marxist and liberal logic of economic determination or “determination at the base structure” in analyzing economic cooperation and exchange despite political and military confrontation between two Koreas and between the U.S. and North Korea.

The complexities of the Korean, in terms of actors as well as issues and processes, mean that we cannot rely on a single explanatory mechanism in analyzing problems and prescribing solutions. With an analytical eclectic approach which emphasizes logical connections among puzzles specified by different research traditions, the complexities in Korean security and peace can be analyzed by the combination of data, interpretations, and causal logics of different research traditions. With the combination of assumptions, concepts, interpretations and methods of competing research traditions, analytical eclecticism can offer complex causal mechanisms that can explain specific actions, interactions, governances and institutions. It can also offer prescriptions for conflict resolution and peace building in Korea. In order to solve the dilemmas and contradictions that have generated Korean exceptionalism, an eclectic approach is the most effective strategy borrowing selectively to account for a “hybrid” phenomenon that cannot be
explained with a single conceptual mechanism (Katzenstein and Sil, 2004).

The Korean case, eclecticism enables us to find solutions to conflict resolution in general and to the North Korean question in particular. Conflict resolution in Korea is a very complex phenomenon in which elements of realism, constructivism, liberalism and functionalism have been intermingled with each other and therefore any singular conflict resolution mechanism cannot provide a solution. While realism based on power politics predominated during Cold War years, the rising economic interests and identity politics have made it very difficult to resolve the North Korean question exclusively with realism. Even though multilateralism in the area of economy has blossomed in East Asia in line with the rapid increase of intraregional economic exchanges, multilateralism in the area of Northeast Asian regional security community has lagged far behind regional economic community. Nevertheless, the North Korean question paradoxically has prompted the concerned actors to explore multilateralism in order to find solutions to nuclear issues. Nonetheless, what is exceptional in Korean case is since the end of Cold War one single mechanism has never exclusively predominated in the security landscape. Immediately after the high tide of multilateralism, realism revived with the power transfer to a conservative government in South Korea. While constructivism emerged among young Koreans armed with IT communication devices and SNS, SNS-mediated Korean Wave (韓流), the Jasmin Revolution in Tunisia and the Arab Spring have not yet reached the young generation in North Korea.

8. Search for Feasible Solutions for Conflict Resolution and Peace Building in Korea

8.1. Testing Hypotheses

To explain the difficulty and unfeasibility of peace building in Korean Peninsula, five hypotheses should be tested.

Hypothesis 1: Divided countries with serious “security dilemmas” find it very hard to make peace by means of functionalist and neo-functionalist talks, cooperation, exchanges and visits.

Hypothesis 2: The longer the division has lasted and the larger the political, economic, social and cultural heterogeneity has built in formerly homogeneous divided countries, the more difficult those divided countries experience in restoring peace and eventual reunification.

Hypothesis 3: Even though “democracies may rarely, even never, go to war with one another” (Russet, 1993), a democracy can go to war with a dictatorship, regardless of whether the dictatorship is a neighbor, or shares the same nationality.

9 Typical economic interests related with North Korea are relieving famine in North Korea, food aid to North Korea, and economic opening and development of North Korea, etc.

10 North Koreans’ nationalistic hatred against “American imperialism,” competing nationalisms among Korea, China, and Japan, and ant-Americanism among young South Koreans).
Hypothesis 4: While economic asymmetry between divided countries promotes functionalist integration and spill-over to peace-building, military symmetry or balance of power entices divided countries to strengthen alliances with hegemons and to promote arms race rather than peace-building to resolve security dilemmas.

Hypothesis 5: While the consciousness of homogenous ethnic identity among the people in divided countries promotes peace and eventual reunification, that of heterogeneous ethnic identity among the two peoples in divided countries does not promote peace but secession or perpetual national division.

8.2. Search for Feasible Solutions

Confirming these five hypotheses might contribute to preventing violent conflicts between two Koreas, and among large and middle-sized powers in Northeast Asia including U.S., China, Japan, and Russia. Concerned actors already had made the violent Koran War which can be seen not only as a civil war between North and South Korea, but the greatest international war during the Cold War years in which two superpowers were actively involved. Korean Peninsula has remained a very dangerous and vulnerable place in which was remains a risk, even after the end of the Cold War elsewhere. Confirming these hypotheses help us to understand why and how the two Koreas and their neighbors can resume violent conflicts and eventual war, as well as to explore the possibility of “impossible” or “exceptionally difficult” tasks to resolve inter-Korean conflicts and to rebuild peace in Korean Peninsula.

Eclecticism can use realism to elucidate how to restore order from anarchical international society; it can use constructivism how to convert negative constructivism from the case of Germany and how to make a successful “social transformation” after reunification; it can use functionalism and neo-functionalism to learn why neo-functionalist exchanges and talks of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun government did not automatically “spill-over” to political and security areas, and it can use both constructivism and functionalism to explain why we need institutions, social capital, social trust, and constructivist identity formation for functionalist talks and exchanges to be upgraded to neo-functionalist political package deal for conflict resolution, peace building, and national community building.

Lastly, testing these hypotheses with an eclectic approach would contribute to enhancing “peace building capacity, tools, and intellectual capital worldwide” because the research on conflict resolution and peace building in Korean Peninsula is not a parochial study or a country-specific case study on peace building and conflict resolution, but many heuristic implications for developing a general theory. Even though experiences have given us negative lessons of the impossibility and exceptionality of conflict resolution and peace, paradoxically, Korean experiences have taught us the need to remove “impossibility,” “exceptionality,” and “infeasibility” from conflict resolution by means of analytical and practical eclectic devices for increasing peace building capacity in Korea and beyond, and designing bilateral and/or multilateral institutions that can resolve conflicts. Removing “impossibility” and resolving “exceptionality” will surely contribute to elaborating
a general theory of conflict resolution and peace building.

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Examining Emergent Environmental Strategies in the Era of Kim Jong Un

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Environmental management, extraction of natural resources and strategies supporting their utilization have long been important elements of North Korea’s (DPRK) “revolutionary” industrial and economic approach. Historically, under the leadership of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il’s, the DPRK adopted paradigms of environmental ideology and practical strategy sourced from those of its partners and supporters within the wider communist bloc and marked primarily by the tenets of classical central planning. Since the death of Kim Jong Il in December 2011, external commentators/analysts have been waiting to discern the DPRK’s future direction under Kim Jong Un’s leadership.

This paper will investigate whether it is indeed now possible to discern the development of a distinct post-Kim Jong Il environmental approach, given the emergence of publications and projects focused on the natural world whose authorship and inspiration is accredited to Kim Jong Un. It will firstly reiterate those earlier paradigms of environmental engagement recounting the approaches adopted in response to the period of crisis in the early 1990’s, which was sourced from newly engaged external institutional actors. It will analytically engage the narratological intersection between these approaches and the DPRK’s presentational strategy. Finally holding this focus on narrative and practical charisma in mind, the paper will review recent developments in the DPRK’s place in the CDM and UNFCCC process establishing whether necessary connections are made with historical themes of charismatic, political authority in the age of Kim Jong Un.

Keywords: Environment, Development, Kim Jong-un, Charismatic Politics

1. Introduction

Current political, academic and media narratives surrounding the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) focus primarily within three areas of approach, and it seems difficult for many scholars to examine the DPRK, its political and policy development or its institutional functionality from outside of paradigms of “unknowability”/opacity, threat or collapse.

This paper however approaches the DPRK from a different analytic perspective, holding it to be an essentially pragmatic and reflexive actor in both its internal and external policy, and utilizing this approach within its investigation of both the historical development of environmental policy and ideology within the DPRK, and strategies and connections in the contemporary era.

Following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, Pyongyang’s institutional structures and its politico-ideological forms were subject to a multiplicity of stresses, and its previous environmental and agricultural strategies proved impossible to sustain in the light of the changed geo-political realities. However, just as the DPRK had continually adjusted its environmental strategy not only to reflect its developing

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ideological formulation but also to accommodate changes in its diplomatic or military position, so it did during this period of crisis. Incorporating strategies sourced from external actors encountered during the famine period, strategies derived from developing “western” paradigms of conservation, environmental awareness and low-carbon economics, became increasingly important to the DPRK’s economic functionality and planning. This paper will examine not only these elements of the nation’s strategy but also how the DPRK has utilized such elements within its presentational strategies and legitimatory narratives in the contemporary era. Given the increased usage in recent years of such narratological elements, the paper will seek to investigate whether these indicate the future direction of the DPRK in the era of Kim Jong-Un, and if it is, what environmental direction the DPRK might take under this new leadership.

2. ‘The Arduous March’ and Emergency Environmental Solutions

The DPRK’S developmental approach, founded in the mid to late 1960s and grounded in the economic framework of classical Soviet style central planning, remained essentially paramount within its environmental strategy until the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in the late 1980s/early 1990s. Faced with the sudden collapse at this point of not only its economic and technical partners but also the wider ideological frameworks which supported it, the DPRK adopted some radical survivalist strategies, radically altering its environmental approach and developmental strategy. Within a year of the dissolution of the USSR, Kim Il Sung announced what was known as the “Let’s Eat Two Meals a Day Campaign”, at the very least presaging the famine that was to come (Noland et al., 2001). In the field of environmental management, strategies were abruptly changed. As an emergency solution to the crisis, the authorities within the forestry sector abandoned the afforestation policy of many decades in an attempt to create more land area for the cultivation of basic crops. Internal documents and data from the DPRK on the extent of such deforestation are not forthcoming (or were perhaps not collected), but external studies undertaken by United Nations agencies after 1995, the peak year of disruption, note the impact of this change in policy. Bobilier records the results of the UNDP/FAO investigation which concluded “…that more than 500,000 hectares of marginal lands were deforested and cultivated” (2002).

3. Encountering the External

There is little doubt that this era of environmental disaster and geo-political transition was extremely challenging for the DPRK, and much of the research literature addressing the possibility of its collapse, dissolution and eventual reunification with the ROK derives from the perceived inability of its institutions and leadership to respond with meaningful or positive solutions at the time (Haggard et al., 2008). I would, however, claim that in the midst of this tumult new institutional responses to environmental failure can be determined. Further to that, perhaps policy outcomes generated by the developing ability of bureaucratic and ideological forces to mitigate for such failures might discerned and these outcomes categorized as a part of paradigm of conservational environmental management.

Given the long period of developmental stasis in the DPRK, and even given the
impetus of near collapse, how might this new paradigm of institutional and governmental approach have been encountered or adopted? For the answer to this we must turn to historical analysis of the DPRK’s geo-political strategy during the era of the Warsaw Pact. Pyongyang was well known during the Cold War for its triangulatory approach to diplomacy and trans-national interaction, even to its allies and closer supporters (Scalapino and Lee, 1972). Gaining institutional and technical support initially in the post Liberation period from both the Soviet Union and China (especially during the Korean War) (Kho, 1978), following the death of Stalin, and Premier Khrushchev’s secret speech denouncing much of Stalin’s political approach, North Korea moved, between 1956 and 1960, to embrace Maoist developmental strategy (Prybla, 1964). Responding to the impending failure of the Great Leap Forward, North Korea again moved closer to the Soviet Union, having earlier, during the Sino-Soviet Split, held each partner equidistant while establishing a role and relationships with the Non-Aligned Movement. Given this history of adaptive diplomatic strategy, it cannot be surprising that forced to adjust to a new era in which the DPRK had even fewer political allies and virtually no economic or practical support, it attempted similar triangulations or adaptations.

Initially, in order to extract itself from its period of crisis, the DPRK had been forced to seek aid and support from external agencies such as The World Food Programme, UN Development Programme (UNDP), the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), and International Committee of the Red Cross, among others. It seems that North Korean institutions deftly utilized elements of the disaster to their own advantage “These floods played an important public relations role insomuch as they facilitated the North Korean government’s portrayal of the famine as a product of natural disaster…” (Noland et al., 1999). Although I do not aim to contribute to the debate surrounding the veracity or detail of the DPRK’s claims surrounding the famine, nor whether outside agencies and other NGO’s have been subject to institutional exploitation by the DPRK (Flake and Synder, 2003), I believe that it is undeniable that western institutional actors support and funding of elements of the DPRK’s governmental framework aided the development of its institutional capabilities. This support and development thus enabled it to equip itself with some of the bureaucratic and ideological tools to survive in the post-Soviet and post-famine era. For the purpose of this paper some of these developments led to the redirection of the DPRK’s environmental strategies and natural conceptions towards a rapidly developing environmental and conservational institutionalism.

4. Encountering the Environmental

The DPRK’s encounter with a developing environmental institutionalism and its “green” agenda included engagement with organizations such as the World Food Programme and UNICEF, whose focus was the immediate mitigation of the famine and food crisis. However, it also included interactions aimed at alleviating Pyongyang’s institutional crisis and building future infrastructural capacity. Within the environmental sector, both the UNDP and the FAO engaged with the DPRK to this end after the initial famine period, part of their institutional agenda being an assessment of the state and condition of the DPRK’s forests and the functioning of its’ forestry sector. The results of this review were summarized within the three volume series, “DPR Korea: Agricultural Recovery and Environmental Protection
Examining Emergent Environmental Strategies in the Era of Kim Jong Un

(AREP) Program, Identification of Investment Opportunities”. Bobilier summarized the UNDP/FAO exercise’s findings in a feasibility study published by the French NGO “Triangle Generation Humanitaire” in 2002. The forestry sector of the DPRK, the researchers asserted, was beset with problems, including “…Bad management of forests and wood shortages, increased erosion, leading to a loss of soil productivity in rice fields and a high vulnerability to flood damage, loss of soil productivity in sloping lands…impossibility for natural regeneration…” (Bobilier, 2002). UNDP/FAO researchers and Bobilier however maintain that as far as institutional commitment was concerned “the Government recognizes the importance of land management and reforestation…” (Bobilier, 2002). Encountering such environmental approaches has resulted in Pyongyang’s seeming engagement and incorporation of their language, terminology and conceptualization relatively quickly within its own institutional and ideological framework, so as in fact to become key elements to its developmental approach during the Kim Jong-il era.

5. Development Strategies: Tidal Reclamation

In order to demonstrate or evidence this new environmental incorporation within the DPRK’s developmental strategies, we must return to some of the areas in which Pyongyang exerted so much focus during its period of “technological revolution” of the mid 1960’s (Kho, 1982). This period was not, in any conventional sense, one of cogent environmental awareness as we would now understand it. However the DPRK’s approach was rooted in paradigms of developmental action upon its landscape which mainly derived from the activities of other nations in the Warsaw Pact committed to socialist central planning.

One key area in which such developmental activity was undertaken was that of coastal and tidal land reclamation. In particular we might examine the Taegyedo Reclamation Area, which has been an enormous construction project (Winstanley-Chesters, 2013), which has incorporated much of the ideological development that occurred during the period of its construction. However the Taegyedo project is in a sense a project of a different age, an age of monumental scale impositional and transformational projects; the new era of environmental development would demand projects of a different category and scale.

Since the completion of the Taegyedo project, the Punijman Tideland in South Hwanghae Province, an example of new scales and approaches, been completed (“The reclaimed tideland is...another asset of eternal value created in its western coastal area thanks to President Kim Il Sung’s great idea of remaking the nature and under the wise leadership of Kim Jong Il...” (KCNA, 2010a)), serving as the first reclamation project constructed in order to serve a multiplicity of functions. Punijman is not simply an extension of agricultural capacity, but rather incorporates an environmentally aware focus in which industrial output and capacity is reimagined. Its area of reclaimed land is conceptualized as providing (according to the KCNA), along with conventional arable lands, areas for conservational aquaculture and the fiduciarily important extraction of sea salt. It is possible that this model of reclaimed tideland serving multiple functions will develop into a wider theme within reclamative activity during Kim Jong Un’s rule, incorporating older schemes within this new paradigm. An example of this tendency towards
revitalization includes a project at Ryongmae in South Hwanghae province, which was first initiated in 1998 but has since been neglected (KCNA, 2011a). Ryongmae held a ground breaking ceremony on 28 December, 2010 and is now envisaged as a multi-purpose reclamation area incorporated aquaculture and hydro-electric power, being potentially the largest of newly developing projects at some twelve miles long (KCNA, 2011a).

6. Developmental Strategies: Wind Power

To determine the manifestation of environmental conception and approach, Pyongyang’s engagement with previously unconventional sources of electricity generation, such as wind power, could be equally useful as exemplars. Pyongyang’s institutional approach has moved on somewhat from the period immediately post famine when in May and September of 1999, a team of American energy specialists from The Nautilus Institute, including the academics Peter Hayes and David Von Hippel, along with North Korean counterparts, installed seven wind generators at Unhari, a small coastal village 70 miles west of Pyongyang (Hippel and Hayes, 2007). This system provided some 10 kilowatts of capacity, and a power house with electrical equipment that could provide stand-alone power and interfaced with the DPRK’s wider electricity grid. Not only was this engagement the first instance of wind power installation in the DPRK, but in fact the first time an energy survey or socio-economic assessment of the impact of a project had been undertaken on any issue.

The DPRK has continued to develop its wind power capacity, particularly following the gift of two fully functional large capacity turbines from Vestas in Denmark as well as the blue prints for their construction and technical support and training (Vestas, 2011). There are now many turbine projects in the DPRK though most are still small in scale; some have turbines of a capacity of up to 75 KW and there was an estimated nationwide production of 3MW by the end of 2004. Central institutional developments have meant the development of a National Wind Energy Strategy involving the comprehensive mapping of areas of exceptional wind speed and potential power generation, and the extension of national capacity to 100 MW through the development of test sites running at up to 10MW a site. Pyongyang’s institutions have sought to deploy such infrastructure as a means to reduce independence on expensive external fuel sources, as well as means to connect the DPRK with further international partners (Yi et al., 2011).

7. Legitimacy and Narrative

Further to these narratives of practical environmental development, another intriguing element has been the influence of such approach on the presentational, or charismatic narratives of the DPRK. Pyongyang’s utilization of these new strategies following the famine period in the forestry sector saw for the first time practical projects connected to narratives of regime and national legitimacy. A prime example of this narrative coupling concerned National Tree Planting Day, which for many years was celebrated on 6 April. Originally this day had commemorated Kim Il Sung’s 1947 to Munsu Hill and formed the foundational event for the Forestry Sector, being recounted in the text “Let Us Launch a Vigorous Tree Planting
Movement Involving All the Masses”. In 1999 however and without reference to the change, National Tree Planting Day became 2 March. This new date instead commemorated an earlier event, on 2 March, 1946 when Kim Il Sung climbed Mt Moran (on the outskirts of Pyongyang), with both Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Suk. The accession of Kim Jong Il to power in 1997 required a re-visioning of its legitimating, authoritative narratives from which its institutions and regime derive their power. A key imagistic narrative focusing on the DPRK’s “Holy Trinity” comprised of Kim Il Sung (Father and revolutionary hero), Kim Jong Suk (Mother and revolutionary heroine), and Kim Jong II (Son and revolutionary offspring) was reinforced by this new date and narrative change. Not only that but through this narrative vector both the commemoration represented by National Tree Planting Day, and the institutions of the Forestry Sector served by it as the annual ceremonial connection around which popular events and other projects are organized, were incorporated into the post-famine and post Kim Il Sung era and its new environmental approach.

The KCNA described the background to this newly dated and conceptualized event in the following terms “On 2 March, 53 years ago, the President Kim Il Sung climbed up Moran Hill together with the revolutionary fighter Kim Jong Suk and General Secretary Kim Jong II and said that many trees should be planted there and turn it into a recreation place for the people…” and accordingly, “the working people across the country are now all out in the drive to plant more trees in mountains and fields of the country on the occasion of the tree planting day” (KCNA, 1999a).

Reassertions of institutional agenda and adaptation of its commemorative’s event’ role, framing it as central to planning and goal setting developments meant that the newly formed institution “The Forest Conservancy Bureau of the Ministry of City Management and Land and Environment Protection” made much more of these narrative and commemorative events. The Bureau for example began to introduce new goals on this day, such as “…to expand forests by 155,400 hectares this year” (KCNA, 2011a), expanding its institutional purpose and outlook: “Envisaged in the plan is the planting of lots of trees for firewood and trees for the wellbeing of the people and the economic development of the country including those for fiber, paper and oil” (KCNA, 1999b).

National Tree Planting Day’s new position as both a commemorative event and developmental spur also generated institutional integrations within the Forestry Sector. Major figures within the bureaucracy of both national, regional and local governments, such as Kim Jong Nam (Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly), were now involved during the day; “Kim Yong Nam, Pak Song Chol, Ri Jong Ok, Hong Song Nam, and other senior party and state officials planted trees with working people, youth and students on 2 March…” (KCNA, 1999b). It also appears that events marking the day, which had to this point been confined to Pyongyang itself, and in its previous configuration on Munsu Hill, were now to be held throughout the country and to be connected with a multiplicity of local forestry projects; “Meetings of working people, youth and students to vow to push ahead with tree planting were held with the attendance of senior party and state officials at the Kumsusan Memorial Palace, Mt. Yangji in Phyongsong, South Phyongan Province, Chongsan-ri and Thaesong-ri, Kangso district, Nampho and Mt.
Jongbang in Sariwon, North Hwanghae Province…” (KCNA, 1999a). 1999 also saw a number of other commemorative days or periods apparently designed to demonstrate the importance of the forestry sector, such as “Tree Planting Month”, and the institution of “National Forestry Workers Day” on 10 August (on which the KCNA reported that, “Forestry workers across the country are greeting their holiday with labor achievements” (KCNA, 1999b)).

8. Nature in the Narratives

Similar environmental elements within narratives of regime legitimacy and authority could also be seen during the mourning period at the death of Kim Jong Il and the subsequent accession of Kim Jong Un. During this funereal and commemorative period, the DPRK’s news agency, KCNA reported environmental aspects or participants a number of times. Important examples of this tendency included the inscription commemorating the place of Mt Paekdu, a sacred mountain for Koreans, in DPRK revolutionary history, suddenly glowing red (“Kim Jong Il's autographic writings "Mt. Paektu, holy mountain of revolution. Kim Jong Il." carved on the mountain, in particular, were bright with glow. This phenomenon lasted till 5:00 pm.”, (KCNA, 2011b)), as well as the ice on the lake at the top of the mountain, Lake Chon cracking despite freezing temperatures. In Pyongyang there were also reports of cranes and other birds adopting distinct postures of reverence or mourning.

Such events and reports served as a form of demonstrative, legitimatory theatrics, connecting the regime’s authority, representing as it does in its narrative presentation, the manifestation of the Korean nation’s most positive elements (Kwon and Chung, 2011). The realm of the active environmental achieves this representation and manifestation through connecting conceptions of the constructed nationhood, participating directly in the political, human realm. This allows the environmental to form part of the meta-physical construction of Korean nationhood. Such narratives of legitimacy appeared extraordinarily important during this period, and the KCNA featured an extensive five part series of reports addressing every detail of the environments contribution to the mourning period. This environmental theme was also widely noticed externally, with, in the UK both the Guardian and The Daily Telegraph running articles directly derived from the KCNA’s reports.

9. Environmental Emergence

It is now some three years since Kim Jong Il’s death and Kim Jong Un’s assumption of power; given the various developments, adjustments and narratives in the time since, perhaps now it might be possible to form initial conclusions as to the future direction of DPRK’s environmental strategy under this youngest Kim? Given the glacial nature of the ascension to power of Kim Jong Il following Kim Il Sung’s death, in which it took several years before even the titles necessary to say that succession had been successfully achieved were bestowed on Kim Jong Il, it may be that institutionally it is not yet possible to draw definitive conclusions. However the transfer of power between Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un surprised most commentators due to both its speed and comprehensive quality. Within days of Kim Jong II’s death, Kim Jong Un had been anointed both institutionally and figuratively
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(Kwon, 2013) through the use of classic elements of terminology as “Young General”, “Marshall” and “new Tangun”. Within the year Kim Jong Un had reached such a level of power and security as to be able to reorganize the higher levels of the military command structure and within two to purge and execute his own uncle Jang Sung-taek and the substantial bureaucratic element which owed him support.

As regards environmental strategy under Kim Jong Un, the young leader seemed to grasp the narrative and practical reigns at a similar speed to his co-option of institutional power. Published material focused on underpinning institutional or presentational narratives quickly emerged, for example, 27 April 2012 saw the publication of the first work of theory by Kim Jong Un. Perhaps astonishingly, given Kim Jong Un’s age and alleged predilections for western gaming technology and basketball, it focuses on the environmental sector.

“One Effecting a Draastic Turn in Land Management to Meet the Requirements for Building a Thriving Socialist Nation,” aside from being demonstrative of the continued existence of the DPRK’s predilection for labyrinthine titles, served as a textual transfiguration for the environmental management (KCNA, 2012a). Reiterating the agenda and perceived historical impacts of the environmental strategies of both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, in some senses it could be seen to be part of a retrospective exercise in political lionization focused upon Kim Jong Il (“Under his wise guidance and deep care, a large number of grand edifices of eternal value have been built in various parts of the country and streets and villages have turned into a socialist land of bliss…”), however, this is not its only focus.

Akin to many of the texts deriving from early on in Kim Jong Il’s literary production, it serves to direct such reference back on the current generation through reflecting upon Kim Jong Un himself. Naturally, although the text does not make clear the direction of practical or theoretical travel undertaken by the younger Kim, it does assert the success of previous directions and notes their importance within the memory and perception of Kim Jong Un.

Accordingly, in a similar manner to other historical texts (such as Kim Il Sung’s “For the Large-Scale Reclamation of Tidelands”), this text and the legitimatory strategy contained within is then incorporated into a process of secondary/ indirect reflection derived from external sources and reflection. Kim Jong Un’s consideration of environmental matters has apparently proved popular and interesting in Peru, where according to the KCNA, both the Socialist Party of Peru and the “Peruvian Group for the Study of Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism” have noted its publication. The importance of recording the reception of Kim Jong Un’s work by such a “tenuous” and distant grouping is of course on the one hand to reaffirm the international mission and importance of the DPRK’s revolution, and more importantly on the other to allow the external source to make explicit what the initial text and local DPRK response only makes implicit, as the Peruvian’s themselves say: “The Peruvian Group for the Study of Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism is convinced that the Korean people will register brilliant successes in preserving land and environment and building a thriving socialist nation true to the idea of Kim Jong Un on land management and under his leadership” (KCNA, 2012b).

This publication was followed on 3 August by the publication of a speech made at the end of July entitled “Let Us Effect Kim Jong II's Patriotism and Step Up the Building of a Prosperous Country”. This text too according to references provided
by the KCNA forms part of the posthumous lionization and ‘mythos’ construction surrounding Kim Jong II, and the dynastic continuation and stability provided within the narrative in the person of Kim Jong Un. Ostensibly such lionization is based on the superior nature of Kim Jong II’s patriotism both in terms of its fervency and nobility, as well as in light of the development of Songun politics his willingness to actually defend it. It is interesting however that not only is the patriotism rooted within his willingness to defend the people of the DPRK as well as its borders, but also according to Kim Jong Un, his patriotism was “… genuine patriotism as he loved every tree and every blade of grass of the country…” (KCNA, 2012b). Such a statement did not go unnoticed within the DPRK’s institutions and a day later it was reported that Kim Song Gun, a department director of the Ministry of Land and Environmental Conservation had remarked that Kim Jong Un’s “…work is perfectly logical and exoteric. It tells us what attitude and stand we, officials, should take in the drive for building a thriving nation” (KCNA, 2012c).

Aside from directly attributing developmental narratives and inspiration to Kim Jong Un, the DPRK’s environmental strategy has continued follow the approach taken under Kim Jong II. The spring of 2012 saw the same “Spring Land Management” and Tree Planting Drives as in previous years. Projects within the field of tidal reclamation at Kwaksan and Ryongmae continued their development and within the published narrative were compared to the now semi-foundational Taegyedo project to assert the importance of natural spaces within the developmental narrative of the DPRK (KCNA, 2012d). The tendency towards multi-functionality within the tidal reclamation field has been further demonstrated in the organization of industrial salt production at the Ongjinbunjiman reclamation project (KCNA, 2012e). Within the agricultural sector, organic methods of production and husbandry have also continued to grow in importance, with pork and arable farms at Taedonggang near Pyongyang adopting full scale organic processes (KCNA, 2012f), and the opening of the first factory for the production of organic fertilizer also near in Pyongyang in April (KCNA, 2012g).

Perhaps the most important development within the environmental field during this first year of Kim Jong Un’s rule however has been the completion of the effort begun in 2005, and connected deeply with the expertise brought by and through external institutional actors (Habib, 2010). The DPRK was the 149th nation to sign the UNFCCC document and to ratify the Kyoto Treaty on Climate Change Mitigation. It did so on 27 April, 2005, and ever since that date the institutions of the DPRK have been attempting to extract what surely, apart from the legitimating or supportive narrative aspects, is the immediate primary advantage for the DPRK to be gained from its signing, namely the access to the financial return open to it through the “carbon credit” element of the CDM system (Habib, 2013). The DPRK’s post-Cold War position has bequeathed it a potentially lucrative place within the CDM framework. In-spite of being a comparatively reasonably populated and geographically sized nation, owing to past economic collapse, the DPRK’s economic and developmental situation in carbon emissions terms is considerably reduced, leaving it in a good position to extract financial advantage or leverage from the CDM. However in order to participate in the process a sovereign actor must be fully engaged and adept at the sort of bureaucratic expertise and justificatory practice which is a hallmark of modern capitalistic social democracies and their
attendant corona of NGO’s and other external actors. The DPRK has in the past proven itself not to be particularly well versed, for understandable reasons in the finer details of such institutional practice as so had little success in its attempts at registering economic or developmental projects under the UNFCCC system. Until now it seems, for as NK Economy Watch reported on 16 August, 2012 (NK Economy Watch, 2012) , the DPRK succeeded for the first time in meeting the conditions of registration and Hamhung Hydropower Plant Number One (UNFCCC, 2012) was the first carbon credit earning project within the DPRK’s jurisdiction.

Environmental strategy, theory and practice have developed quickly in the years since the famine period in the DPRK. Initially sourcing from expertise and support supplied by external actors and agencies during the period of crisis, the DPRK developed and utilized its own distinct approach to environmental practice during the era of Kim Jong II, including within its own narratives of sovereign, institutional and regime legitimacy. It is still unclear whether or not Kim Jong Un has particular levels of environmental expertise, or if the environmental realm will develop in importance within the institutional and presentational narratives or productive agenda of the DPRK during his reign. What has been clear is the preservation of its important place within narratives of legitimacy for both the regime and nation (Kwon and Chung, 2012). This was most clear during the funereal/mourning period following the death of Kim Jong Il, but the development of such narratives has continued in this first year of Kim Jong Un, especially in framing the posthumous presentation of Kim Jong II’s patriotism. The text of Kim Jong Un’s first publication, focused as it was on matters environmental, also serves to denote that within the environmental field, theory and practice will continue to evolve under Kim Jong Un as it did under Kim Jong II. Environmental aspects will continue to play an important economic role within the agricultural sector, and considering the DPRK’s first success in the CDM process, perhaps remain a vital source of non-sanctioned foreign currency. It is apparent that environmental matters will also continue to play a developing role with the construction of both dynastic and national legitimacy.

References


Examining Emergent Environmental Strategies in the Era of Kim Jong Un


Robert WINSTANLEY-CHESTERS


This paper addresses cooperation in projects of higher education as a form of engagement with North Korea. The majority of experts acknowledge that there will not be any real economic reform in North Korea without an adequate number of well-trained public officials, administrators, and managers to guide the country out of its dire straits. In this regard, recent studies have shown how the DPRK has manifested its intention to overcome the economic impasse by fostering higher education in IT, economics and science in cooperation with Western actors. During the last decade, NGOs and universities have been allowed to develop educational projects in the country, and to train North Koreans in the EU and in a few Asian countries. These new initiatives have raised hopes among North Korea watchers about future developments for the country’s human resource system and the society at large. However, it is yet to be seen how North Koreans who benefit from exposure to foreign knowledge will be able to apply what they learn within their domestic context. The first part of the paper will introduce the concepts of capacity building and educational cooperation within the context of engagement with the DPRK. Subsequently, the paper will summarize the history, characteristics and the current state of higher education in North Korea, and then examine three projects of international cooperation with the DPRK at the level of tertiary education, before summarizing the challenges that lie ahead.

**Keywords:** North Korea, knowledge sharing, education, international cooperation, DPRK’s international relations.

1. **Introduction: Capacity building and educational exchanges within the context of the DPRK's foreign relations.**

The outbreak of the first North Korean famine in the early 1990s brought to the world's attention the disastrous situation of what was then an isolated country, where an unfortunate series of climatic events seemed to have caused grave food shortages, claiming the lives of hundreds of thousands, some say millions of people. Nearly two decades later, a wealth of studies (Smith, 2005; Ramsay, 1999; Haggard and Noland, 2007) have shown that the famine was in fact due to a combination of climatic conditions and decades of mismanagement, where the latter had equal, if not predominant weight.

By the end of the 1980s in fact, the DPRK had already lost most of its productive capacity; in other words, the country was unable to provide any kind of response to the chronic shortages of energy, food and primary goods, being largely depended on China and the Soviet Union. At the beginning of the 1990s, changes in both the domestic and international scenario (namely the collapse of the Soviet Union, the death of Kim Il Sung and establishment of diplomatic ties between China and South Korea), left North Korea directionless, isolated and dependent on foreign aid.

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The international community first responded to what looked like (and was, in many ways) an emergency with contingency plans to limit the effects of the famine. However, as the years went by, it became clear that humanitarian aid alone would not solve the problems of North Korea, and that the country needed to develop capacity building, to restore some degree of self-sufficiency and attempt basic economic reforms.

According to Bernhard Seliger (2009, pp. 69-71), capacity-building programs have been attempted in North Korea ever since the mid-1990s, as these proved to be necessary at some level for almost any kind of foreign aid, due to the country's technological backwardness. Projects organized by several NGOs gradually made their way into the country, however, none of these earlier initiatives tackled the structural issues that keep the DPRK in a state of permanent aid dependency. Those efforts, in other words, addressed agricultural problems, land erosion and other such issues, because these are considered more ‘neutral’ and easily accepted by the North Korean leadership as they do not point at the political and ideological causes behind the economic stagnation.

Unfortunately, for the very same reason, they also did little to solve the institutional and structural problems that must be addressed for the country to stop living hand to mouth. Aside from the reluctance of the North Korean leadership to accept streams of foreign thought that would jeopardize its rule, capacity building in North Korea was, especially during the 1990s, also limited by Western fears that projects providing North Koreans with ‘too much knowledge’ might perpetuate the regime, rather than promote change (Seliger, 2009, pp. 73-74).

Instead of development and training, therefore, more attention both in politics and the academia was given to security issues, as the international community tried to deal with North Korea through negotiations on its nuclear program, economic sanctions and humanitarian aid. Not many countries wished to engage with North Korea, but a change in this pattern started to occur around 2001, when a number of Western governments established diplomatic ties with the country, and some new initiatives by different NGOs saw the light of day. The establishment of diplomatic relations was crucial for these new initiatives to emerge, because political support is required for capacity-building projects to move beyond technical issues and to address the more fundamental problems, and it is an extremely important factor in determining whether these projects will succeed or not (Babson, 2007, p. 5, 17; Shin and Lee, 2011, p. 15; Seliger, 2009, pp. 73-74).

Among the new initiatives, educational cooperation is seen as an important instrument of capacity building. Educational cooperation (or exchange) is an ‘umbrella term’ that includes academic cooperation, cultural visits, and scientific information exchange. The term also encompasses initiatives that do not lead to specific degrees, but could nevertheless contribute to a wider mutual understanding between the DPRK and Western countries. It is important to note that exchanges with the DPRK cannot and should not be evaluated with the same criteria used for regular exchange programs, because of the peculiarity of its political and economic situation, nor should complete reciprocity and mutual recognition of degrees be a concern at this point in time.

In the context of DPRK’s foreign relations, the benefits of educational exchanges can be less tangible and may need to be evaluated with a far longer time-
span. They could offer the possibility for a growing number of younger North Koreans to gain a different view (hopefully a positive one) of the outside world and help create a new ruling class with ideas and capacities that could in the future help change the direction of the country (Shin and Lee, 2011, p. 17). Educational cooperation can also bring much-needed knowledge to North Korea and this in turn could slowly help the country stand on its own feet, in economic terms; but results are not to be taken for granted.

This article introduces three projects as examples of this new form of engagement, and of how political support, or the lack thereof, can influence these projects, while also attempting to illustrate that even though North Korea is not about to stop receiving foreign aid any time soon or to radically open up the country overnight, there is considerable interest on their side to seek new solutions that go beyond short-term fixes and would help the country catch up in terms of science and other forms of knowledge, and that young North Koreans are increasingly open to the idea of studying abroad, despite the difficulties they continue to face at present.

Before proceeding any further, the next section will outline the characteristics of the North Korean education system while the following section will present three case studies, to illustrate what types of relations currently occur between foreign educational providers, NGOs, Western institutions and a number of foreign actors in the DPRK. The final section will offer some preliminary conclusions related to the challenges that lie ahead.

2. Education and Society in North Korea: History Matters.

In the immediate post liberation period (1945-1948), Kim II Sung’s faction, composed of former guerrilla fighters, managed to win essential Soviet support, which in turn determined their crescent popularity and the supremacy over other political groups in North Korea (local communists and left-wing nationalists among others). By the mid-1960s, through the purges of nearly all political adversaries, this group had occupied each and every position within the State, the Workers’ Party of Korea (KWP) and the Korean People’s Army (KPA). Its progenies constitute much of today’s elite in North Korea, a social class born out of a process of social change initiated with the 1946 land reform that has revolutionized the structure of North Korea human landscape ever since.

This land reform and other acts of legislation were instrumental for the consolidation of power by Kim II Sung’s group. By literally turning the social ladder upside down overnight, the North Korean leadership created a new social order in which the poorest and more numerous categories in North Korea (peasants, miners and factory workers) replaced the landlords and businessmen of the colonial period. People were subsequently categorized into three main classes.

The core class, the most loyal, was formed of former guerrilla fighters and their immediate families, together with the peasants and workers who supported them. The wavering class contained all those who had been employed in trade, services and other professions, as well as a few intellectuals. Finally, the hostile class grouped together all the elements deemed untrustworthy by the regime. These
included anyone who had been collaborating with Japanese occupying forces, as well as anyone with family ties in South Korea, former religious authorities, and landlords. This primary division, in turn, contained up to forty-seven sub-classes.

This revolutionary change was organized into a system known as Seongbun, which represents today one of the most extreme cases of social stratification (and discrimination) active in any country. The word Seongbun is the shortened form of Chulshin Seongbun, (출신성분), literally meaning the ‘system of ascribed status’ or the social classification system of North Korea. As with all other aspects of life in North Korea, the Seongbun system, together with the ideology, has been instrumental in determining educational policies. Although its existence and importance have been verified through numerous accounts of defectors from all ranks of society, there is little documentary evidence of registries and certificates coming from North Korea in which such system is directly mentioned.

At present, the social rank of a person is largely determined at birth, based on his family ties; for instance if one’s relatives come from a generation of former landlords or wartime collaborationists, or have roots in the South, the result is a lower ranking, and therefore the impossibility to live in Pyongyang, or to join the Army, or acquire any relevant position within the Party.

On paper (in the Constitution, for instance) the DPRK maintains a commitment to equal rights, individual freedom, gender equality, and education for all. However, on closer scrutiny, this appears to be more of a de jure proposition than a reality. Nearly all available documentary sources, as well as North Korean defectors, confirm that class differences are heavily marked (Chun, 2004; Cho, 2007; Cho et al., 2009). Helen Hunter writes that “the implications, in terms of the educational level and the experience of the top leadership, are overwhelming” (1999, pp. 3-13, 207-209). These aspects will be examined below; at this stage it will suffice to say that, having turned the poorest and least educated into the ruling elite, the North Korean leadership, itself not educated beyond elementary or middle school, faced a threefold challenge.

Firstly, it had to build from scratch an educational system that would nurture future generations of revolutionary leaders. Secondly, it needed to avoid any external influence which could prove detrimental to the claims of the ruling ideology. And finally, it had to provide the masses with the indispensable training to rebuild the country after the war, and to guarantee economic development.

As we will see, the North Korean leadership managed to achieve the first of these goals in full and the second in part, but left the majority of the population with contradictory results in terms of knowledge. The regime has, in other words, been capable of replicating itself for nearly four generations practically undisturbed, in spite of a prolonged technical state of war with South Korea, a growing regime of international sanctions, a devastating famine and the economic crisis that hit the country in the early 1990s. From the leadership’s point of view, this was indeed a success. In the same fashion, during the 1960s, the North Korean regime could also be credited with having built one of the most disciplined workforces in East Asia, as nearly every citizen in the country attended primary school.

However, while the DPRK can claim to have eradicated illiteracy, boasting one of the highest level of literacy in the world – approximately 100% of the population – by providing free access to basic education for all, the same cannot be said about
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the quality and the content of its educational programs, or about the real learning opportunities beyond the regime's needs in terms of working knowledge. At present only a handful of young North Koreans have access to meaningful higher education, and even then, most show significant gaps in their knowledge when compared to their South Korean, Japanese or European peers.

Reports show that the quality of education in North Korea remains hindered by weight of ideology, and the cult of personality that Kim Il Sung installed in the 1960s. For decades, the population have been taught to think of Kim Il Sung as ‘the greatest mind of the century’, with ubiquitous claims of his infallibility. The unquestioning adherence to each and every word pronounced or written by the leader was enormously amplified during the 1970s and the 1980s, when the personality cult was fueled to new extremes in coincidence with Kim Il Sung’s 60th and 70th birthday.

At the same time, North Korea created and modified its education system in correspondence with ideological shifts, to match the necessary requirements brought by external and internal conditions. In structural terms, the DPRK has adapted education to the periodic crises and the specific tasks they called for, such as the post-1945 decolonization, the Korean War, the mass mobilization campaigns like the Chollima movement, and so forth.

Finally, the educational ladder was designed to closely resemble and perpetuate the social structure, where members of different social backgrounds were more or less 'spontaneously' channeled through a specific type of school (technical, artistic, etc.) in view of their future occupational status (Lee, 2003; Han, 2001). Throughout the decades and various changes in this system, North Korea has always maintained a tiny group of elite schools and academies at the very top of the system. These had access to better materials, facilities and teachers; however, their students were recruited exclusively among the highest ranks of the elite, to guarantee political stability among younger generations (Lee, 2003, pp. 21-26; Cho, 2002, pp. 75-77). This is particularly evident at university level.

The quality of higher education in North Korea differs drastically from one region to another, from the low-ranking, remote northeastern provinces to Pyongyang, which is not only the country’s business and political center, but also home to the country’s best educational institutions. The further one moves away from the capital, the less likely one is to receive education beyond basic levels, or to access decent public services (Lee at al., 2010; Lee, 2003; Han, 2001). The great majority of young North Koreans who can afford to study abroad (and are politically eligible to do so) reside in Pyongyang and are enrolled in one of its major universities.

There are four institutions that outrank all others in terms of prestige in the fields of humanities, economy, science and technology: Kim Il Sung University (which includes the Institute of National Science, also known through South Korean media as ‘KAIST in North Korea’), the Kim Chaek University of Science and Technology, the Pyongyang University of Foreign Languages and the Kim Hyung Jik University of Pedagogy. The Koryo Songgyungwan University, located in Kaesong could be considered an exception to this rule: although not as important as its counterparts in Pyongyang, it enjoys a good reputation thanks to Kaesong being the center of North Korea’s light industry and to the establishment of one of North Korea’s special
economic zones (SEZ) in its proximity.

It should be noted here that the definition of ‘university’ in the North Korean context does not have an immediate Western equivalent; in fact, the only ‘real’ university in the DPRK, according to Western standards, seems to be Kim Il Sung University, while all the others might be more easily compared to specialized colleges. The difference is not merely nominal, as it reflects the employment opportunities for the students of each institution. The graduates of Kim Il Sung University often acquire jobs in the Korean Worker’s Party and the government, while the graduates of the other top institutions are treated more like technocrats who can gain key positions within regional administration and ministries (Cho, 2006).

The system thus allocates graduates to different positions based on their family and political background, with no real consideration for merit (Kim, 2005, p. 243). The children of a restricted elite, those at the very top, will almost automatically be enrolled in Kim Il Sung University and, once graduated, go to form the new ranks of the future leadership; right below in order of importance, a number of young North Koreans from well-to-do families will fill the higher intermediate ranks, and so forth. Education in the DPRK is in other words, a self-contained system. In addition to this, the imbalance between objective content and propaganda in academic programs, the lack of adequate materials, up-to-date information and feedback from the international community have made the North Korean higher education system a ‘factory of cadres’ with outdated knowledge and limited skills.

However, in recent years a few changes have begun to occur. The DPRK has become aware of the fact that it needs to acquire knowledge of modern economic planning rather than technology alone, if it wants to overcome the current stagnation. It should be noted that despite its present hardship, the country does possess the potential to revive at least some sectors of its economy and to be a prospective partner, for example, for international IT firms and companies operating within the energy sector. Recent news revealed how North Korea is indeed advanced in small IT niches and it is starting to attract some interest as a regional outsourcing hub (Loughlin, 2012). What is also important is that the country has dedicated part of its very limited resources to support educational cooperation with numerous Western countries, on nearly every aspect of adult education, retaining a strong focus on IT, economy, foreign languages and science.

In the West, the idea of educational cooperation with the DPRK was pioneered in the late 1970s by large international organizations such as the UN, UNDP, and UNESCO, and then fostered in Seoul, during the Sunshine policy decade, when South Korean think-tanks, economic institutions and government branches produced a number of studies geared towards re-defining the DPRK’s educational capacity and human resource system, in view of a gradual reunification. Between the late 1990s and the mid-2000s, those reports came in most cases to almost identical conclusions: North Korea’s educational system and human resources apparatus needed urgent restructuring if any progress was ever to be made on the economic front (Kwak, 2005; Yoon, Lee, and Lee, 2006).

It is evident that such input could not be generated domestically, but had to come from outside sources. Today, the core issue is the extent to which it is possible for outside institutions to operate successfully in a country where despite widespread
literacy, access to education is regulated by means of political discrimination with little regard for meritocracy. Can the ruling ideology allow external actors to deliver significant changes in the scope, purpose and contents of education?

Whilst one could argue about what motivated the regime to seek external aid in spite of a rhetoric that praises self-sufficiency, the DPRK’s involvement in a number of international initiatives from the early 1980s is undeniable. Between 1983 and 1987, for instance, a good number of North Korean officials, teachers and top students were already in Norway, Denmark, and France, thanks to a UNESCO-coordinated project aimed at improving foreign languages and scientific learning in the DPRK. They were enjoying the privileges of studying abroad, and acquiring skills which they could then transfer back to their home country. They were, in other words, undertaking programs we might recognize as educational exchanges (even if there weren't any Western students doing the same in the DPRK at the time).

The DPRK has never shown any ideological restraint on the idea of acquiring foreign knowledge. Rather, it has operated with a clever pattern of ‘selective ignorance’ choosing from time to time the type of project, the partner countries and most importantly, the local participants into programs that could deliver a slight qualitative improvement of its national education, without hampering the loyalty to the ruling ideology. But how can a state that has long predicated the infallibility of its leaders admit to insufficient preparation and to the need for external training?

Through detailed reading of North Korean media and government reports, as well as South Korean documents related inter-Korean cooperation, one can see that the country has long been preoccupied with the improvement of its human resources and the quality of its education. Furthermore, it has sometimes admitted to some of the weaknesses within its educational system; but it has ascribed all shortcomings to external factors rather than addressing the shortsighted policies of its leadership. In other words, the ideological commitment has never been questioned, rather, if any new needs came along (as in the case of foreign language or technical training), the DPRK was quick to rely on external aid (NESCO – DPRK Ministry of Education, 2004).

Three cases of ‘conditional opening’

The three projects the history and characteristics of which this paper examines to better understand educational cooperation with the DPRK are, the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology (PUST), the training programs run by Choson Exchange (CE), and the training for North Korean officials and academics provided by a team of European specialists (hereinafter EUS). These three initiatives differ in scope, focus, location, size and period of activity. Nevertheless, they also present important similarities; all of them have obtained significant results in establishing positive, long-lasting relations with different counterparts in the DPRK.

Despite the names of some of these initiatives, none of them feature a real exchange (i.e. a two-way flux of personnel and data) but rather they exemplify the idea of ‘knowledge sharing’ in the sense that while they provide training to North Koreans, they also act as an indirect, informal channel of information from the DPRK towards the outside.

Of the three, PUST represents the first and certainly more unusual example of an international education project, almost entirely funded by private donors, yet
developed directly in the DPRK under governmental auspices. The other two, Choson Exchange and the EUS cooperation, illustrate the different ways in which both NGOs and academic institutions can operate through a variety of channels, official and unofficial, to facilitate knowledge transfer or promote the introduction of new concepts within the DPRK.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Projects &amp; Characteristics</th>
<th>Pyongyang University of Science &amp; Technology (PUST)</th>
<th>Choson Exchange</th>
<th>Training Program for DPRK Officials, in Third Countries (Asia) run by EUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year established</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Categorized/Registered as</td>
<td>Higher Education Institution (under the auspices of the DPRK’s MoE)</td>
<td>NGO, Non for profit</td>
<td>Unofficial Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters/Origin</td>
<td>USA and South Korea</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location of Activities</td>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Singapore and occasionally DPRK</td>
<td>DPRK &amp; Asian Countries (not official)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully operational since</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2003/2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding/Resources</td>
<td>NAFEC, Other private donors, ROK Ministry of Unification (unofficial)</td>
<td>Private Donors</td>
<td>Development agencies in EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacts with DPRK Counterparts</td>
<td>DPRK Ministry of Education</td>
<td>CCRFC, MFA, Others</td>
<td>DPRK Embassies in EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inbound Programs (Training participants in the DPRK)</td>
<td>University Programs (BA, MBA, MA)</td>
<td>Seminars (occasional)</td>
<td>Training programs for officials (some academics involved as well)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outbound Programs (Bringing participants from the DPRK)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Seminars, Intensive courses and training sessions (Economy, Fiscal policy, Urban Planning and other topics)</td>
<td>Study-related visits and seminars</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Choson Exchange represents a form of *ad hoc* educational provider for officers.
and young professionals, while the EUS cooperation, albeit unofficial, is one of the most solid examples of cooperation between North Korean officials and foreign teachers. The peculiarity of this program lies in the fact that it trains North Koreans in a 'neutral' territory (another Asian country), allowing participants to match theory with practice, in an environment that is closer to their socioeconomic reality. The following table summarizes the main characteristics of each project:

3. The Pyongyang University of Science and Technology (PUST)

The PUST\(^1\) case has been abundantly covered by the press, as it is unprecedented in North Korea: a foreign-managed, foreign-owned and directed institution with a campus in Pyongyang, under the supervision of the DPRK Ministry of Education, yet with freedom to choose its teaching staff and curricula, as long as it does not directly challenge North Korean ideology. PUST is even more exceptional due to the history of its founder and director, James Kim, and the nature of its main fundraiser: NAFEC, a Christian organization with headquarters in the US and South Korea.

PUST is the first international university in North Korea. The North Korean Ministry of Education gave permission for the establishment of the university in May 2001, and the building of the campus began in 2002. Before PUST, James Kim, had already established China's first foreign university, the Yanbian University of Science and Technology (YUST), located right next to the North Korean border in Yanji (Stone, 2007, p. 183). Much of the funding for the project in North Korea, collected through NAFEC, came from South Korean donors, and even South Korea's Ministry of Unification is claimed to have given $1 million to the project, though with little fanfare. However, despite this grant, the project faced several delays, and it was not until 2009 that the opening ceremony could be held, and only in 2010 did the university open its doors to its first students (Stone, 2007, p. 184; 2009, pp. 1610-1611; 2011, pp. 1624-1625).

The goals for PUST were set high from the beginning, and the university's website states that they aim to aid the development of North Korea by creating an institution with “first-rate faculty” teaching the brightest of North Korea's students, who will later on become the new generation of “innovative global leaders” (Stone, 2007, p. 183). Kim was given permission to act as the president of the university and to hire foreign staff of his choosing, as well as a 50 year lease on the campus (Stone, 2007, p. 184) Kim's co-president, Ho Kwang Il, was appointed by the DPRK Ministry of Education, as was the vice president Pak Sang Ik. Though Kim is a devout Christian, as are many others of the university's foreign teaching staff, he promised to keep religion out of PUST. Instead, the students take lessons on North Korean Juche ideology just the same as their counterparts in any other university. However, PUST is unlike any other university in North Korea not just because of

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\(^1\) Privacy Note: This section contains excerpts of an interview with professors working at PUST. The interview was recorded in 2013. The names of the professors and other details have been omitted to preserve privacy and future endeavors with PUST. The acronym PP (as in: PUST Professors) is used instead. The content of the interview was transcribed from the original audio file, and adapted to the format of the article. The original wording and construction of each paragraph has been preserved as much as possible. Direct quotes are taken from the original transcript, unless otherwise noted.
its foreign faculty members and the use of English as its language of instruction, but because it is the only one in the country with full Internet access. Foreign teachers can use Internet as they please, and even second-year graduate students can use the Internet to help them with their studies, although a log is kept of the sites that they visit (Stone, 2011, pp. 1624-1625).

In 2009 it was said that in the beginning PUST would operate three schools: one dedicated to information technology, another to industry and management and a third that would teach agriculture, food, and life sciences. It was also stated that later on the university would expand into architecture and engineering, as well as public health. However, PUST has been facing funding problems, and there is no definitive information whether the plans to open the planned new schools have materialized or not. Likewise, enrollment targets were initially set at 600 graduate and 2000 under-graduate students by 2012; but a 2011 article gives the number of 67 graduate students and 200 undergraduates as 2010 (Stone, 2011, p. 1610). The University's homepage does not provide any up-to-date information on the current state of its programs or the number of students enrolled.

In terms of educational content, PUST adopts a flexible approach, given the fact that the North Korean system has no standard of equivalence with any Western counterpart, and that in some cases, adapting notions to the existing framework of reference may work better than training students to an entirely new approach. On this issue, an interview with a PUST Professor (hereinafter PP) revealed that

“Students knew some bits of theory here and there, some things about marketing, not much, of course, because some of ‘our’ notions are not relevant to them and some other notions are simply not applicable. I would not say they knew how we do business here in the west, but I would add: Is there a need for them to know how we run things over here, really in depth? – I can say they know some things related to economics, IT, finance and project management.”

PUST has also made an effort to allow teachers with as much flexibility as the system consents. Professors at PUST have to undergo a prior period of training to learn how to deal with the peculiarities of the North Korean system and the exceptional environment of the Pyongyang campus. They are not allowed, for instance, to discuss any political matter, in or out of classroom setting, just as they cannot leave the campus’s premises, unless special reasons arise. In spite of this, Professors seem to enjoy a good amount of liberty in terms of educational choices, as PP recalls:

“...I would decide most of the contents, as I was the expert on that particular subject. I would then submit the curriculum and if the dean (and the faculty) approved it, then I implemented it in the class. Everything has to be screened and pre-approved; I would say that they (the faculty) look at the big picture and if something works they adopt it quickly. Professors are, free to propose, just like they would do back home. I am not an expert in how things function in North Korea and at the higher level of PUST and between PUST and North Korea (and I do not need to know it, frankly), but if I think they need more of a certain element in the teaching, or if the Dean thinks they need more on top of the actual program, we would discuss and arrange that.”

As for the future of the institution, the development of PUST suggests that the University is an example of how the more institutionalized forms of exchange in particular are vulnerable to political tensions. The lack of funding is largely due to

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2 Interview with PUST Professor 1 (hereinafter: PP1), winter 2013.
3 Ibid.
worsening of North-South relations, which began in 2008, after Lee Myung-Bak took office in South Korea and took a less lenient approach with Pyongyang, and a South Korean tourist was killed on Mt. Kumgang. The Cheonan incident of 2010 complicated matters even further. With faltering support from the South, PUST has not been able to live up to initial expectations, and the university has been unable even to acquire all the necessary equipment for its campus. Some professors fear that this will eventually lead to the brightest students being sent to other universities in the country. Many hoped PUST would help groom a new North Korean elite with a wider worldview, and the institution somehow still aims to do so, with plans of taking some students to visit universities in China, and even allowing some to participate in the European Erasmus exchange program (Stone, 2011, pp. 1624-1625). It should be noted here that PUST makes a clear case of not wanting to interfere in any way at political level with what the DPRK considers to be ‘sensitive topics’: the university aims at developing knowledge for peaceful cooperation between Korea and the world. However, unless it is able to solve its oscillating funding problems, these plans may never become reality, and PUST could fall victim to political circumstances.

4. Choson Exchange

The case of Choson Exchange (CE) represents an example of independent initiatives of cultural cooperation both within and outside of the DPRK. However, its pool of contacts within the DPRK is not the same as that of the PUST; its educational projects and the way they are carried out are also different. Choson Exchange specializes in short-term seminars, geared towards groups of talented young professionals and academics selected by a number of DPRK institutions or government bodies to undergo a period of specialized training and bring new sources of knowledge into the country. Choson Exchange also differentiates itself in its attitude towards the media. Whilst maintaining the usual, necessary discretion about specific details of its cooperation with DPRK institutions, the organization is committed to make public as much of its activity as possible, on their homepage as well as on social media.

Technically, Choson Exchange is a nonprofit organization registered in Singapore. Its founder, Geoffrey See, explained in a few interviews how the project was first conceived and then turned into a working reality:

“On my first trip to Pyongyang, in 2007, a student from Kim Il Sung University [...] told me that she wanted to join a trading company to prove that women can be great business leaders. She asked if I could bring economics or business textbooks for her the next time I visited the country” (See, 2011).

See (a research affiliate at MIT’s Center for International Studies) realized that there was a thirst for knowledge in the North Korea and that, given the right educational opportunities, some of these people could become globally integrated leaders.

After 2007, he was joined by a number of partners that now constitute the core of the Choson Exchange. After the first trip in 2007, See and his associates launched their first exploratory project in 2009 and finally registered the organization as a Singaporean Non-for-Profit in 2010.

So far, Choson Exchange has mainly focused on short term initiatives, mainly
conducted outside the DPRK, with a few exceptions. There are plans for a full academic program (Master’s level) to be conducted in Singapore, but things have not been finalized yet at the DPRK end (it seems that one factor in the delay may be related to the requirements from the Singaporean partner institution being hard to match for some North Korean participants, especially in terms of English fluency). The seminars (or workshops) are organized in small-to-medium groups (under 20 participants) and according to Choson Exchange they are usually easier to set up than other programs, as similar seminars have already been organized in Pyongyang.

In these instances, DPRK institutions present their candidates selected from a pool that has been pre-screened either by the sending institution (banks, or various companies or agencies) or, alternatively, by Choson Exchange’s main partner, the CCRFC. Occasionally, CE may receive bureaucratic support by other counterparts or directly from companies within the DPRK. When it comes to establishing relations with DPRK agencies or institutions, Choson Exchange specifies that this process requires time and perseverance, in order to find a proper way to access the network of foreign-facing DPRK actors, and more important, to gain their trust and will to cooperate. In terms of content, CE programs are strongly focused on marketing and finance, although other subjects may be introduced from time to time (the first workshop ever organized was in fact about urban planning).

As these topics are not usually familiar to those coming from the DPRK, it is necessary to ask how the participants digest the new information and all the concepts that, to our knowledge, are foreign to their system (e.g. monetary and fiscal policies, banking systems, marketing strategies). Choson Exchange makes a distinction between some basic concepts (e.g. taxation of private capitals and individuals, fiscal responsibility, most of which constitute the foundation of western administrative systems) that are completely new to DPRK participants, and others, such as state-provided goods and services that they are more familiar with.

As for the impact that these seminars have had on the participants, the feedback received by Choson Exchange indicates a 'gradual waking-up' to the existence of plausible alternatives, rather than a 'shocking revelation’, in other words, North Korean participants seem to be able to incorporate new knowledge into a pre-existing frame of socialist education. The fact that some of these workshops are organized in Singapore (a highly efficient and well administered country, which however does not possess the full pluralism of politics that other western countries have) could constitute a plausible model, so to speak, of gradual integration between a more open economic approach and an authoritarian political system.

The work of organizations like Choson Exchange seems to be well received by the North Korean participants, at least judging from the feedback (feedback that is by necessity anonymous), published in their 2011 activity report:

“I was impressed by the training programs in order to have a skilled labor force. Training and retraining is very important in order to remain competitive [...] another issue important for us was the allocation of resources. Singapore is a market economy and it was a surprise for me to learn that 90% of the population owns their apartment […] While attending this [Choson Exchange] program, I came to conclusion that in future, we must include many capable and intelligent people of a think-tank for DPRK’s economic development and growth...and find out together a right approach to many economic problems – North Korean participant in Singapore Economic Policy Dialogue.” (Chosen Exchange, 2011, pp. 6-7).
It seems plausible that some things could change in what could be the first generation of DPRK managers and new leaders, or at least among those who are selected to attend these seminars. The Choson Exchange has recently released a survey on female participation in North Korea’s business sector, an interesting document on an even less explored side of the DPRK economic reality (Chosen Exchange, 2011). As for all other initiatives of educational cooperation, the main problem remains access to funding, depending on which CE plans to continue its educational plans for 2013 with a focus on domestic training for North Koreans (Chosen Exchange, 2011, p. 4).

5. The EUS Experience

Together with the UBC experience from Canada, the cooperation between a very small team of EU experts in transition economies and the DPRK is at the same time an important, durable and little-known reality within the panorama of educational exchanges between the DPRK and western countries. The program was initiated by North Korea: EUSp and two of his colleagues were approached by the North Koreans. The reason, as EUSp explains, was probably because they had previously run a number of different programs in other countries, under similar circumstances. The team, based in Europe, was first group of researchers to get into an Asian country (hereinafter AC) at the time of its opening in the late 1980s, setting up collaborative initiatives with local partners, with whom they still cooperate. They also had a similar program in central America, where they trained local authorities in market economics; the team also worked with the Baltic countries when they were opening up after the collapse of the Soviet Union, as well as in China, and previously, in Pakistan during the 1970s.

Initial negotiations with North Korea took two years because, as EUSp recalls:

“North Koreans absolutely wanted to come to Europe for a training program but we opposed that from the very beginning because, given the conditions of North Korea, coming to Europe wouldn’t have been suitable. If that happened, North Koreans would have had only a limited training, in a theoretical sense. They would not have had the chance to do field visits that could be relevant to their circumstances”.

EUSp proposed from the very beginning that the program should be run in AC even though DPRK authorities were not keen on the idea, as they generally felt “much superior to AC in their economic development, as there could be nothing they could learn from it”.

The negotiations took place more than a decade ago, with EUSp leaving time for DPRK authorities to evaluate the idea of working with an AC, and it wasn’t until the early 2000s that the North Koreans felt ready to start under such conditions.

Privacy Note: This section is based on a lengthy interview with a Professor of economics in a EUS University, recorded in 2013. As in the PUST case, the names of the professor and of his colleagues and other details have been omitted to preserve their privacy and future endeavors. The acronym EUSp (as in: EUS professor) is used instead. The content of the interview was transcribed from the original audio file, and adapted to the format of the article. The original wording and construction of each paragraph has been preserved as much as possible. Direct quotes are taken from the original transcript, unless otherwise noted.

For the Asian country hosting training programs, the acronym AC is used instead.
Since then, the EUS has operated five programs in AC, all being structured in the same way, with periodical changes in the content because

“the programs are not intended for the same people. It is important to have new groups every time; we see it as one of our objectives to actually bring people out, different people every time”.

The programs run for two to three weeks and combine lectures for half of the day and visits or other practical training for the rest of the day. In general, participants attend lectures in the morning, and then make study visits related to the day’s lecture during the afternoon.

This is the reason why EUSp wanted programs to run in AC and not in Europe. Having, for instance, a lecture about trade or banking, this must be “structured on the audience, in the sense that it must have elements the audience can relate to, so, something that is from a country that is on its way to reform, even though the word reform has to be used very cautiously and North Koreans prefer the word 'Improvement'...”. EUSp explained that if North Koreans were to make a visit to the central bank of any EU country, it would have been completely irrelevant to what they could ever experience at the moment. The philosophy behind the content of the program has been very specific:

“We told them: ‘we do not know what kind of policies you are going to run in North Korea, but because you have contacted us and we have agreed to provide training, we will tell you about how things are run in other countries, in regards to international economy, so, this is how we think’... and I think that’s a much better way than, for instance, simply telling them: 'you have to do this and that'. It is extremely important to overcome, the friction that occurs if we start telling them what they should be doing (instead of what they could do)”.

In terms of content, the program focuses on international economics and trade. EUSp has structured it around three core issues, each of which requires 15 or 20 hours of lectures. The first core issue is dedicated to theory, for instance, the explanation of the theoretical justification for having an interest in internationalization, and international trade and globalization. In this first phase, the program exposes North Koreans to the same basic theories that EUSp or other professors would run in university programs in the EU, albeit in a very condensed form. The second part of the training focuses on economic policies:

“Whereas the first part of the program (the theoretical analysis) shows participants that there are gains and benefits to be made from international trade, the second focuses on the fact that now, in order to implement such theory, a country has to carry out specific policies, and make appropriate decisions when it comes to protectionism and tariffs, for instance, or the institutions that are necessary to facilitate positive internationalization”.

This part of the seminars involves between 15 and 20 hours of discussions of trade policy in general. EUSp also provides participants with concrete examples about how policy conclusions have been applied in different parts of the world, with specific attention to what successful East Asian countries, for instance, have done in order to get as far as they have. EUSp also mentions South Korea in this context, and surprisingly enough, North Korean authorities seemed to be willing to listen:

“It was not easy at first, but they listened. Nobody went out of the room. Some of them were grumbling a little, but they all sat and listened”.

East Asia is a very central example to North Koreans, who often discuss the case of AC with EUSp, especially on the policy side of AC’s development. According to
EUSp, the AC authorities have made (as it is natural) quite a few mistakes in their reform process, so that now it is possible for the North Koreans to extract useful lessons from those.

Finally, the third part of the courses is geared towards business strategy, bringing the program to full circle. In fact, the theory helps North Koreans understand why they would want to engage in internationalization; subsequently, the policy part tells them what government can do to facilitate such engagement, to ensure that the effects of such internationalization are as positive as they expected. Finally, the business strategy tells them how (in practice) companies act in order to benefit from internationalization, what are the challenges and what are the lessons learned from other examples in international business in general, about successful strategies. This is obviously quite new to North Koreans and, as EUSp explains, “always interesting for them, because they can see the immediate applications (with the study visits) for their own economy”.

The program has been quite successful so far, even though, as in every complicated process, there have been a few bumps on the road. EUSp explains that during most of the initial sessions, he had to stop and take one day to focus fully on macroeconomics, because North Korean participants did not have any training in this regard, nearly no theoretical foundation.

“At first, they had no understanding of how market economy works, and how prices are set; no clue about the relation between demand and supply, market structure, market forms”.

Once the initial efforts have paved the way for theoretical foundation, the program moves on. EUSp acknowledges that the intense work done in the beginning (when nearly all teaching materials and syllabus had to be created for the first time) has later paid off:

“I know for a fact that they are now using our materials in their lectures in various universities, the textbooks we provided, and or teaching, so my assumption is that next time, they will have at least a rudimentary understanding of how the market works”.

The study materials are prepared by EUSp with his team, they are originally in English, although during the seminars, the slides are translated in Korean, for those participants who do not have sufficient command of English. In the same fashion, during the presentations, English slides are used alongside the Korean ones and on nearly all occasions there are interpreters and translators. EUSp remarks that interpretation has been a serious problem from the beginning, not only in terms of pure language difference, but mostly because even when North Koreans relate to the Korean spoken in the South, they do not have most of the terms we are used to in western economic training.

“When we started the program, there were no words in North Korean language to describe the phenomena we were dealing with. I think honestly that our first two rounds of lectures where important not only because they conveyed the basic ideas, but also because the translators, the Koreans, worked really hard to find the right words”.

Help on language issues comes from one of the key people involved in the program, a Korean with education in economics and business, who is also EUSp's assistant. According to EUSp, the first groups of North Korean participants have now compiled a dictionary of economic terms, from the notes taken during the early seminars.
Perhaps the most interesting spillover effect, a positive one, coming from the EUS cooperation, is that, aside from the obvious effect in terms of knowledge, it has produced positive interaction and a mind-opening (if not a true change) in the opinion of North Korean participants, as EUSp recalls:

"The opinions of the Koreans have changed, it actually already happened in the first program. The leader of the Korean delegation came up to me and said, very frankly: 'Before we came here, we did not think this was worthwhile for us, to come to AC at all, because we couldn’t think there was anything we could learn, but we now realized that there are things here that could be useful for us'. And of course they talk very often in terms not only of positive lessons, but also of ‘negative lessons’, and I think that is completely justified from their point of view”.

The 'negative lessons' to which EUSp refers are those that could potentially drive North Korea away from cooperation projects, and they relate to the impact that new economic realities (as in the case of AC) could have on the mindset of North Korean authorities. For instance, it seems that when they first looked at how AC changed after attempts of economic reforms, some DPRK officials were not at all pleased with what they saw. The hustle and bustle of other cities apparently had a negative impact on North Koreans, who feared that the current orderly and regimented way of life in North Korea might disappear due to the opening to foreign influences.

The EUS experience, as presented by EUSp during his interview, shows that while flexibility in negotiation and patience are key elements, foreign institutions can overcome the bureaucratic (and sometimes dogmatic) impasse of North Korea by being at times more ‘assertive’ in their demands for cooperation.

For instance, had EUSp agreed to all the demands of the DPRK government, the program would have been held in Europe rather than in AC, with high chances of an early failure due to a non-relevant environment for North Koreans, and a lack of comparable institutions in economic and financial terms. It is safe to say, judging from the interviews and the data presented so far, that the forms of educational engagement with best chances of long-term success are those that in some way challenge the immobility of some parts of the North Korean government and introduce new elements with a non-judgmental attitude. Presenting innovation in educational contents on topics as an option, rather than as a ‘must-have’ seem to be the way to go for the near future.

6. Conclusions

What do all these initiatives tell us about the DPRK and its willingness to acquire scientific and technological knowledge? What role will education play in the future of North Korea and how will the country manage to restructure its human resources? The case studies presented here are only to a certain extent representative of a new North Korean reality, and should not be used to assume that some trends will emerge in the future while others will not. However, even at this stage, there are lessons to be learned from the cases of educational engagement presented in this paper, just as there are important factors to be considered on the historical and cultural levels. At present the number of difficulties, caveats, and the undeniable effort required, suggests that, in order to be successful, educational cooperation with the DPRK has to overcome a number of challenges.
6.1. The Weight of Politics

First and foremost, even in the minor context of this paper, it appears that the projects introduced here could function better if only political conditions allowed it. Such conditions can be divided in two main groups: internal and external. The internal ones are (a) North Korea’s need to protect domestic legitimacy vis-à-vis the South, and (b) the fact that, having painted itself into an ideological corner, it cannot easily allow the spread of foreign knowledge into the country; yet, at the same time, it desperately needs that knowledge, together with many other forms of foreign assistance, in order to survive. External factors include: (a) the fact that North Korea is under some of the strictest regimes of sanctions currently enforced by the UN and the USA, and (b) the tense relations and the lack of political and diplomatic recognition with South Korea, US and Japan. These factors contribute to the present difficulty in setting up successful and durable educational exchanges.

6.2. Coordination versus Fragmentation in Cooperation Initiatives

A very important aspect of educational engagement is how different foreign actors operate in and towards the DPRK. Projects and initiatives are as diverse and numerous as the individuals and institutions involved. Will they be more successful if they are coordinated or if they work independently from one another?

In theory, coordination (usually under the umbrella of larger international organizations such as the UN) allows different actors to share information, avoiding the overlapping of initiatives and the wasting of precious resources, even if at times the bureaucratic process and can delay results. Canadian expert Erich Weingartner proposed as early as 2007 the creation of a Liaison Unit for Knowledge Share (LUKS) with the DPRK, “to find the means to harmonize the motivation of external knowledge providers to effect changes in the current DPRK system with the perceived need of DPRK counterparts to safeguard the security of the existing system” (2007, pp. 7-9). The main role of the LUKS, according to Weingartner would have been that of a 'buffer' between DPRK institutions and the numerous NGOs and institutions operating in North Korea.

However, if we look at how the North Korean society itself is extremely fragmented, with lots of intersections and people who do not share information, the idea of a coordination (or too strong a coordination) of efforts could present some problems. Should the international community decide to coordinate its efforts, we could witness a power struggle within the North Korean authorities to decide who should be the sole counterpart of coordinated foreign assistance and knowledge export.

The risk associated with such a power struggle would be that any entity having exclusive rights on the dialogue with foreign partners would do their best to monopolize and control the relationship. As the landscape of knowledge sharing in North Korea is still quite unstructured, this may indeed cause some overlapping of initiatives. However, this would be a small price to pay, at the current stage of development, in comparison with the fact that the international community probably could reach a bit further out, a bit deeper than it would, if it was working with a coordinated effort.
6.3. Need-Want-Can: Balancing Knowledge Transfer to North Korea

A correct assessment of what North Koreans can learn is just as important as understanding the difference between what they need to learn first and what they would like to prioritize instead. Much of the success (or the failure) of each initiative usually hinges on the fact that educational projects have to address important needs, managing at the same time to avoid any infringement of political rules. Experience has taught international actors that North Korea can act quite ‘instinctively’, with little planning and with a set of priorities that are diverging if not opposite to the ones of its partners. For instance, when it first reached out to the world in order to experiment with economic reforms, North Korea started and closed down a number of projects in a very short time, unsure which direction to take, with mixed attitudes towards the possible benefits and risks of opening.

In this case, the limitations pertain to the overall feasibility of each project just as to the teaching, which often has to be ‘detached’ from the historical and political context to be accepted, and presented instead as the sum of experiences from foreign countries rather than a precise set of instructions that address specific inefficiencies of the North Korean system.

After nearly two decades, the priority for North Korea remains preserving political stability, although the importance of ‘adjustments’ (a word always preferred to ‘changes or ‘reforms’ by North Korean authorities) is steadily growing. North Korean authorities retain nearly exclusive decisional power over the candidates for each educational opportunity and limit their contact with foreign teachers, even if this proves detrimental to the quality of their learning experience.

In order to avoid frustration, and ultimately failure in knowledge sharing, each project should be presented with a clear distinction (on the side of foreign partners at least) between what North Koreans (academics, students and officials) need to know first, what the authorities want them to learn (or believe they should learn) first, and what participants would be allowed to learn and implement for the time being. Without such distinction, failure is likely to occur, as resources will be wasted or misdirected.

6.4. Gender Inequality

A common negative feature of most initiatives of knowledge sharing in North Korea is the gender inequality in access to foreign expertise. Most programs are either attended only by a majority of men, or simply not open to women. Such is the case of PUST (where only male students are admitted, although the University has vowed to address this issue in future), and the same issue has been noted in the EU experience. Although no comprehensive data exists at the moment on the exact number of DPRK women who have participated in study abroad programs or have benefitted from foreign-sponsored training in North Korea, this seems to be a problem that is both relevant to the quality of education in North Korea and crucial for its society that is rapidly evolving, where the women run an unofficial yet all-important economy, but are still kept at a distance by a number of rules and traditions. It is significant that Choson Exchange has recently organized a workshop entirely dedicated to the training of women, and moreover that this program has found favor with the government.
In a recent report on the ‘Women in Business’ program, Choson Exchange has stated that although women are becoming increasingly important in North Korea’s business sector, (and this is attributable to the fact that they are often not required to stay in government-assigned positions, usually reserved to male colleagues), at managerial level, they are underrepresented in many areas. In the opinion of Choson Exchange "access to business training and international opportunities could go a long way towards leveling the playing field for female managers in North Korea" (Chosen Exchange, 2011). The gender gap in business management can be explained, for instance with the fact that institutions like the University of National Economy, a key focal point for business training, has only 20% of females enrollees, with only 5% of international business opportunities given to females. This of course makes Choson Exchange's programs for women’s entrepreneurship in the DPRK all the more important.

6.5. Candidates' Selection and Spread of Knowledge in the DPRK

The gender gap in North Korean higher and adult education is in turn related to the larger question of the country's attitude towards educational cooperation, which affects the selection process and the overall quality of the candidates for international and domestic programs. North Korea has so far chosen a path of carefully selected, intermittent cooperation, privileging the safety of its own system over widespread exposure to foreign influences. In other words, the final choice of participants, for both inbound and outbound programs, has always been made by the North Korean authorities and is very often based on the level of political reliability of the candidates rather than real meritocracy.

Even though this attitude has been changing in recent years, it was not uncommon to see more government officials than actual academics in the first exchange programs. Apparently, the fact that such educational opportunities would be 'wasted' by selecting bureaucrats over scholars did not worry the regime as much as the possibility of foreign knowledge spreading out of control. With this in mind, the issue of knowledge spread in the DPRK has become one of the main concerns for those institutions that interact with the country.

Those who advocate sanctions and oppose engagement argue that projects of knowledge export, such as PUST, will only help the children of the elite, leaving the less fortunate even further behind. In certain respects, given the peculiar ‘meritocracy’ scale in North Korea these may be considered valid arguments. An important aspect emerging during the PUST interview is that, in spite of the general rule of Songbun, students from all over the country seem to have the opportunity to study there. PP recalls that while not knowing the intricate details of the selection process,

"It definitely seemed [to me] that students come from different places. I was very surprised because I would have expected that really everyone would have been from Pyongyang, or at least the greater majority. But this was not the case. Also interesting was the fact that when I spoke to them, they told me they could ‘recognize’, so to speak, the ones who were from outside the capital, by the way in which they dress up, or how they carry themselves. I agree on the fact that if the teaching went only to the top elite, then it would not make much sense."6

6 Interview with PUST Professor, Feb 2013.
6.6. Cognitive Dissonance: Unintended Consequence of Cooperation?

Educational cooperation with North Korea is generally presented as a ‘technical’ activity, a practice that should be implemented regardless (or aside) of political factors. There is, however, a very important aspect in every initiative that brings North Koreans in touch with foreign knowledge, which is the discrepancy that would ensue from juxtaposing the reality of foreign influence (in terms of superior wealth and scientific advancement) with the façade that the North Korean government tries to maintain. In other words, the more the country exposes itself to foreign knowledge and influences, the more its people become vulnerable to what psychologists refer to as ‘cognitive dissonance.’

I use this term here to describe an aspect that is considered a major risk and a very sensitive issue, therefore not easily discussed by any of the parties interviewed in this work. Common sense would suggest that, finding themselves learning from foreigners, at some point North Koreans would have to acknowledge that their system did not work. As much as it is currently possible for the leadership to blame external factors (the sanctions, the climatic misfortunes and so forth) for the bad economic situation, the question remains (for loyal North Koreans) why the leadership has to resort to foreign assistance when the education system and the media depict the leadership and the national ideology as infallible.

In this regard, it comes as no surprise that North Korean media make no mention of (positive) foreign presence when it comes to educational and scientific advancements. It remains to be seen how the current leadership will be able to balance an ever-increasing need for information technology, keeping the information part at bay. The final answer to this question will only be revealed with time; however, in the light of the findings of this work, this is likely to become an increasingly difficult issue for the North Korean government to solve.

References


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The term is borrowed from psychology, as most readers will know, was coined by Leon Festinger in 1956. It is used in this article to express the potential (and so far unpredictable) reactions that the introduction of foreign knowledge may bring, first to the mindset of North Korean elites, and afterwards in the general population.


This article presents the media narratives of Kim Jong-Il’s death (17 December 2011) as they were reconstructed in six national newspapers in Romania. By using both quantitative content analysis and qualitative media discourse analysis, we reveal the existing “myths” about the North Korea political regime and the unique ways in which they were packaged together in media stories. In approaching this subject we use two theoretical frameworks: the narrative aspects involved in the publicizing of a media event and the “media frames” theory. The results show that both informative and emotional elements were salient in stories about Kim Jong Il’s death and legacy published in the Romanian media. Additionally, Kim Jong Il’s death and legacy were framed in a mixed manner in Romanian media with journalists using both episodic and contextual frames to cover two distinct events and processes.

Keywords: mass media, myths, media events, media frames, content analysis

1. Introduction

In his analysis of the difference between reality and media, Edelman emphasizes that:

“[News] construct the social reality to which people respond and help construct the subjectivity of actors and spectators as well; in the process, they reinforce established power structures and value hierarchies” (Edelman, 1988, p. 34).

In the case of North Korea, as Smith (2000, pp. 111-112) notes, the media coverage remains a captive of a “securitizing framework” shaped by two fundamental assumptions: North Korea as “bad,” and North Korea as “mad” country. In fact, as Gusterson (2008) points out, the American (and, we can add, Western) media “story” about North Korea is roughly the same: North Korea is a backward, isolated country run by a tyrant with comically eccentric, excessive tastes a regime which consistently lies and cheats, and is driven by the childish narcissism of its leader. As Hemmings (2013) has stressed, the isolated nature of North Korean society means that the country has long been subjected to generalizations and stereotypes in other (that is, Western) media.

The focus of the present article is the analysis of the Romanian media’s framing of the North Korea and Kim Jong Il after 19 December, 2011. We consider Kim Jong Il’s death and legacy as a clear example of a media event (Dayan, 1994) in which the articulation of frameworks used to present myths related to Kim Jong Il and North Korea transforms the pure (media) event in a media ritual (Couldry, 2003). In approaching this subject we use two theoretical perspectives. On the one
hand, we take into consideration the narrative aspects involved in the publicizing of a media event, by focusing on the event narratives built so as to transmit a particular significance of an event. The analyzed media event was the moment when the death of the former leader of North Korea was announced in Romania and several “narratives” related to North Korea and its leader(s) were presented by the media. We consider “textual narrative” to be mainly the sequence of certain texts which were used in order to present an event -- in our case Kim Jong Il’s death and legacy - in a specific order with a specific purpose and from a specific point of view. Unlike in the case of a merely semiotic analysis of the written text, in this “social semiotics”-based perspective the starting point was decoding the cultural codes and myths transmitted when an event becomes public. From a different perspective, Romanian media used various “frames” to present both Kim Jong Il’s death and his legacy. Gamson (1989, p. 157) defines a frame as “a central organizing idea for making sense of relevant events and suggesting what is at issue”. It is generally considered that frames are used in mass media because they have the capacity to highlight certain elements and perspectives, thus increasing the chances for certain interpretation schemes to be selected and evoked from among many others. As Sieff emphasizes (2003) the repetitiveness of frame presentation to the public shapes in time the way in which a certain topic or subject is perceived. In other words, the more frequently a certain topic is framed by a certain approach, the more probable it is for people -- and the public in a broader sense -- to adopt that perspective on the matter.

2. Short history of the relations between Romania and North Korea

In approaching the issue of media coverage of North Korea and Kim Jong Il’s death and legacy only in one country’s (i.e. Romanian) mass media, we started from the historical link which existed between East-Asia communism and Romanian communism after 1971 until 1989 (Tismaneanu, 2004). As Tismaneanu shows in his analysis of the Ceausescu regime:

“In the late 1970s, Romania appeared to be moving toward a political formula closer to Asiatic despotism (as described by Karx and Wittfogel) than to routinized bureaucratic authoritarianism in the Brezhnevite mold” (2004, p. 40).

This peculiarity of recent Romanian history has been analyzed in various studies (Almond, 1988; Fisher, 1989; Verdery, 1991; Deletant, 1999) and the general consensus is that Romania in the 1980s was more akin to North Korea than Hungary or Poland. The “neo-Stalinism” (Tismaneanu, 1989; 2004) which characterized both Romania and North Korea in 1971-1989 had separated those countries from the rest of communist world. As Tismaneanu showed, this neo-Stalinism was

“Reactionary and self-enclosed, it valued autarky and exclusiveness. It adhered to a militaristic vision of both domestic and international settings” (1989, p. 2).

As some authors have suggested (Almond, 1988; Fisher, 1989; Verdery, 1991; Deletant, 1999) Ceausescu’s trip to China and North Korea in 1971 had resulted in a “mini-cultural revolution”, in fact, an oversized personality cult that lasted until the Romanian revolution of 1989. This personality cult had traits in common in Romania and North Korea, such as the relevance of the Great Leader’s family, his
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native village and his birthday for the ideology of communist systems (Cheong, 2000). In fact, Romanian and North-Korean neo-Stalinism was a syncretism which connected a programmatically rationalist world view (scientific socialism) with a set of religious beliefs deeply embedded in the emotional infrastructure of national political cultures of both societies (Tismaneanu, 1989). This peculiarity was also reflected at the level of dominant political discourse both in Romania and in North Korea, where one could witness a “sacralisation” of the political power. Thus, Nicolae Ceausescu and Kim Il Sung were presented in the public space as able to reveal the Objective Truth of History and the Laws of Social Evolution as Founder Fathers of a new world (Brzechczyn, 2008). The “divine” nature of the leader was also present in the media and public discourses. Instead of Ceausescu’s name, the Romanian press used the titles: Genius of Carpathian Mountains”, “Symbol of Peace and Light”, or “Sweet Kiss of the Fatherland”. In the same vein, in North Korea it is impossible to simply say “Kim Il Sung” and even in an unofficial situation, he was named “The Great Leader Kim Il Sung” (Milewska, 2010).

The political and social changes which started in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 led to structural changes in Romania, with the country experiencing transformations from a communist society to a pluralist, democratic one, from state-owned property to private enterprise and the appearance and growth of free mass media and civil society. In 2004 Romania became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and two years later joined the European Union as a full member. North Korea, meanwhile, remained one of the few communist countries in the world (together with Cuba, Vietnam, Laos and China), a reclusive, closed country where nothing seems to have changed in the last twenty-five years (Hemmings, 2013).

At present only few studies have analyzed the similarities between North Korea and Romania political system and ideologies, and only during the communist regime (Cheong, 2000; Chen and Lee, 2008). Negligible research is to be found on East-European media coverage of North Korea both during the communist period and after 1990\(^1\). The only references of media coverage of North Korea have been in the analysis in relation to Western (European and US) media. Shim and Nabers pointed out that the representation of North Korea as either a menace or a weak, if not failed state, are the two dominant ways of portraying the country in Western media. (2011, p. 16). At the same time, the concept of security and the framework of “securitizations” is always paramount in the Western coverage of North Korea today (Seo, 2009).

Seo (2009) examines factors that influence Western and South Korean journalists when reporting on North Korea. By conducting a survey of journalists who covered North Korea and a content analysis of media reports on North Korea, Seo found that sources at institutional level had a significant influence on

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\(^1\) Our general assessment was that information about North Korea was very scarce in the former-communist East and Central European countries. It is true that this assessment is based on the situation of media coverage of North Korea in Romanian media after 1989, and we cannot generalize to former-communist countries as a whole. Given the gap in the existing literature we only assume that the situation is the same in other countries, the minimal coverage of North Korea in media from that part of Europe leading to a lack of scholarly interest in the issue.
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journalists’ perceived importance of the rogue state dimension of North Korea (2009). Lim and Seo (2009) found that, after former President George W. Bush branded North Korea as part of the ‘axis of evil’ in his State of Union address in 2002, it received considerable attention from both the US government and the US news media. Media discourses varied between military threat, human rights and dialogue, and changed according to political and security conditions of the specific periods. Lim and Seo (2009) then posed the question how the American public responds to foreign news when its government and news media change their prominence according to relations between the U.S. and North Korea. They found that these shifts made the American public choose economic sanctions over military solutions toward the country.

There are also relatively few studies that attempt to explain how North Korea specifically is constructed in the Western media. Generally, these few framing studies have contended that the country is an enemy of the US and Western world, one that should be approached carefully. The evolution of these news frames from diplomacy to the possibility of armed conflict was reflected in public opinion polls, which indicated that between 2000 and 2007 the US public increasingly viewed North Korea as a threat (Kim et al., 2008), demonstrating that news frames do indeed shape public opinion.

Starting from the visibility of Kim Jong Il’s death and legacy in mass media, we were interested to identify the main media devices used for framing the myths of Kim Jong Il’s death and legacy and the main patterns of decoding those myths both at the level of journalists and public. Starting from our own observation of the Romanian media “agenda” we observed the sudden interest of Romanian media in covering North Korea in relation to Kim Jon Il’s death and legacy. As the analysis below will show, that interest began with the announcement of his death and stopped immediately after his burial, the media coverage being only for the events related to this brief moment in North Korea recent history.

3. Theoretical framework

3.1. News framing and framing devices in mass media

The term “framing” refers to the act of organizing a constant flow of events, groups and individuals in order to help us understand the world (Goffman, 1974). It entails:

“selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution” (Goffman, 1974, p. 417).

“Frame” is a notion used to explain the way people perceive reality (Bateson, 1972). Tuchman (1978) and Gitlin (1980) use the concept to show how media coverage of social issues -- as an elite discourse -- contributes to maintaining the status quo in the social power structure. In so doing, Gitlin defines framing as:

“persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual” (1980, p. 7).

According to Pan and Kosicki (1993), when it comes to news stories, there are four dimensions wherein framing devices may function: syntactic, thematic,
rhetorical, and script structures. First, the framing of an issue can be identified by examining the order of words or information in the typical inverted pyramid structure of a new story (i.e., syntactic structure). A given aspect of an issue can also be given prominence by a “hypothesis-testing” feature of news stories (i.e., the thematic structure). The stylistic choices made by journalists can also serve framing (i.e., the rhetorical structure). Finally, news framing can be performed through script structure, which refers to the scheme composed by the sequence of activities and components of an event. The generic version of script structure in news stories consists of the ‘wh’ questions: who, what, when, where, why, and how. The script structure in news stories:

“conveys the impression that a news story is a relatively independent unit, because it appears to contain complete information of an event with a beginning, a climax, and an end” (Pan and Kosicki, 1993, p. 60).

News discourses, however, are stories because they are “arbitrarily chunked concretes in a continuous flow of history” (Pan and Kosicki, 1993, p. 60).

With thousands of people crying in the streets and a whole mythology related to the North Korean leader, many stories triggered by the unprecedented event flooded the news after Kim Jong Il’s death. The framing of such media had to involve the selection of narratives that were most relevant not only for the North Koreans but also for the Romanians. In other words, the question as to “whose stories and which facts within each story would be covered by the news media” was likely to be extremely relevant for the image of North Korea and its leader in Romanian media. In this respect, examining the script structure of news stories helps to capture the news framing of the event, since the structure provides information on whose and which news was selectively reported.

As the existing literature points out (Gans, 1979; Scheufele, 1999; Shoemaker and Reese, 1996; Sotirovic, 2003) there are various typologies of framing. Among these, we will only mention the distinction between episodic and contextual framing and the distinction between the macro and the micro level to which the framing applies (Scheufele, 1999). As Sotirovic (2003) has shown, “episodic framings” tend to concentrate on the individual, emphasizing the individual explanations, whereas “thematic framings” are interested not only in the individual level but also in aspects connected to the general social level and implicitly in social explanations. At the same time, as a macro construct, the term “framing” refers to the procedures used by journalists and other communicators to present the information in a manner which matches the fundamental schemes used by their audiences (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996). For journalists, framing does not mean trying to distort news but to trying to reduce a certain topic level of complexity, if we consider the restrictions related to the organizational routine in a media institution (Gans, 1979). In other words, “frames” become a valuable tool for presenting relatively complex topics in an efficient and accessible manner for a lay audience, because they use cognitive schemes the audience already possesses. As a micro-construct, the framing process describes how people use the information and the characteristics connected to the presentation of certain information referring to some issues and topics at the moment their impressions related to these (topics and issues) are being created.
3.2. Myths and media events

Myths enable the simplification of reality and the reduction of existing contradictions to a primary form of the fight between good and evil. They give the impression that power and those who possess it are sacred; each of the mythological hero’s words and actions becomes a symbol and a sign. Any myth uses images that render an event or a social actor recognizable and unforgettable. Myths are irrational, their action medium consists in human feelings and emotions – if emotions did not exist there would be no empathy or identification with the hero of the myths either. Finally, myths always match the public and the political medium’s expectations – they help create a particular image of a politician who addresses a particular type of electorate. There are three classes of symbolic representations or significances which are used at a large scale in relation to mass media myths:

1. Time representation – using and presenting different time frames;
2. Metaphorical representation in which analogue associations are used;
3. Synthetic (or artificial) significance – which refers to uses of representations that imply serious distortions of reality, its reconstruction. (Nimmo and Combs, 1980, p. 27)

In what concerns the 2011 death and legacy of the former North Korean leader we argue that the event of December 19, 2011 could be included in the media rituals group (Cottle, 2006, pp. 411–32; Couldry, 2003, pp. 59–69). Couldry defined “media rituals” as:

“Actions that are capable of standing for wider values and framework of understanding connected to media” (2003, p. 64).

Using texts in the case of such an event type ensures the basis for the manifestation of the feeling of belonging to a community with a double meaning: real (the North Korean people) and “imaginary” (Anderson, 1983; Appadurai, 1996). The community that witnessed this event is made up of direct participants, who were deeply emotionally involved in the event, and simple spectators, who were not involved and/or were not like the participants in this event.

In the context of mass media texts, according to Pierce (1990), all the three aspects of the sign (iconic, indexical, and symbolical) function simultaneously in order to support the interpreting and framing of particular news. In the case of the text a number of factors function in order to limit the polysemy. According to Goldman and Beeker’s analysis (1985, pp. 351–61), we understand texts on a daily basis which is why we see them as “naturally produced artifacts”, whose significance is neither built nor challenged. At the same time, textual symbolism is often based on metaphorical relations, which are fundamental to our cognitive system, thus becoming invisible (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, pp. 115–23.) Moreover, the people producing and those reading a newspaper can function, in Fowler’s (1991) terms, on the basis of a “shared competence” of the interpretation which developed over years and can make one’s favorite significance of a text inherent and much more automatic.

In the case of a text, as Fisher (1987) shows, the fundamental guidelines of the narrative logic are faithfulness and coherence. To be more precise, in order to make sense as a narrative, the text must build a coherent story and create the impression
that what is said through sequences seems true when compared to other pieces of text which we known to be true in real life.

4. Hypotheses and Research Questions

First of all, we assessed that when they present a media event that took place in another country (a foreign media event) the Romanian media should pay more attention to the informational aspects of the delivered story than to the emotive or psychological elements, and share them with Romanian readers and viewers. Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis:

H1. Kim Jong Il’s death and his legacy are more likely to be framed in terms of their informative elements, the emotive and/or psychological elements being minimized by the Romanian media.

According to our assessments, many different types of information ought to be included in Romanian media stories about Kim Jong Il’s death and legacy. On the one hand, the former (mostly political – communist – but also economic and cultural) ties between Romania and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea disappeared after December 1989 (Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012), and therefore information about the country’s political regime and social-economic issues was scarce in the Romanian media over the last twenty-three years. On the other hand, the media event referred to took place in December, a month when Romanians celebrate the beginning of the democratization process and the end of the Romanian communist regime. Consequently, for both previously mentioned aspects, the present study examines the comparative ratios of information and emotional aspects of “news packaging” in Romanian media and therefore the following research question arises:

RQ1. What kind of information is more salient in stories about Kim Jong Il’s death and legacy?

As Couldry (2003, pp. 59–69) suggests, we also considered that in the case of the event of Kim Jong Il’s death and legacy the main characteristic of the relationship between the media and the community was the presentation and the manipulation of certain fundamental schemes and categories through written texts. Those fundamental schemes will take the shape of “myths” related to Kim Jong Il’s death and legacy. As framing researchers recognize (Entman, 1991; Gamson, 1995), it may be difficult to grasp the frames generated by media practices because they are deeply anchored in the extant culture and resonate naturally with cultural motives; this could be especially true in case of the “myths” of a community with whom the public has no “shared competence” of interpretation – as was the case of the Romanian public and (North) Korean mythology. Therefore, to avoid “cognitive dissonance” (Festinger, 1962) we assumed that the myths presented in the stories covering Kim Jong Il’s death and legacy would be framed in Romanian media in an episodic manner – by emphasizing individual explanations at the expense of social
explanations. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed:

H2. Kim Jong Il’s death is more likely to be framed in an episodic manner by the Romanian media, while contextual framing will prevail in the stories covering Kim Jong Il’s legacy.

North Korea’s myths should be presented by Romanian journalists by focusing on the involved actors’ personality, mood or motivational contexts (Sotirovic, 2003), and thus the situational forces and the circumstances of the process or event will be less present in media depictions of them. We anticipate that this will be a result of the attention paid by Romanian journalists to the informational aspects of the story. Stories presenting North Korea myths are also likely to be subjected to the episodic framing following the social identity theory, which anticipates a negative differentiation of the out-group from the in-group. (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Given this situation, it is difficult to predict the prevalence of contextual framing for North Korean myths. Therefore, the next research question arises:

RQ2. What were the main frames through which the myths of Kim Jong Il’s death and legacy were presented to the Romanian public?

After reviewing the sample that contained Romanian media materials, we noticed the existence of some elements from North Korean mythology in the articles devoted to Kim Jong Il’s death and legacy, and were interested to see how the Romanian public understood this mythology and decoded it in an appropriate manner. We considered the readers’ comments at the end of articles covering Kim Jong Il’s death and legacy to be indicative of public reactions. Accordingly, this hypothesis is proposed:

H3: Public reactions to articles published about Kim Jong Il’s death are more likely to be more minimal where articles present the mythology referring to North Korea’s leaders.

As regards the issues of specific myths presented in relation to Kim Jong Il’s death and legacy, we assumed that their reception would be inherently contradictory in Romania: they do not present the “shared competence” of the interpretation necessary for understanding texts, as Fowler (1991) showed; moreover, they are related by a “shared competence” of the interpretation which developed over the years and could make one’s favorite significance of a text inherent and much more automatized. In addition, the myths related to Kim Jong Il as they were presented in Romanian media were decoded at two levels: the journalist’s level and the audience’s level. Consequently, we could assume that the decoding process was accomplished only in the case of some myths, while others remained (almost completely) meaningless for the Romanian public, due to the absence of a “shared competence”. Accordingly, the following research question is posed:

RQ3. Are there any differences in the way the audiences decoded of the myths
related to Kim Jong Il’s death and legacy as presented by the Romanian media?

5. Data set and methodology

Strictly speaking, the analyses dedicated to media frame, identified four steps involved in framing research (Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000). First, we identify a problem or an event (Entman, 2004, pp. 23–24). A frame in communication can be defined only in relation to a certain event, a certain issue or a certain political actor. Second, if the purpose is to understand the way in which the frames from the message influence public opinion, then the research should concentrate on a specific attitude – for example, the attitude towards issue “X” (Feldman and Zaller, 1992; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987). Third, we inductively identify an initial multitude of “frames”/“framing” for a topic or an issue. Gamson and Modigliani (1987, p. 144; 1989, p. 7) suggest the analysis of the frames produced by different actors and elite organizations related to the topic of interest in order to make a “list” of “existing cultural frames at a certain moment” in the elite discourse. Finally, once an initial selection of frames was delimited, we chose the sources for the content analysis (Tankard, 2001, p. 101; Dimitrova et al., 2005; Nisbet et al., 2003, p. 48) and in order to delimit and study these frames.

On the basis of the “methods triangulation” principle and for validity reasons, two main methods of data collection were used in the collection and analysis of data: quantitative content analysis (QnCA) and qualitative content analysis (QuCA).

From the point of view of methodology, in the QnCA performed, we employed ‘the theme’ as main analysis unit. We did not simply count words because we considered that the employment of themes offers an advantage in the results which it generates and which are:

“… rich in information and potentially extremely productive, consequently they would be preferable to any other types of segmentations [physical, syntactical, categorical or propositional]” (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 110).

The term ‘theme’ refers to the analysis of the narrative as verbal material and to the use of relatively comprehensible analysis units such as themas (Murray, 1943), themes (Holsti, 1969), or combinations of categories (Aron, 1950). This type of analysis was used by Holsti (1969, p. 137) for the analysis of political documents.

In the same research project we use the QuCA, understood as:

“…an attempt to understand the systematic relations between texts, discursive practices and socio-cultural practices” (Deacon and Golding, 1999, p. 147).

The purpose of qualitative content analysis is to discover and clarify the ways in which:

“...the power relations and structures are built into the daily language and, in that way, the way in which language contributes to the legitimating of the social relations that exist and of the hierarchies of authority and control” (Deacon and Golding, 1999, p. 310).

The Romanian media outlets were selected because of their market-quotas in the online and offline environment.2 Six outlets were considered: four newspapers

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2 According to the statistics of RomanianAudit Bureau of Circulation Transmedia (BRAT) for 2011 - www.brat.ro.
Valentina MARINESCU and Ecaterina BALICA

– “Adevarul”, “Jurnalul National”, “Romania Libera”, “Gandul” – and two “aggregate” websites: Ziare.com and Hotnews.com. The period analyzed covered two weeks from 19 to 31 December 2011. Only stories about Kim Jong Il's death, burial and legacy were selected and examined. This resulted in a total of 242 articles. The unit of analysis was the article including comments by readers.

6. Coding

This study examines both the script structure of a news story (the wh-questions) and the myths related to North Korea and Kim Jong Il that emerged after his death in December 2012. Although Pan and Kosicki (1993) analyze script structure sentence by sentence, this study examined the entire structure of a news story. The wh-questions answered in a story are not all headlined or given the same degree of salience. The emphasis on a certain question, produced by including it in the headline or lead or by repeating similar elements, constitutes a news framing.

To determine the main frames used and the myths presented in the Romanian media, we examined the text of the articles and the comments made by readers in reaction to information they had read. The frames used were subdivided into contextual and episodic frames. The operationalization of each frame and examples of it are showcased in Appendix A.

7. Results

In general, at the level of the entire sample analyzed, there was a clear focus on the information “mixture”, namely on news (40.8% of the total number of articles) and, at the same time, on columns (45%). Another aspect of the reconstruction of this media event is its time-space dichotomy with the event and the issue it discusses located on both a national and a world scale: 30.3% of the articles cited information from AFP (a foreign news agency) while 14.8% used the Romanian news agency Mediafax as the main source of information. The predominance of visual elements (73.9% of articles are accompanied by a photo or a video) also points to the relevance of informative elements in the general flow of messages delivered.

Table 1. - Correlation between the genre of media material (informative vs. emotional) and the dominant topic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant topic death</th>
<th>Dominant topic legacy</th>
<th>Dominant topic burial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Informative material</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>-.104*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The composition of the sample was the following: “Romania Libera” - 45 articles, “Jurnalul National” – 19 articles, “Gandul” – 57 articles; “Adevarul” - 40 articles; Hotnews – 44 articles; Ziare.com – 37 articles.

---

3 The composition of the sample was the following: “Romania Libera” - 45 articles, “Jurnalul National” – 19 articles, “Gandul” – 57 articles; “Adevarul” - 40 articles; Hotnews – 44 articles; Ziare.com – 37 articles.
### Emotional material

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- .115*</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.107*</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

If we consider the three dominant topics of the articles (“death”, “legacy” and “burial”), it is apparent that their importance was highlighted in the emotional media material (comments, columns, editorials) published. The hypothesis about the salience of informative elements in framing Kim Jong Il’s death and legacy in Romanian media was not supported.

The usage of texts and images in journalism made it possible for the event world to be perceived as a succession of memorable moments, rather than as a series of complex processes taking place in time (Sontag, 2004). As regards events presented in the news, Morley (1992) emphasizes their “naturalness” – for the onlooker they are events that merely seem to happen – their significance is concentrated in a memorable moment that gains its significance through the “news frame”. The present event – including the media construction of social reality – was characterized by a certain degree of mystery and ritual.

As to the media presentation of Kim Jong Il’s death and Kim Jong Un’s appointment as “Supreme Leader” of North Korea, the themes used in the analyzed articles illustrated both the “continuity” and the new beginning myths. The balance between “death” and “inheritance” was clear in the main theme of the articles analyzed: Kim Jong Il’s death was mentioned in 110 cases (50.3% of the total articles) while in 84 cases (38.5%) reference was made to the appointment of Kim Jong Un as the new North-Korean leader.

In addition, the presentation of the media ritual presupposes an inversion of the past/future time order in the same sample of articles. The key elements in this case were, on the one hand, emphasis placed on the “communist regime” (mentioned in 32.5% of the sampled articles) and, on the other, the quasi-absence of the “official name” of the country - the name “Democratic People Republic of Korea” was mentioned in only 5.5% of the same media sample.

One can also notice a binary opposition of themes in most articles with reference to the people (others than Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un) and institutions mentioned. International institutions were mentioned in 62.3% of cases while 37.2% made reference to internal institutions; individuals from other countries were mentioned in 31.3% of articles while 68.7% mentioned individuals who were clearly from North Korea.

In the case of Kim Jong Il’s death as media event, the issue is not establishing a time and space relation, but mostly underlining a power relation. The illustrated time relation with the news functions through a certain meaning of the past returning to the present, as is the case of articles including references to the Korean War (8.9% of the total sample) and to Kim Il Sung’s personality and leadership (14.1% of the sample). The power emphasized in the articles was located at a double level: the
North Korean population and the North Korea political regime. In 34.2% of the cases, people from North Korea were presented in Romanian media as “brainwashed”; in 49.3% of the cases they were presented as “terrorized” and in 24.7% the generic term which described them was “prisoners”.

Table 2. -Correlations for episodic framing in articles devoted to Kim Jong Il’s death and legacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kim Jong II’s death</th>
<th>Kim Jong II’s legacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>News</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>.104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference to institutions -Yes</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>-.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference to individuals - Yes</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>-.193(**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The leader of NK is presented simply as “leader”</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Elements of the episodic frame did not gain a prominent position in the coverage of Kim Jong Il’s death; the same is true about the contextual frame, which was not more favored in the case of his legacy. Therefore the second hypothesis was not supported.

Table 3. - Correlations for contextual framing in articles devoted to Kim Jong Il’s death and legacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kim Jong II's death</th>
<th>Kim Jong II's legacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Editorial, comment, column</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>-.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

86
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference to the regime in North Korea concerns communist, personal, feudal, Stalinist dynastic dictatorship</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>-.045</th>
<th>.028</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.512</td>
<td>.677</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>217</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference to the situation in North Korea concerns the economic, social, political and military context</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>-.123</th>
<th>.233(**)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.071</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>215</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference to the actions of ordinary people from North Korea as “mass crying” and “mass hysteria”</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>.369(**)</th>
<th>.005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.967</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference to ordinary people of North Korea as &quot;brain-washed&quot; individuals</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>.402(**)</th>
<th>-.134</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.258</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference to ordinary people of North Korea as “terrorized” individuals</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>-.157</th>
<th>-.097</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.185</td>
<td>.486</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

In simple semiotic systems, as Halliday (1985) suggests, signs are closer to the phenomenal world and the real world of our experience. So we cannot presume that...
people who watched this will read the elements as a grammar which gives certain connotations to the symbols; instead, they will read them as a whole, they will index real or symbolical events and moments. Therefore, news has the capacity to index the real world existing “out there” and in return limit the linguistic message accompanying it. As Halliday claimed, in the complex sign systems (like language) the sign is separated from its significance by grammar (1985, p. 351). In contrast, in simple sign systems, the significance of the sign is more in the phenomenal world.

The results of the QnCA indicated that in 8.2% of the cases the analyzed articles referred to Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un with phrases such as “individual with a supernatural essence”, “son of God” or even “God”. As to North Korean mythical elements present in the articles, “sacred mountain Paekdu” was mentioned in 20% of the cases, and the homage of a bird (either a “crane” or a “stork”) paid to Kim Jong Il after his death was mentioned in 12.8% of the analyzed articles. The other mythical elements used in the Romanian articles were: Kim Jong Il’s signature appearing in the snow after his death (7.7% of the cases), the double rainbow that appeared at his birth (6.2%), and the new star rising in the sky at his birth (9.2%).

How did the public decode the articles presenting elements of North Korea mythology? First, we should mention that only half of the total analyzed sample (50.4%) received comments –only 9% of which were included at the end of those articles which also covered mythical elements related to Kim Jong Il’s death and legacy. As to the themes covered by the public’s comments to articles which included mythological elements, in the case of two articles the readers made reference only to the life of ordinary people from North Korea; in two others the comments referred to the general situation in North Korea (without mentioning leaders and ordinary people), while for seven articles the comments addressed a “variety” of issues related to the general situation, the life of ordinary people and of North Korea’s leaders. In just one case we noted comments that somehow assessed the supernatural elements related to Kim Jong Il’s life and death as “believable”; in other cases the entire “mythology” presented was labelled as “untrue”, “lies”, “communist propaganda”, “fake”. Thus, it is evident that the third hypothesis was confirmed by the empirical data.

But are there any special journalistic procedures in presenting the mythology associated with North Korea’s leaders? We assume that in the case of such a “media event” a maximization of the dramatization of the actions and people involved (Tetu, 2004, p. 15) is apparent. Where can we locate the “dramatic” elements and how were they packaged in the articles discussing the myths?

In order to provide an answer we will consider two myths: the “myth of sacred mountain Paekdu” and the “myth of the bird (crane or stork) tribute”. The first is presented in an article published by the newspaper “Adevarul” on 22 December, 2011.

Strange phenomena took place at the leader’s death, writes the communist media.

“The ice on the Chon Lake, in the Paektu Mountain broke with a thud” when Kim Jong II died on Saturday, reported North Korea’s state news agency, KCNA. Then, “a snowstorm started”. Paektu Mountain is located in the northern part of the country, close to the border with China. It is considered a sacred place by the North
Koreans, as the country’s founder, Kim Il Sung -- Kim Jong Il’s brother⁴ -- had set an anti-Japanese camp for his army there during Japan’s colonization of Korea.

The official historiography of the regime claims that Kim Jong Il was born on this mountain in 1942. According to foreign historians the leader, who died last week, was in fact born in Siberia, where his father ran away from Japanese troops.

The snowstorm suddenly stopped on Tuesday morning letting the sun to light the snow-covered peak of the mountain. That is when “Kim Jong Il’s signature appeared on the mountain, indicating “Paektu Mountain, the sacred mountain of the revolution” claims the news agency, which mentioned that the phenomenon lasted until the evening. It added that a glimmer was noticed at the top of the mountain for half an hour on Monday, after the official announcement of the death of the country’s leader.

The narrative has a linear development: The first paragraph, announces that strange natural phenomena -- such as a snow-storm on the Paekdu Mountain -- took place after Kim Jong Il’s death; it adds that this mountain was considered “sacred” by North Koreans. Nothing else is said about Paekdu Mountain’s “divine” (“sacred”) origin; Romanian readers are informed instead that Kim Jong Il was born not on this mountain, but in Siberia. In the third paragraph, two other events are mentioned: the light noticed at the top of Paekdu Mountain and Kim Jong Il’s signature appeared in the snow. Thus, two completely natural phenomena – the snow-storm and the light at the top of the Paekdu Mountain – and a “bizarre” (but not “supernatural”) one: Kim Jong Il’s signature in the snow.

The second myth – the bird’s homage to Kim Jong Il’s death – was presented in a similar manner by the Romanian media, the only difference being its “identity” – a Japanese crane or a Manchurian stork:

In the Northern city of Hamhung a Japanese crane was noticed, after it circled Kim Jong Il’s statue three times. After the crane had sat some time on a tree, bowing its head in deep sorrow, it flew toward Phenian (Jurnalul National).

Tuesday evening, around 9.20. p.m., a Manchurian stork was noticed in Hamhung, a city in the northern part of North Korea, close to the border with China. After it circled Kim Jong Il’s statue three times, the stork sat in a tree for some time, bowing its head in deep sorrow. In the end, the Manchurian stork flew toward Pjongjang (Ziare.com).

This is also a linear story and the symbol mentioned (the bird) hardly has any ability to index the real world existing outside the simple physical presence. After all, for the Romanian reader a bird (either a crane or a stork) has a direct real correspondence and there is nothing supernatural about its appearance in a place.

If we agree with Tetu’s thesis that “dramatization is a constant of emotional mediation” (2004, p.15) we can say that this element is completely absent in the case of the above-mentioned two myths. Romanian media coverage of Kim Jong Il’s death as a media event did not pay any attention to feelings, therefore the media re-construction of this particular event completely lacks any meaningful emotions.

⁴ This significant error on the part of the Romanian author regarding the relationship between Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il reveals the general lack of knowledge about North Korea and is more than a simple mistake.
8. Discussion

The present analysis shows that in the case of the images and symbols presented by the media, there is no “innocent eye” (Gombrich, 1989). Even texts about events that seem new are not isolated stimuli but are connected to previous images and ideas which come to us together with the words. Consequently, texts are considered by the receiver in relation with the pre-existing beliefs and experiences, known as “schemata”, these being “…general cognitive mental plans, that are abstract and….serve as guides for actions, as structures for interpreting information, as organized frameworks for solving problems” (Fiske and Taylor, 1991).

In his analysis of media anthropology, Coman (2003, p. 38) claims that journalists provide messages of a special nature in two situations: when they communicate during crises and when they cover ceremonies. In crisis situations they use mythical thinking structures, while in ceremonial situations they activate symbolic mechanisms typical of the logic of rites (Coman, 2003, p. 38). The mythological interpretation of events aims at at least two aspects: first that a mythical charge persists in media messages, and may be exploited by journalists to transmit messages easy to assimilate by the public, and second that the journalistic discourse and the mass media texts play the same role in modern society that myth used to play in archaic societies, that of securing order and significance for reality.

This is the situation with the publicizing of Kim Jong Il’s death, which acted first on a symbolical level. In this case, a time redefinition process took place consisting in considering recent past events as completed and marking the opening towards a new period of the political regime. What is interesting is that this “new period” is not characterized by the Romanian media as having new values, new symbols, –nor yet new mentalities and social representations. On the contrary, the Romanian media’s emphasis was placed on the “continuity”, on the communist regime and its ideology’s endurance.

From the set of hypotheses proposed at the beginning of the article, only one was supported by the empirical data. Both informative elements and emotional ones were salient in stories about Kim Jong Il’s death and legacy published by Romanian media in December 2012.

The quantitative framing of the articles reveals that Kim Jong Il’s death and legacy were framed in a mixed manner – journalists used both episodic and contextual frames to cover two distinct events and processes. The correlation coefficients did not obey a causal logic and the existing set of data did not allow us to advance further post-hoc hypotheses about what framing devices Romanian media preferred in connection with Kim Jong Il’s death and legacy.

If the informative articles about the life, death and legacy of the North Korea leader seemed easy for Romanian readers to decode (the vast majority of comments made by readers were recorded for this type of articles), the audience were unable to decode the mythological elements associated with North Korean leaders. At this point some general remarks related to myths and stories in relation to the Romanian public are in order. For Romanians, the internal composition of myths had to be complex and to have a mythological sense that involved the concept of transformati
on, brought about some changes, and referred to a common fact, deprived of any symbolical meaning or mythological presumption – the Prometheus myth as a way of understanding both the social transformations and the economical ones. What can be said about the fact that a Japanese crane (or a Mandarin stork) seemed to pay homage to a dead leader? It has nothing “exceptional”; it is a simple observation, an accident in a “bird’s life” and not a complex symbol for a Romanian decoder. The same is true about the snow-storm and the light at the top of Paekdu Mountain.

From the perspective of the Romanian media, the “media ritual” of Kim Jong Il’s death in December 2011 could be assessed as a liminal moment, a disruption of the type of social time that started in 1989. We chose this event because we noticed that the presentation of Kim Jong Il’s death in Romanian media brought to public attention and interest the political and social situation in North Korea. Once a “former-communist” ally of the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was no longer considered so after the political changes in 1989, which resulted in the quasi-absence of any news related to it in Romanian media in the last twenty years. Romania’s clear orientation towards Western values turned communism into a period in “history”. The references to North Korea concerned mainly the political axis (31.8% of references concerned the political regime; 20.8% concerned social relations and 13.5% concerned the military regime). It is only at this “raw” level of information that the sets of myths connected to Kim Jong Il’s death (and legacy) were decoded in Romania.

Much more importantly, if we take into account the ways in which Western media promoted the images of the Soviet Union and its allies during the Cold War as “aggressive, lazy, illiterate, foolish and uneducated” (Dennis et al., 1991, p. 6) there is a striking similarity with the ways in which the North Korean people is presented in Romanian media – as “brain-washed”, “terrorized” individuals. Those findings confirm Hemmings’ (2013) observations about the ways in which North Korea can be approached as a subject for study:

“Often as not, much of media coverage of North Korea seems to obscure the nature of the regime rather than shed light on it. […] Such regimes are difficult to study without some bias. With the world’s worst record of human rights, it is difficult if not impossible for Western scholars and experts to study the country without some emotive response” (Hemmings, 2013, p. 66).

The limitations of this study are instructive for future researchers. The study examined a sample of Romanian newspapers to test the hypothetical frames and ways of presenting the North Korean myths related to Kim Jong Il’s death and legacy. Future research could test whether the current findings are replicated within a larger sample and/or within a sample of media materials from a different post-communist country or, in a comparative approach, from different countries, post-communist or not.

Acknowledgments

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References


Kim Jong Il´s Death and Legacy


Valentina MARINESCU and Ecaterina BALICA

[Accessed 27 December 2013].


**Appendix A.**

Operationalization of frames

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How it is done</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episodic framing</td>
<td>Uses only individual explanations for events, expressed mainly as news. Presents the individual name and institutions as main actors. They also present the characteristics of the leader.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Contextual Framing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Uses the circumstances of the process or event, expressed mainly as comment, column, editorial piece. Presents the situation in the country, the political regime, ordinary people and their actions.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

- Specific genre of article – column, news, editorial;
- Reference to regime in a country
- Reference to ordinary people in a country
- Reference to the actions of ordinary people
Regime Survival, Societal Resilience and Change in North Korea

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1. Introduction

The rapid ascent to power of Kim Jong-un, accelerated by Kim Jong-il’s death in December 2011, confirmed hereditary succession as the modal form of political succession in North Korea. ‘Do not hope for any change in us,’1 is a statement oftentimes coming out of Pyongyang, warning outsiders that no reform of any sort should be expected. And yet, although the country’s moribund economy avoided both East-Central European and Chinese style reforms to stay afloat, trade across the Chinese-North Korean border is bringing social and economic changes into the lives of ordinary North Koreans. This grassroots-level dynamic is transforming the country in subtle but profound ways.

While a great deal of attention has been devoted to North Korea from the perspective of East Asian security studies, so far surprisingly little attention has been devoted to what goes on inside the country, including the issues of the hereditary succession era as well as the political economy of transition. Rather, the time is now ripe for a shift in emphasis towards a study of what actually goes on inside the country, and increasingly across its no longer sealed boundaries. North Korea is gradually but steadily becoming a ‘normal country’, meaning that its citizens are no longer as cut off from access to information and outside reality as in the past. It should be studied as such, and to that end greater borrowing from the analytical tools of comparative social science, as is done in some of the texts reviewed here, is to be welcomed.

This is of course not to deny the value of the scholarly work done on strategic issues, the threat to global security posed by nuclear proliferation, and especially North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear status.2 At the same time a focus on hard security tends to overshadow the micro- and meso-level changes that are taking place inside

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the country and across its borders. The books reviewed in this paper thus represent a valuable addition to the literature, contributing to our understanding of a reclusive regime and a society that is hard-to-access – let alone understand –.

2. North Korea from afar

As Kwon and Chung note in their introduction, there is ‘no mystery about North Korea’s political system’ (2012, p. 1). Little remains unknown about the brutality of the regime domestically and its international posture. At the same time, the challenges of accessing data (when they even exist), entering the country and possibly even doing fieldwork remain daunting, thus limiting the kind of research that is possible when it comes to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the validity of the data. A long immersion in the country is just not possible (Kwon and Chung, 2012, p. 10). Some of the work on the country remains based on ‘hearsay’, limiting our understanding of this secretive state and its reclusive elite, and also hindering a proper policy towards it.

Accounts from defectors, refugees and members of the international community working for a limited period of time in the North have traditionally been the main source of information about ‘all things North Korean’. This body of literature includes the work of Abt (2014) and Everard (2012), as well as the whole ‘defectors’ literature’ (Harden, 2013; Kang, 2001; Kim, 2010; Kim, 2009). Alongside this type of publication, North Korean scholarship has relied on input on perspectives from history and international relations. Seminal works by historians Bruce Cumings (2004) and Charles K. Armstrong (2013), among others, have shaped the way we look at and understand North Korea.

On the whole scholars in political science and international relations have otherwise tended to be more focused on more strategic/security issues and typically more policy-oriented (Cha, 2013; Cha and Kang, 2003). Empirically grounded and methodologically solid work based on field research inside the country includes Hazel Smith’s account (2005) of how the famine struck and was ‘dealt with’ in the 1990s. Smith’s book constitutes a rare ethnographic study of the North Korean economy, insightful and methodologically innovative. The famine also constitutes the focus of Haggard and Noland’s study (2007) of market, aid and reform in the country.

This article surveys four examples of recent work on North Korea. The volumes reviewed in this essay partly complement some of the accounts based on interviews with defectors and refugees while adding new material and perspectives. Demick’s and Hassig and Oh’s books shed light on the lives of ordinary people, but have also less to add to theoretical discussions. Lankov’s monograph draws on the author’s decades-long familiarity with and travels to the DPRK, but similarly avoids an engagement with theoretical debates. Kwon and Chung’s work is the exception here, with a truly unusual and novel contribution to understanding North Korean politics.

3. A country in transition

From a variety of perspectives the books address a similar set of themes: how do
ordinary people live in North Korea, and how has their life changed during the Arduous March (the famine in the 1990s) and as a result of the proliferation of informal markets and the intensification of cross-border trade with China? How have trade flows impacted on value systems? Since Pyongyang has deliberately avoided the Chinese path of reform, let alone a Central-Eastern European way of political opening, what does the political economy of change look like in the northern part of the Korean peninsula? How best should we understand what is happening inside a country where socialism has long given way to a radical form of hereditary politics which mixes a combination of Confucian beliefs, nationalism, and loyalty to the Kim family, all ‘shot through’ with a good dose of postcolonial undertones?

Demick’s book is the least academic of the four, as it draws from the author’s seven-year stint in Korea as the Los Angeles Times Seoul correspondent during the 2000s. In Nothing to Envy (2010) the author explores the question of ‘what it is like to live in one of the most repressive regimes’ (p. 8). Demick’s informants are refugees from a single city, Chongjin, which at 500,000 inhabitants is North Korea’s third-largest city. Chongjin is a distinctive setting where two different segments of North Korean society live side by side: on the one hand there are the indigenous residents, the legacy of imperial Japan’s effort to make inroads into Manchuria via Chongjin’s port and the infrastructure they built in the early 20th century (alongside other various factories, whose building Pyongyang never credited to Tokyo); on the other there are local elements of the core classes, relocated to the periphery, closer to Vladivostok than to the North Korean capital (p. 31, 37-38). Despite being a journalistic account, Demick’s work is a thoughtful and insightful contribution to understanding the country ‘from below’. North Korea, she notes, is ‘not an underdeveloped country. It is a country that has fallen out of the developed world’ (p. 4). In the 1960s it was home to a ‘viable, if Spartan economy’ (p. 79), bearing more resemblance to Yugoslavia than to Angola around that time. By the early 1990s, however, the economy was on a ‘slow-death path’, stagnating at first and then plunging into a nose-dive. The backdrop to Demick’s work is the great famine of the 1990s (especially 1996-1998) which followed the collapse of the Public Distribution Service, the state-managed system of food provision and social control (Haggard and Noland, 2007, p. 9). Demick’s main source of information are North Korean refugees in the South who have left life in the North in various waves in the aftermath of the great famine that killed up between 600,000 and one million people, about 3-5% of the country’s population, according to the bleakest data. The disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the withdrawal of aid from Moscow’s, complemented with the implosion of North Korea’s own economic system, left the country as a virtual black spot on the map. Economic collapse meant electricity blackouts, among other things. During the day this meant that factories could no longer work (yet workers were still expected to show up so that surveillance and indoctrination could continue). At night, Demick notes, ‘darkness ensured unprecedented levels of privacy’ (pp. 4-5), almost freedom, to ordinary North Koreans. In her book Demick follows the lives of a number of North Korean refugees, beginning the story from the pre-famine period. Through the account of the lives of doctors, teachers, neighborhood watchdogs (inminban), young couples
seeking to develop and maintain relationships, street children (*kochebi*, or wandering swallows) and smugglers of goods from China, we learn the variety of survival mechanisms adopted by North Korea’s citizens to cope with hardship and brutality, and to carve out some islands of separateness, even in extremely harsh conditions. As domestic surveillance, organizational life, mobility restrictions gradually break down (or are no longer enforced), what emerges is a changing North Korean society, able to turn disaster turned into opportunity. In the later part of her book (chapters 16-20) Demick explores the new feelings of alienation, uprootedness and daily struggle that accompany North Koreans living in the South. Although not fully developed, the point made here is that after several decades of separation, North and South Koreans have grown more and more apart from each other. Are Koreans no longer *hanminjok* (one people)?

A new North Korea is also visibly taking shape in Hassig and Oh’s book (2009), which like Demick’s, draws on years of conversations with dozens refugees and seeks to shed light on the lives of ordinary North Koreans. The structure of the book is quite intriguing, as each chapter outlining officialdom is mirrored by one presenting a focus on everyday life and a changing reality on the ground. While chapter 3 revisits the pillars of the North Korean type of socialist command economy, its collapse (resulting from ‘the absence of trade with advanced economies, failure to receive continuing support from fellow socialist economies, natural disasters, and a degradation of the economic infrastructure’, p. 67), and half-hearted attempts to introduce Chinese-style reforms in 2001 (the ‘July 1 Economic Management Improvement Measures’, p. 71), chapter 4 moves the focus from ‘working for the state’ to ‘working for oneself’ or ‘working abroad’, that is on individual survival mechanisms beyond passivity. Chapter 5 introduces the system of surveillance and presents the contours of the official information system, while chapter 6 shifts the attention to the hidden thoughts and double-thinking of the population. Though intriguing and potentially revealing, this chapter is also problematic in that the paucity of data suggest it may be premature to state that ‘[t]he transition from socialism to capitalism seems to have gone too far to stop’ (p. 132); however, the emergence of markets, legal and illegal, has indeed created a ‘new economic class of people with hard currency’ (p. 130). Hardship fostered an entrepreneurial spirit, a newly discovered mobility facilitated access to goods across the border, which in turn brought not only material resources, but also access to new, unrestricted, information. This prospect of pressure and change from below, rather than the fear of any elite infighting,\(^3\) bodes ill for the long-term viability of the North Korean ruling class. Hassig and Oh explore a similar drama of ‘change and conservatism’ as they (re-)personalize North Korea’s citizens. That said, the very plausible claims advanced in the book could have been backed up by stronger evidence, so that the hidden thoughts of the North Koreans often referred to (p. 244) could appear not just plausible but confirmed and in principle verifiable. Double-thinkers the North Koreans might well be, and indeed the information control system is slowly breaking down, but adding more data and evidence to minimize

\(^3\) This is unlikely at present given the still obvious costs of defection now, and fear about future retribution.
exposure to criticism would have strengthened the book. Moreover, the last few pages on the policy implications (pp. 250-253) add little to what has been already been said in greater detail by others scholars pondering how to deal with the North, including Cha (2013), Cha and Kang (2003), and Lankov in his ‘The Real North Korea’ (2013).

‘How do they do it?’ (surviving, that is) is the question Lankov addresses in his sober, occasionally bleak, but perceptive text. The Real North Korea discusses extensively the themes of the political economy of change and of a gradual mutation in the information environment. Despite strenuous attempts by the North Korean elites to withstand pressure to ‘open up’ and at least introduce Chinese-style reforms, Pyongyang has stubbornly rejected such calls, putting politics (through the Songun policy, or ‘military-first’) above economics, as Kwon and Chung also note (2013, p. 11, 19). And yet the withdrawal of aid which accompanied the Soviet collapse, the collapse of the Public Distribution Service in the 1990s, the famine, and a number of catastrophic economic policy choices have also thrust change upon the North as well, following the law of unintended consequences. Socio-economic hardship (or the ‘Arduous March’, as per official parlance) saw honest but unimaginative citizens die of hunger, while others, more resourceful, discovered in themselves an entrepreneurial spirit that many outsiders thought dead and buried by decades of totalitarian propaganda. Despite all odds, faced with starvation, North Koreans engaged in trade activities, inside the country and across the border. First barter then later hard currency kept the North Koreans afloat and alive. Goods started to flow from China and indirectly from South Korea as well. With goods started to flow ideas and eventually new ideas, just as the North Korean leadership feared. While it is difficult to gauge, as Hassig and Oh claim (2009, p. 244), that young North Koreans boast fashions and haircuts that mimic those of actors in South Korean dramas, it is nevertheless fair to acknowledge that, as Lankov convincingly shows, that a value system change might be occurring as a result of the relaxation of the information environment. This relaxation is not enabled from above, but has simply forced itself on the country via illegal means. Be this as it may, Lankov argues, it is precisely access to information, inside the country or preferably outside (via exchange programs) that will ultimately bring about change in the North (p. 216). A large portion of the book is dedicated to the survival of the regime and ultimately the state (chapters 3-6). If survival is the main goal of the North Korean elites then their behavior, combining rejection of any form of political or economic reform and an attempt to keep the population as insulated from the rest of the world as possible is the only course of action available, whatever the social, political, and economic costs for that population.

Lankov’s book is a solid, provocative piece of work, but strives to speak to one audience too many, remaining suspended between academic scholarship, policy-oriented readers, and a broader audience. Despite the number of analytical tools that the literature on authoritarianism offers for the understanding of this type of regime (of which Kwon and Chung make rather extensive and productive use), Lankov shies away from a theoretically informed discussion of the sources of North Korean

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4 This theme is also explored in Spezza’s contribution to this special issue.
stability and change. Although occasionally a comparative glance or a theoretical reference is offered, no systematic framework other than explaining the logic of survival (and thus indirectly the durability of an otherwise anachronistic regime) is put forward. This is regrettable as the author would surely have something meaningful and empirically-informed to contribute to broader academic debates. That said, what Lankov’s study lacks in theoretical cohesiveness, it fully makes up for with its thorough if occasionally bleak analysis of a changing country. The first half of the book (chapters 1-2) essentially lays the ground for the second. Chapters 3-6 and the conclusion are dedicated to questions of the present and future: how best to deal with the country, scenarios, implications for the US and South Korea, and an outline of a confederal option for the Korean peninsula. North Korea, Lankov contends, might be around for quite some time and, he adds perhaps more controversially, this might not necessarily be a bad thing (chapter 5). The Somalia scenario (i.e. regime collapse followed by a descent into civil war) is reasonably discarded (p. 188), whereas he indicates a period of violent transition as far more likely (pp. 187, 195-197). This is consistent with the literature on authoritarianism and authoritarian collapse (Brooker, 2009; Brownless, 2007) which show that personalist sub-types of authoritarianism are unlikely to morph smoothly into viable states, let alone democratic ones. After showing how ‘the sticks are not big enough’ and that the ‘carrots are not sweet enough’ either (chapter 5), in chapter 9 Lankov outlines the contours of a confederal option, which would keep North Korea formally in place, tied to and yet not merged with the South for a period of about ten to fifteen years. This, he suggests might well be the least bad option, as the time-frame would both allow the North to catch up without hemorrhaging its population (mobility would be restricted to some extent, possibly thanks to a visa regime, and purchase of land and housing in the North would also be subject to regulation), while at the same time giving North (and South) Koreans a realistic timeline for unification (pp. 243-45).

4. The future of revolutionary politics: From charismatic politics to hereditary succession

By far the most theoretically sophisticated of the texts reviewed here is Kwon and Chung’s North Korea: Beyond Charismatic Politics (2013). This book is a remarkable and novel exploration of the relationship between revolutionary art and politics. ‘Power as display’ becomes central to explaining how the DPRK, a modern theater state, moves from revolutionary charisma to post-charismatic politics (legacy or succession politics), allowing Pyongyang to manage not one but two rounds of hereditary succession.

In their volume, Kwon and Chung set out to understand the ‘evolution of North Korea’s postcolonial political system’ through the lenses of modern revolutionary politics (p. 1). To this end they borrow tools from both sociological (Weber) and anthropological (Geertz) traditions, and add insights and concepts of their own. What emerges is a complex and novel picture of just ‘another country’

5 The idea was originally developed by Wada Haruki (cited in Kwon and Chung, 2012, p. 4), drawing on Clifford Geertz’s study of ritual politics and symbolic power in Indonesia (1980).
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(p. 2), along the same lines of what Bruce Cumings had argued in a prior study of North Korea (2004). North Korea is ‘just as modern and as much as a production of interaction with global modernity as any other political system in the world’ (p.2). While not unique in its authoritarian durability, the regime has shown a ‘remarkable resilience’ (p. 3). Key to understanding the stability of the first few decades was the notion of charismatic authority, most notably the revolutionary charisma of the country’s founding father, Kim Il Sung. Focusing on ‘politics as display,’ the relationship between art and politics is examined in depth through a careful study of North Korean filmography, the Arirang mass spectacles, its ideology (especially the ‘barrel of a gun’ philosophy and the military-first – Songun and Chongdae theory, examined in chapter 3), and the emphasis on both the family state and the partisan state (chapters 2 to 4). What is striking, according to Kwon and Chung, is how the fundamentally ‘impermanent nature of charismatic authority’ was transcended through a Weberian ‘routinization of revolutionary charisma (p. 3). Starting already from the early 1970s (formative in this regard), and accelerating during the Great National Bereavement in 1994 following the death of Kim Il Sung, North Korea under Kim Jong Il made legacy politics a central dimension of the country’s political and social system.

As Kwon and Chung embark on a sophisticated attempt to account for ‘stability against all odds’, they depart from the standard understanding of ‘North Korean ideology’ as a combination of the more extreme and less humane aspects of Confucianism with a Stalinist variant of socialism. The authors do not deny that these elements are, or in fact have been guiding elements of North Korea’s ideology in the past. At the same time, they contend that what is crucial to understanding the survival and durability of the regime and its decision to place ‘politics above economics,’ is the routinization of charismatic politics. Kwon and Chung draw extensively on Max Weber’s work on the different types of authority and especially the charismatic sub-type.

The book advances two noteworthy arguments, both of which are of great relevance in understanding North Korea’s regime and its longevity, but also in placing this peculiar country in a broader comparative framework. The first is the routinization of revolutionary charisma which led to the establishment of hereditary rule. Central to the mission, they convincingly show, was the pursuit of ‘the realization of a historically transcendent charisma in the form of actualizing a hereditary succession of power’ (p. 188). This was done at great costs at all levels, for the population, but also for the nature of the regime itself. A seemingly successful state-building phase in the 1950s and 1960s where a Spartan though viable economy was built, subsequently turned into a ‘story of tragic failure’ (p. 189). All, the population and the economy, had to be ‘sublimated’ to politics, leading to an ‘extreme centralization of political and executive power’, destroying - among other things - ‘the democratic principle of the socialist revolution’ (p. 189).

Kwon and Chung advance another claim that makes North Korea less distinctive and more ‘normal’. Accommodating – and eventually moving beyond – Marxism-Leninism, emphasizing the least humane aspects of Confucianism, the

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6 Confucianism has been an oft-use prism to look at political behavior in Korea, north and south (Bell and Hahm, 2003); Kim, 2011 and 2012).
country’s leadership attempted to present itself as a profoundly post-colonial country (pp. 14-15, 80-82), establishing and strengthening ties with revolutionary countries in the Global South, such as Algeria, Angola, Congo, Laos, Yemen, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, p. 140). This argument is extremely important in two respects. The first is the grounding of the North Korean experience in the framework of post-colonial politics and identity, where the nationalist component of the identity of the North Korean polity is as important, if not more so (over time) than the socialist one. This is not unlike the case of other socialist states in East Asia, like Vietnam and China. Secondly, and following from the previous point, this new understanding of North Korea calls – by extension – for a ‘pluralistic understanding of the global system’, especially as far as global transitions from socialism are concerned (p. 13).

Although not all chapters are equally convincing (chapter 6 on the moral economy appears disconnected from the rest of the text), this is a truly sophisticated analysis of North Korean ideology and politics. Like the other books reviewed here, and despite a different temporal focus, even Kwon and Chung’s North Korea is undergoing transition. However, unlike the other transition kickstarted by the Soviet collapse and the end of the PDS, North Korea’s transition here started in the early 1970s. Where does this leave the country now? ‘The military-first era North Korea is a proud partisan state, but a failed family state’, Kwon and Chung acknowledge in the concluding pages of their concise and yet extremely rich book (p. 177). This failure is ‘both moral and structural’, leaving the DPRK without a viable society and thus without a viable state (p. 189). This, no less, is the fundamental challenge the new leadership must confront if it wants to preserve itself.

5. A country in transition

The books reviewed here are different from each other, with two more academic (Lankov, and Kwon and Chung) and the other two (Demick, and Hassig and Oh) for a broader lay audience. They adopt different lenses and approaches, and focus on different aspects of North Korean politics and society. Taken together, however, they complement each other well and provide the reader with both a full picture of the domestic and international logic of survival of the regime, and of the way in which North Korean society and economy are changing, despite all appearances. The texts underscore both the exceptionality of North Korea (whose regime has last exceptionally long, has replaced socialism with hereditary politics, has been exceptionally repressive, and has built an extreme cult of personality) and at the same time its normality. This of course does not mean that North Korea is like any other country, but rather than in order to understand the ‘Hermit Kingdom’ more theoretically informed work is needed. In their different ways, the four books all call for bringing the analysis of North Korea’s regime and society into the mainstream of academic research. Long treated as a relic of a bygone era, an aberrance of the current international system or a mysterious object (or subject) of global politics, North Korea, or better our understanding of it, has long ‘suffered’ from the country being treated as a unique case, something with few or no equals. The books reviewed here are not comparative (very few comparative studies of the
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DPRK exist anyway), but none the less all suggest – most notably Kwon and Chung’s monograph – that our understanding of what goes on in the country would greatly benefit from adopting conceptual tools used for making sense of other states and non-democratic regimes.

An absurd anomaly which defied all trends and expectations North Korea may be, but saying so does not take us very far in understanding continuity and change in the country, either at elite or mass level. The four books take this awkward but stubborn resilience as a departure point for their analysis, but then move on, more productively, to analyze changes at political, economic and social level. Three start their analysis against a similar backdrop, namely the collapse of the Public Distribution Service (the rationing system) and the first hereditary succession. The fourth (Kwon and Chung) shifts the focus to an earlier era, the 1970-1972 period (when the first succession phase actually was in preparation) and the ‘Great National Bereavement of 1994’, when that succession finally materialized. The arguments put forward largely speak to each other, with points touched on in one text being fully developed in others. For example, the emergence of a moral economy during and in the aftermath of the Great Famine, only hinted at in Kwon and Chung’s book, receives extensive attention in Demick, Hassig and Oh, and Lankov’s monographs, which show in greater detail the unexpected marketization of North Korean society. The changes discussed in the four texts: hereditary succession, the emergence of an informal economy, and an evolving access to information which is informing the worldview and values of ordinary North Koreans, tell readers a story of a system that is far from static or ossified. The regime might have shown remarkably longevity, but society has evidenced resilience as well, and adaptability too.

6. Conclusion

In sum, the message conveyed by the texts reviewed in this essay is two-fold. First, contrary the commonly held belief that erratic behavior and irrationality drive North Korean politics, a rational logic of survival has guided Pyongyang’s policies, at home and abroad, no matter how radical and brutal this might have been, and whatever the costs. The second is an attempt to articulate the agency of the typically de-personalized North Koreans. Rather than passive automatons at the mercy of a brutal regime, they come across as agents, resilient, adaptable and entrepreneurial. This in fact bodes well for the hopefully not too remote future of a post-Kim North Korea.

Based on the insights of these volumes, three possible paths for future research suggest themselves. As North Korea – in its own peculiar way – has embarked on socio-political change, it is imperative to locate it on a comparative map, without denying its own distinctive traits. In this respect the country is thus ‘normal’, at least in the sense of being able to be treated as an instance in a broader universe of cases where the traditional tools of the social sciences can be meaningfully adopted. For instance scholars could fruitfully locate transition Pyongyang-style in a broader study of authoritarian survival and change, so as to understand the domestic sources of regime (in)stability.

Secondly, the North Korean case – when taken together with developments in
China and Vietnam, suggest that a comparative study of socialism and post-socialism would benefit from a comparison of European and Asian cases, with social justice as a more central feature in the former cases, while Asian socialism had a more distinctively post-colonial and national dimension.

Last, but not least, the difficulty North Korean refugees experience in adjusting to life in the South, and the extreme form of nationalism they have been exposed to in the North (as explored by Myers, 2011) raises the question of whether Koreans in the North and South still constitute one nation (hanminjok), or whether over the decades, and despite the rhetoric that all Koreans are one, we now are confronted, in fact, with two increasingly distinct Korean nations.

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References


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Articles
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The Impact of Democratization Processes on the Recruitment of Cabinet Ministers in South Korea

Rainer Dormels*

The year 1987 with its demonstrations is regarded to be the starting signal for democracy in South Korea. The continuation of the military dictatorship was prevented, and in December 1987, for the first time in many years, the president was again chosen directly by the people. This paper shows on the basis of two examples (the places of birth of the ministers and the routes to ministerial office), the consequences democratization has had on the minister's recruitment. The democratization of 1987 did not stop the preference of special regions in the case of recruiting ministers. The first time that this behavior changed significantly was after the appointment of Roh Moo-hyun as President. However, through a precise research of background-data of ministers it is possible to identify differentiated statements. The preference cannot be observed in certain regions steadily for a complete governmental period, but there were periods in which individuals from a certain region were represented in the cabinet in especially large numbers (majority and dominance phases) and periods in which this was not so (renunciation phases). These phases can be found during the presidencies of Syngman Rhee, Park Chung Hee, Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo, but not those of Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung. The analysis shows that democratization could not stop the single-sided appointment practice at regional level immediately; indeed, the motivation for this behavior changed only after the presidency of Roh Tae-woo.

In the second half of his government Rhee recruited his cabinet mainly from the administration as did Park from 1963 on and Chun till 1985. Since 1985, however, an evening out of the number of individuals with administrative experience and those with experience in parliament can be identified. This shows a development in the direction of egalitarian trends in politics and society, and thus suggests changes in the political culture of South Korea. Nevertheless, a noteworthy result of the dynamic consideration of the minister's dates is that there is no gradual trend towards fewer bureaucrats and more politicians; rather, cabinets with a markedly higher number of politicians and those with a higher number of bureaucrats alternate.

Keywords: minister, South Korea, democratization, regionalism

1. Ministers as part of the South Korean elite

As the supreme leaders of a government agency, ministers are involved in planning political measures and policies as well as drafting legislative proposals. Ministers sit on the most important committees in the decision making of the government. A minister in South Korea is part of the administrative elite, yet at the same time he also belongs to the political elite, as he is involved in governmental affairs. Socially, a ministerial post is a symbol for a top career. After leaving his position a former

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minister will be addressed as “minister (changgwan長官)“, and even after his passing this glorious reputation will not die out as his status will be registered in the family records and thus ennable his offspring (Hong Tŭk-pyo 1994, p. 107).

This paper deals with the pattern of the recruitment of ministers in South Korea. It will shed a light on how the recruiting of ministers is influenced by political culture. After introducing the previous research on ministers in South Korea, a new method of analyzing background data of ministers, the “dynamic analysis” will also be developed. The empirical part of this paper (section 4) will only deal with parts of the political culture of South Korea. On the basis of two criteria (the places of birth of the ministers and the routes to ministerial office), the consequences democratization has had for ministers’ recruitment will be shown.

The significance of ministers within the power structure of South Korea requires some elaboration. The New Year's special edition of the monthly magazine SinTonga in 1994 was entitled "the power elite" and covered following elite groups:

- The president and all people close to him (the secretariat of the president as “little cabinet”, his chief bodyguard, the intelligence chief, the audit court, the family of the president and his personal advisor).
- The administrative elite (prime minister, all ministers, the main tax office, prosecutors, police, Foreign Service, ministerial heads of a department).
- Delegates (deputies)
- The legal elite (judges, prosecutors, lawyers)
- The military elite
- Economy
- Public opinion shapers (Professors, religious leaders, mass communication, women’s movements, interest groups)
- Culture and Science
- Regional elites

The fact that the German scientist Zapf (1966) counts ministers in Germany among the political elites, while Sin Tonga in South Korea counts ministers among the administrative elite, already throws light upon the function and position of a minister and possibly also on the recruitment methods. Thus, in Germany most ministers are selected among the members of the parliament whereas in S. Korea many are recruited among those who had a career within the administration before. However, in the case of S. Korea it is necessary to differentiate between periods in which ministers have been recruited principally from those with an administrative background and periods when they have mostly been recruited among those with a political background.

Hwang Jong-Sung (1997, p. 98) understands the administrative elite in South Korea as equal to ministers, being part of the political elite of the country. His article “Analysis of the Structure of the Korean Political Elite” limits the scope of the ‘political elite’ to the ruling elite. Specifically, it examines 1) the ‘presidential office elite’ such as the Presidential Secretariat, 2) the ‘party elite,’ defined as holders of important positions within the ruling party, and 3) the ‘administrative elite’ defined as Ministers. Schematically, this classification could be described as follows:
In South Korea, ministers are not among the most important decision makers in the country; this is due to the strong dependence on the president, who appoints or dismisses ministers at his own discretion without need of the consent of the national assembly, but still being a minister is considered a symbol of a successful career. Due to the large numbers and the comparability of data on a national and international scale, the data on ministers is a starting point for research on the political culture of South Korea. However, this is not the only reason why it is an interesting topic for examination. Interestingly, many disputes and problems of South Korean politics and society are discussed on the basis of background information of cabinet ministers. Cabinet reshuffles frequently prompt news articles where, among other things, the minister’s home universities, regional origins, gender or current affiliations with the military or parliament are discussed. The authority of the central government and the importance of family, school and regional ties in Korea explain the strong public interest in such matters.

In particular, the consistent preference for appointing individuals from the southeastern Kyŏngsang provinces to government positions (especially between 1962 and 1998) was one cause for regional antagonisms in South Korea (see Dormels, 1999). Furthermore, especially during the presidency of KimYoung-sam (1993-1998), the large number of graduates from Seoul National University in high government positions was subject to intense criticism. Another concern was the frequency of ministerial reshuffles which made consistent, long-term planning difficult. Thus an investigation into the recruitment patterns and the background data of the ministers of South Korea is directly related to some central problems of society and politics which are:

- Regionalism
- School ties
- Participation of women in management and policy
- The influence of the military in the government

Figure 1. “Political Elite” South Korea, according to Hwang Jong-Sung (1997, p. 98)
The Impact of Democratization Processes on the Recruitment of Cabinet Ministers

- Circulation of elites
- Generational changes in politics and administration of the country
- Uncertainties in planning

Interestingly, some previous research on individual variables of the ministers of South Korea or in whole of the political elite of South Korea (e.g., periods in office, gender, and province of birth) associated political and administrative recruitment behavior with social phenomena as part of the "political culture".

For example, in giving reasons for the short tenures of ministers, Blondel (1985, p. 96) mentioned the possible influence of political culture, without, however, being more specific. In the case of Japan he rejects the explanation of the high turnover among ministers as being a result of political problems, as in Greece or France, seeing it rather as a system of 'organized' rotation. Elsewhere, Blondel (1985, p. 163) mentions the connection between the short terms in office of ministers in South Korea as "cultural characteristics "and" political traditions."

A second example relates to attempts to explain the low political participation of South Korean women and the reservations of the population against active political participation of women, also referred to as the "political culture" of both Koreas. Although patriarchal dominance is seen as a global phenomenon, there are differences in severity. The political culture is here to be included in the discussion process. According to Lenz (1997, p. 84) the central and defining elements of political culture are formed by gender role models that play an important role in the selective integration of women into politics, and go back to cultural symbols and norms that deal with women, men and gender.

Finally, in Korean research on elite recruitment, regional biases in the appointment of ministers are explained in terms of the "special political culture of the country" (An Pyŏng-man, 1985, p. 228). Similarly, Kim Hyo-t'aee (1993, p. 18) with particular reference to the variable "regional origin" represented the forms of the appointment of ministers of South Korea as depending on the characters of the presidents and the political culture of the country.

These examples show that different authors in different contexts (tenures of ministers, political participation of women, and regional antagonism in Korea) see a connection between the practice in appointing ministers and a social phenomenon which they call "political culture" of South Korea. The factors influencing the appointment or resignation of ministers are manifold; in particular, the current political situations must be taken into account. In the presidential system under which South Korea was ruled almost the whole period of its existence, characters

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1 Blondel (1985, p. 96) further states “This state of affairs has not so far been fully analysed, led alone explained: both its cultural origins and its consequences for political and administrative life need to be explored. Although it is clearly sui generis and has deep roots in Japanese society, it may perhaps be related to the high turnover of ministers in Korea and the relatively high turnover in Taiwan. For, although the Korean political system has been relatively unstable, the very high turnover of ministers in that country cannot be fully explained by this situation alone”.

2 Blondel (1985, p. 165) concludes: “Thus, in the contemporary world, and with very few exceptions, the political culture, the need to remain credible and the institutions combine to lead very often to a high turnover”.

3 Sohn (1994, p. 265): “Despite the equal rights for men and women promised in the constitution, Korean political culture is predominantly male-oriented and authoritarian”.

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and style of leadership of the presidents had a major influence on the selection of ministers. Schematically the key decision factors for the recruitment of ministers in South Korea can be represented as in figure 2.

Figure 2. Deciding factors for the recruitment of ministers in South Korea

During the investigation period from the first Republic of President Syngman Rhee, which began in August 1948, until the government of President Kim Young-sam, whose minister officiated until March 1998, South Korea had a total of number of 730 nominations and 555 individuals appointed as ministers. These frequent changes of ministers reveal that the political rulers of the country respond rather sensitively to political changes by changing the cabinet. This makes it interesting to investigate the backgrounds of cabinet reshuffles.

2. Previous research on ministers in South Korea

Extensive empirical papers on the political and administrative elite, also dealing with ministers, are found among general overviews of policy of the Government of Korea. This indicates the great importance attached to quantitative elite research. Sin Myŏng-sun (1993, pp. 218-264) and An Pyŏng-man (1999, pp. 207-254) who was later minister of education, science and technology (August 2008-August 2010), dedicated chapters on political elites and elite rotation. There is a more extensive treatise on the same topic by Han Sung-cho (1999, pp. 508-676) which was published in the anthology of politics in Korea by Kim Un-t'ae. Yang Song-ch'ŏl who later became a member of the party of Kim Dae-jung in 1996, and who was South Korea's ambassador in the United States from August 2000, wrote a book with over 1,000 pages on the administration elite in South Korea between 1948-1993 (Song-ch'ŏl, 1994). Except for differences in the periodization of South Korean history (with Yang being the most accurate) there are some weaknesses to these studies, including the group of people tested, the evaluation of the studies, and the time intervals investigated.

As regards the groups analyzed, these are usually too diverse. Although the prime minister is subject to a different selection process (he needs the consent of the National Assembly unlike the ministers), he is treated together with the ministers. Han in some cases also included other officials than ministers in his calculations, but not always. Yang works with average values which take the details of the president as well as those of the vice-ministers into account.

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4 The presented empirical results originate predominantly from a study as part of a habilitation thesis submitted in 2002, (Dormels, 2002a; 2002b) and, except for a portion of the appendix, published in 2006 (Dormels, 2006).
The variables of year of birth/age, birth province, education and prior work or previous activities are taken into account, together with frequencies of appointments. Only Yang considers the tenure of office-holders. Activities after the tenure in office, however, are not taken into account by any studies. When employment and activities before office are considered, public officials are statistically put into different categories (such as teaching and research, bureaucracy, politics, military, media, judiciary, and economy).

In general, all analyses are rather descriptive, and restricted to the most important trends (e.g. regionalism), and the texts often offer only a conversion of tables and statistics into words. Furthermore, the circumstances for the transformation of the cabinet are barely considered. Previous research which engaged with averages observed the variables over a long period of time (periods of governance). These figures do recognize certain trends, but more precise statements about the cause of change are only possible if one takes into account whether there were certain situations where ministers were replaced frequently or a particularly large number of ministers were appointed from the military, from the parties, from the province of Kyŏngsang-do or elsewhere.

Statistics based on the background data of the ministers do not usually consider the terms in office. Thus the results are not necessarily accurate, as it is not only important how many people originated from Honam region, or how many women have been appointed, but also how long they held office. In short, then:

The group of persons to be tested should be as uniform and clearly defined as possible. In the current researches only persons bearing the Korean title 長官 changgwan have been taken into account.

Previous occupations of the ministers do not say much about the recruitment methods. Therefore, the positions which have been hold before the office should be further investigated.

In particular it is necessary to detect changes in recruitment behavior in smaller time dimensions, i.e. changes within a period of government should be explored.

The present study therefore addresses these shortcomings.

3. The method of the present research

3.1. Methodological considerations

The objective of the methods used is to present a comprehensive picture of the recruitment methods of ministers. Ministers’ activities after their tenure are also taken into account, so as to provide information about relationships between the administration elite and other members of society.

It is also interesting how the background data of the ministers have changed over time, as this may also provide clues to changes within Korean society on the identification of these processes of change, therefore proceeds in three steps:

- What has changed?
- Why were the changes made?
- Can regularities in the changes of the variables be detected?
In order to find answers to these questions, it is not sufficient only to determine the average values for extended periods (such as the republics), since changes in the variables may be associated with specific situations. It is also necessary to examine whether long-term changes proceed gradually or whether these changes are subject to sharp fluctuations. Therefore the present study analyzes the data of ministers dynamically.

Previous studies on the ministers of South Korea have examined certain variables of the officials and calculated the average values for longer periods of time, usually the government duration of a president. In the present study, mindful of the frequent changes of ministers, the investigations of the static, average values over extended periods will be complemented by a dynamic observation of ministers’ data (terms, background information, and activities before and after the appointment). This dynamic approach will make it possible to accurately examine changes within government periods.

The frequent changes of ministers in South Korea therefore offer the opportunity to explore the correlations between changes in the data of ministers and exceptional political incidents. Although the changes in average values for certain variables for the Rhee (1948-1960), Park (1961-1979), Chun (1980-1988), Roh (1988-1993) and Kim Young-sam (1993-1998) administrations allow us to draw inferences to certain processes of change in the policy of South Korea, it still remains unclear how these averages were achieved.

A dynamic view of the data offers an abundance of new information on the ministers and their backgrounds of recruitment. Cabinet reshuffles are a further part of the process of change in the policy of South Korea to which the data of ministers add more insights, especially because ministers have so far been considered only sporadically in the history of Korea.

3.2. Method for dynamic analysis on minister data

The most important method in the context of this dynamic approach is the combination of two components, a chart of ministers and the codified variables.

First Component

The chart of ministers is the essential basis for research, providing information about the holders of ministerial posts and date of inauguration and resignation. In addition, the appointments of minister are to be found next to their names, numbered in parentheses.
Sources for the preparation of this chart are lists of ministers, in which year and month of taking and leaving office of individual ministers are listed. The smallest unit of the chart is therefore a month.

**Second Component**

The second component is a list of all ministers of South Korea during the period under investigation (which may be multiple in the case of multiple appointments) with information on selected variables in a codified form. The list is numbered and refers to the numbers in the ministerial chart. In compiling this list, various preparations are necessary. Because the data on ministers is insufficient in quantity and quality, a ‘who's-who’ list of the Minister needs to be created.

Although the daily press also provides information on the background data of the ministers, the most important sources of this work are lexicons on people with a who's-who character. These have been published every year since 1967 by two or three different publishers as an attachment or addition to the current year's books. It is insufficient for the present work to just take any entry of a minister into account, as the activities after their term in office should also be explored. The latest entry in each case is used.

The creation of a who's-who list of South Korea's ministers is necessary because the relevant information is distributed over many editions of Korean people lexicons. For the sake of simplicity, ministers are listed in the order of their appointment. The who's-who list serve solely to facilitate the creation of codified profiles of ministers and is therefore created in the original language. In a second step all variables of the ministers will be examined and coded. The variables are summarized according to the following topics: length of term of office, age, gender, region of origin, education, activities (before and after appointment), and career path.
Combination of ministerial chart and codified variables

For a dynamic analysis of the minister data, this method is able to integrate the variables in a codified form into the chart. This is a new method for the quantification of historical processes of change. The aim of this linkage of the chart with the variables in a codified form is to record the changes in the data of ministers during the change of ministers.

Specifically, this is done using the following steps:

1. In every month where a change of position among the ministers has taken place the monthly average values are being calculated.
2. On the basis of these lists of ministers and the monthly average values, a table with monthly averages for the entire period, divided by periods of governance, is made. These tables form the basis for further investigations and interpretations.
3. Finally, diagrams are made which summarize the monthly values, for reasons of clarity, as semi-annual or annual average values.

4. Ministerial recruitment before and after 1987 - differences in the variables “region of origin” and “paths of becoming a minister”

The year 1987 is considered by many as the beginning of democratization in the Republic of Korea. After large-scale demonstrations, the constitution was changed to allow direct presidential elections. Issues such as regionalism, North Korea, and the Kwangju uprising could now be discussed more freely in public. Did these changes of 1987 have direct influence on the appointment of ministers in South Korea? This is investigated empirically considering two variables:

1. Birth province of the Minister
2. Pathway of becoming minister
The Impact of Democratization Processes on the Recruitment of Cabinet Ministers

4.1. Regions of origin

Regionalism is a hot issue in South Korea, and regional antagonism is seen by many authors as "the biggest problem of the South Korean political culture" (Pohl 1999, p. 165) or "the most critical sociopolitical cleavage in Korea" (Seong Kyoung-Ryung 2000, p. 136). In Korean research on the topic, the regionally unbalanced appointment of persons to high executive positions after the establishment of the 3rd Republic, and the unbalanced regional economic development in favor of southeastern regions, are considered key factors in regional conflict in the country.5

Detailed discussion of the complex issue "regional antagonism" is not the purpose of this part of the paper. It is clear that for an extensive regionally investigation of one-sided appointment practices, not only the ministers’ data but also data from other office-holders needs to be considered. The main question, thus, is the influence of democratization on minister’s recruitment regarding the places of birth of the ministers. To find new insights to this question, the dynamic analysis on minister data developed in the previous section will be used.

Average values of data regarding provinces of birth of ministers according to government

Let us now look at the static data, the total values for the ministers during the reign of a particular president. The results are similar to other research on the elite of South Korea in terms of birth provinces.6

Table 1: Regions of birth for ministers of South Korea7

<table>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seoul/Kyŏ</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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5 Kyung-hwan and Min/Hai-sook Kim (1994, p. 343) conclude: „Many researchers (e.g. Man-Heum Kim, 1987; Yong-Hak Kim, 1989) argue that the most important factor for the regional conflict is that the political power from the Yeongnam district of successive years have employed a policy in favor of Yeongnam, while discriminating against Honam by comparison. Man Heum Kim compared the regional distribution of the high-ranking government officials from the period of the 3rd Republic to the 5th Republic and reported that the percentage of Yeongnam was the highest (28.5%), next Ch’ungh’eong (14.8%), then Seoul (13%) and Cheolla (11.6%). Yong-Hak Kim (1989) reported a more objective elite-appointment structure by region (…), taking into consideration the proportion of regional population in 1943 as a basis. According to his report, the proportion of the elite from Yeongnam was more than twice as high as that of the elite from Honam in most fields except in the case of judicial officials, and it was not only the case of Honam but also the case of Kang-won and Cheju, which produced a lower proportion of the elite than other districts“.


7 In brackets, behind the designations of the regions, the roughly rounded portion of the population is located for the time of the birth of the ministers under consideration of the persons actually living in South Korea, but who are born in North Korea. Due to the small number Ministers from Cheju-do and Ministers, which are born in a foreign country, were not included on the table.
In sum, the above table can be interpreted as follows:

- During the first republic of President Syngman Rhee, people from the central provinces, in particular from Seoul were preferred.
- The military dictators Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, as well as Roh Tae-woo, who was elected in 1987 but also had a military background, and the civilian Kim Young-sam, both came from the southeastern province of Kyŏngsang. Considering the recruitment of ministers, all of them favored individuals from Kyŏngsang-do over Chŏlla.
- Kim Dae-jung comes from the province Chŏlla. Ministers who were born in this province have especially been preferred during his presidency.
- Roh Moo-hyun himself comes from Kyŏngsang-do; however, his party has its supporters in Chŏlla-do.

To conclude, the democratization from 1987 did not stop the preference of special regions in the case of recruiting ministers. The first time that this behavior changed significantly was after the appointment of Roh Moo-hyun as President.

**New findings**

However, through a precise analysis of background–data of ministers month by month, it is possible to make some interesting observations. It can be seen that the preference for certain regions did not have the same intensity within the whole term.
of presidency. There have been periods within a presidency in which no region was overrepresented in the cabinet, and periods when a great number of ministers have had the same origin as the president.

With the help of the dynamic analysis of the ministers’ data we can differentiate following periods:

- Periods in which the president does not nominate a high number of persons who are close to him because of regional attachment (renunciation phase);
- Periods with a clear strategy of stabilizing power by the appointment of a high number of ministers who are compatriots (dominance phase);
- Periods with a visible, but less marked trend of appointing ministers with the same origin as the president constitute the relative majority (majority phase).  

Let us take a look at the individual governments to see if regularities can be found.

**First Republic (Syngman Rhee)**

*Figure 1: Ministers born in Central Korea (capital region/Ch'ungchŏng/Kangwŏn) and in the south provinces (Kyŏngsang/Chŏlla) (1948-1960)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Renunciation phase</td>
<td>August 1948 – April 1951; 18-54%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority phase</td>
<td>May 1951 – June 1954; 46-66%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominance phase</td>
<td>July 1954 – August 1955; 82-92%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority phase</td>
<td>September 1955 – April 1960; 42-67%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Renunciation phase**

Syngman Rhee sought to present himself as a nonparty president and therefore appointed politicians from different groups. Soon followers of the biggest party of South Korea came into the cabinet. On a regional level, the first cabinet of Rhee was relatively balanced.

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8 Renunciation phase, dominance phase and majority phase are therefore not absolutely distinguishable from each other.
Majority phase(s)

The elections of May 1950 reduced the number of Rhee’s supporters in the National Assembly. Rhee had hoped for a coalition with the oppositional National Democratic Party (NDP); however, in May 1951 four NDP supporters of the government resigned. His strategy to integrate members of the opposition had failed. Rhee therefore felt the need for a government party, which he established in December 1951. The post of the minister of defense was very important due to the continuation of the Korean War, and went to Yi Ki-pung from Seoul, who later became the second most important person in the government. In April and May 1951, the posts of the ministry of foreign affairs, the ministry of the interior and the ministry of defense were entrusted to officials from Seoul.

According to Korean politics scientist Pak Chi-Young (1980, 131) within the First Republic there were three periods of severe internal repression

- the Pusan crisis of 1952 (a constitutional amendment was enforced),
- the constitutional amendment in 1954 and
- conflicts on 24th December 1958 due to revisions to the national security law.

Dominance phase

During the first Republic the dominance phase fell into the period after the national assembly elections of May 1954. For the first time Rhee’s liberal party took part and gained more than half the seats. It was also the period in which Rhee enforced a constitutional amendment extending his power by unlawful means, in November 1954.

Between July 1954 and July 1955, 11 of 12 cabinet ministers originated from the northern provinces of South Korea (Seoul/Kyŏnggi, Ch'ungch'ŏng, Kangwŏn), one came from North Korea, but nobody originated from the southern regions Honam and Yŏngnam. From April 1951, not a single minister originating from the southwest was present in the cabinet.

After the National Assembly elections in May 1954, Yi Ki-pung was the number two in the government. At this time president Syngman Rhee was already 79 years old. In November 1954, an illegal constitutional amendment was passed allowing Syngman Rhee’s reelection. This led to a serious state crisis. The strengthening of Yi Ki-pung's power can be seen to correlate with the regional recruitment of ministers.

Regarding the presidency elections in 1952 and later in 1956 where Rhee was stronger supported in the North, i.e. in central Korea, than in the South regions, and due to the fact that the government party was dominated by persons from middle Korea, it can be inferred that the single-sided regional distribution of the minister's positions between 1954 and 1955 was intentional.

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9 The amendment needed 135.33 votes, actually 136 for a 2/3 majority, but only received 135. Nevertheless, the amendment was accepted on the grounds that 135 were enough. The amendment needed 135.33, but got 135, however they said that till 4 after the comma it should be rounded down.
Government

Park Chung-hee

Figure 2: Ministers born in Kyŏngsang-do and Chŏlla-do (1961-1979)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Renunciation phase 1</td>
<td>May 1961 – February 1963;</td>
<td>0-15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority phase</td>
<td>March 1963 – April 1968; 28-39%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renunciation phase 2</td>
<td>May 1968 – May 1971;</td>
<td>11-26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominance phase</td>
<td>June 1971 – December 1979;</td>
<td>32-47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Renunciation phase 1**

Park Chung-hee attempted to make the military coup look like a “revolution of the military”. He appointed young soldiers from different parts of the army who mostly originated from North Korea. Initially, Park declined to appoint military personnel from his home region as it was more important to him to have a strong support of the army.\(^{10}\)

**Majority phase**

The majority phase started in March 1963. In the beginning of that year the resistance against Park's presidential candidacy intensified; even the general staff carried out measures to hinder Park's candidature (Kim Yong-uk, 1997, p. 151). On February 18th, Park announced he would withdraw his candidature for presidency unless nine conditions were met, among others the ending of power struggles between the parties (Kleiner, 1980, p. 206). This was also supported by the Minister for Defense Pak Pyŏng-kwŏn. However on the 15th March 1963, Park Chung-hee organized a demonstration by the military demanding an extension of military rule.

\(^{10}\) Till February 1963, 35 ministers were appointed, only three of whom came from Kyŏngsang-do, all being civilians.
(see Cho Kap-che, 1999, pp. 250-253). As a result, Park limited the possibilities of political activities on March 16th and suggested an extension of military rule for four more years. This caused protests not only in Korea but also abroad. On the same day, Park changed his cabinet and appointed five new ministers - three military officers and a diplomat. In keeping with the present analysis, four of the five new ministers originated, like Park Chung-hee, from Kyŏngsang-do. Among them was the new Minister for Defense, who encouraged support within the military. Later discussions between Park and members of the opposition led to the compromise of August 1963 whereby Park Chung-hee was tolerated as a candidate for presidency if the military government was not to be extended.

16 March, 1963 was the day on which Park was able to extend his position of power; it was also the starting point of a stronger concentration of ministers from southeast Korea. In these critical times, Park probably saw the necessity to employ persons of absolute trust, persons with whom he was connected through origin.

**Renunciation phase 2**

The presidency elections in 1967 had sharpened the public awareness of regional antagonisms between southeast and southwest Korea. Compared to the elections of 1963, Park Chung-hee lost badly in the southwest. Therefore, before the elections in 1971 there was a clear approach towards the Chŏlla provinces. When in August 1968 the Minister for Defense was dismissed for leaking military secrets (see Ilbo, 1968), Park tried to mitigate the general discord by appointing a Defense Minister from Chŏlla-do (Kim Hyo-t'ae 1993, p. 186). During this preliminary election period, relatively few ministers from Park’s home region were appointed. The number from Kyŏngsang-do was further reduced in April 1969, when the opposition party was able to pass a vote of no confidence against the Minister for Education. This was possible with the help of rebels from the government party which was mired in factional fights. Even though in June and October 1969 some ministers from Kyŏngsang-do were appointed, the reorganization of the cabinet in December 1970 in preparations for the 1971 elections reveals that Park preferred a well-balanced cabinet at regional level, so as not to concede any electoral arguments to the political opposition. In September 1970 Kim Dae-jung from the province Chŏlla-namdo stood on behalf of the opposition party, and a strong regionalist campaign followed.

**Dominance phase**

Shortly after the presidency elections in April 1971 and elections to the National Assembly in May of the same year, Park’s restraint from appointing ministers from his home region was over. In June 1971 the number of the ministers from Kyŏngsang-do rose from four to seven. A constitutional amendment in 1969 allowing Park’s renewed candidature for the presidency led to demonstrations by students and critics of the regime. The elections in 1971 led to further worsening of the situation. Hence, Park reorganized his government in June 1971. Kim Jong-pil became Prime Minister, while more military were appointed to the cabinet, to calm the domestic situation. From this time on the number of ministers from Kyŏngsang-
do remained high till the end of Park’s period in office. In the end of 1972, the Yushin constitution was adopted, limiting the action of the opposition. From August to December 1973 the cabinet contained highest number of ministers from Kyŏngsang (nine, i.e. 47%). On 8th August, Kim Dae-jung was kidnapped by the South Korean Secret Service in Tokyo, and in October violent Anti-Yushin demonstrations started. The cabinet reorganization in December 1973 can be seen as a partly reaction to the dispute around the kidnapping of Kim Dae Jung and the demonstrations against the government. The appointment of persons with compatriotic attachment was aimed at stabilizing the government (see Kim Hyo-t'ae 1993, 187).

Fifth Republic (Chun Doo-hwan)

Figure 3 Ministers born in Kyŏngsang-do and in Chŏlla-do (1980-1988)

Renunciation phase: August 1980 – December 1981; 30-33%
Majority phase: January 1982 – April 1982; 48%
Dominance phase: May 1982 – January 1985; 52-67%
Renunciation phase: February 1985 – February 1988; 19-38%

Renunciation phase 1

After the military coup d'état, the first thing to do was return to civilian normality. On 24 January, 1981, martial law was abolished and the government party and opposition parties were established. On 25th March 1981, elections to the National Assembly took place. In order to overcome the economic crisis of 1980, Chun appointed several technocrats to his cabinet. Kleiner, the former ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany in Seoul refers to this as a phase of consolidation of power (1992, p. 193). In his first cabinet Chun took public opinion into account in not appointing too many ministers from his home province.

Majority phase

Nevertheless, a change is to be recognized from January 1982 where on the occasion of cabinet reorganizations in connection with a new plan of economic development, the appointment of ministers from Kyŏngsang-do increased.
Cabinet appointments reflect political power shifts under Chun. The renunciation phase signifies a strategy of change. In 1985, Chun liberalized political life in view of the fact that his term was coming to an end. This was reflected in a cabinet reorganization with proportional regional representations to boost Chun’s credibility. The proportional regional representations increased in the years 1986/87 after protests against the military dictatorship and the approach of new presidential elections.

Kyŏngsang-do, the birth region of the president, was represented in the cabinet from the dominance phase to the renunciation phase, reflecting Chun’s personal influence.

**Government Roh Tae-woo**

*Figure 4: Province of birth of ministers 1987-1993 (in %)*
Renunciation phase 1

With the formation of the sixth republic, the problem of regionalism became urgent. Roh started his term of office after the “demonstration year” in 1987 when questions of regional antagonism were openly discussed and published. The first cabinet of the sixth republic was to be understood as a signal to avoid favoritism towards single regions. Roh Tae-woo deliberately avoided appointing too many ministers from Kyŏngsang- so as to achieve more popularity in other regions.

Dominance phase

Roh, who according to the constitution could not be re-elected, increased the number of ministers from Kyŏngsang-do during the cabinet reorganization in December 1990. He likely sought to avoid spending the second half of his term of office as “lame duck” and therefore appointed close confidants and individuals with hard liner-image into government. These included Ch'oe Pyŏng-ryŏl and Pak Ch’ŏl-wŏ, both originating from southeast Korea. The appointment of these hard liners was a reaction to the protests and student demonstrations which flamed up again. This led to the setting up of a new big government party through the union of Roh’s party with those of Kim Yŏng-sam and Kim Jong-pil.

Renunciation phase 2

Like his predecessors, Roh Tae-woo, especially in view of upcoming presidential elections emphasized regional proportional representation in the last year of his presidency. This was to underline the credibility of a “neutral cabinet” in the upcoming elections.

Concluding Remarks

The analysis of the regions of birth for ministers of South Korea during the presidencies of Syngman Rhee, Park Chung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo shows that with only few exceptions all four cases showed a typical order:

Renunciation phase - majority phase - dominance phase (-renunciation phase)

Renunciation phase on the beginning of a presidency

Syngman Rhee and Park Chung-hee used the tactic of integrating politicians or the military from different political camps, the decision not to appoint individuals with regional affiliation was only a side effect. Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo consciously appointed only few ministers from Kyŏngsang-do to gain the support of the population from other regions. One reason for the renunciation phase at the beginning of a presidency is the fact that the formation of the first cabinet of a new government always attracts the attention of mass media. It has a special character as it is seen as a symbol for the expected policy of the new government.
Majority phase

The entry into the second phase, in which the region favored by the presidents usually becomes the strongest represented in the cabinet, signifying the ending of the renunciation strategy. The poor legitimacy of the government led to the failure of the strategy of integrating different teams to gain of support of wide parts of the population. The result is a strategy change: the President appoints individuals who already stand on his side, often due to regional connections.

Dominance phase

Scandals, constitutional amendments for the extension of the power of the president or other political changes feed the protests of the population. The president reacts with reinforced appointments of persons into government whom he believes he can trust due to regional connections. The dominance phase of a particular region in the government is normally the time when the state takes most repressive action against the opposition. In all four governments, it can also be seen that the dominance phase falls into periods in which persons with an administrative background are members of the cabinet. Repressive measures allow the cabinet to enjoy a high level of undisturbed, vigorous, effective administration (Kleiner, 1980, p. 225).

Renunciation phase at the end of a presidency

The fourth phase signifies another strategy change to achieve the sympathies of the population to strengthen support for a suitable candidate in the forthcoming elections. If the end of the presidency comes unexpectedly, the 4th phase precipitates of course, like in the case of Syngman Rhee and Park Chung-hee.

In sum then, the analysis shows that the frequent appointment of persons from the home region is not a result of conspiracy or pure favoritism; the single-sided regional appointment practice of the ministers is therefore an unintentional effect of a political strategy with which authoritarian rulers sought the preservation of their power or reduce political instability. Given the great importance attached to personal relations in Korean culture, the establishment of a government on the foundation of existing personal connections was therefore a rational choice for decreasing internal instability in a situation of missing legitimation, and also to reduce transaction costs (see Kim Yong-hak, 1990, p. 293).

As pointed out in chapter 1 it is aimed in this paper to show the consequences democratization has had on the minister's recruitment. So now we come to the question whether differences regarding the recruitment behavior before and after 1987 could have been noticed. Interestingly the above order of the phases is not distinctive in the governmental period of the civil presidents Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, although, e.g., in regard to the minister's appointment Kim Young-sam was not less preferential to his home region than his predecessors. The number of ministers from the province Kyŏngnam fluctuates merely between 27 and 43%.
Kim Dae-jung appointed unusually many ministers from his home region Chŏlla-do, but without particular fluctuation in the numbers of the ministers in the period of his reign. The monthly average values of the ministers who were born in the province Chŏlla-do range between 25 and 37%.

We can conclude that a government which is democratically legitimized can move away from the phases of deviant ruling strategies outlined above. Nevertheless, this doesn’t mean the renunciation of preferred regions itself. Kim Young-sam was accused of arrogance in not taking public opinion into consideration, thinking he was democratically legitimized anyway. In contrast to his predecessors, Kim Young-sam appointed especially many Kyŏngsang ministers into his last cabinet, trying to recompense their loyalty. Kim Dae-jung, in contrast, merely sought to create a balance after the Chŏlla province had been disadvantaged for so long.

The analysis show, therefore that democratization was unable not stop the single-sided appointment practice on a regional level. However, after the presidency of Roh Tae-woo (who was chosen democratically but had a military background) the motives of single-sided appointment practice were different, as is indicated through the absence of the phases outlined above with Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung.

4.2. Routes to Ministerial Office

The second aspect that is worthy of examination in the question of what impact the process of democratization had on the appointment of cabinet ministers concerns the routes to ministerial office. Here the question is whether and when democratization has been successful in edging out forces of the authoritarian system like the military and the state bureaucracy. Political scientist Kevenhörster argues in this context that in current democracies there are two routes to high political positions that have become increasingly prevalent: first, through positions in state administration, and second, through the public battle for political posts. While the elitist’ bureaucratic way draws on administrative and technical competence and
assumes a rather reserved, defensive personality profile, the egalitarian, political promotion through political parties favors offensive applicants who take a pragmatic approach to political issues and are mindful of their representative image towards the public. The former see themselves as administrative “specialists”, the latter see themselves as “generalists”. The more egalitarian trends are achieved under the influence of economic dynamics and the wide influence of mass media in politics and society, the more generalists are recruited instead of administrative experts (Kevenhörster, 1997, pp. 142-143). The number of successful candidates from the camp of political parties can thus be regarded as a kind of scale for "egalitarian tendencies in politics and society. Hence, the question is whether, using the recruitment data of the ministers, it is possible to ascertain trends towards a weakening of the power of the administration and thus a stronger politicization of the government.

The competition between bureaucrats and politicians for cabinet positions is shown in figure 6 where the dates until 2002 have been taken into consideration. Figure 6 shows the difference between the number of ministers with experiences as a vice minister (VM) and the ministers with experiences as members of the National Assembly (NA) before appointment to the minister's office. Where the curve lies above the x-axis, the ex-vice ministers dominate, where the curve lies below the x-axis the ministers with representative's experience in the National Assembly dominate.

Up to July 2002, there are a total of 12 periods in which the number of the ministers with parliamentary experience was greater or equal to the number of minister with experience as vice ministers. These can be divided into four larger periods:

**The first years of Syngman Rhee’s First Republic**

- From August 1948 to January 1952
- From May 1952 to July 1952
- From August 1952 to September 1953

It is not possible to be a member of the first cabinet of the Korean Republic with experience as a vice-minister because vice-minister positions were awarded at the time of the formation of the first cabinet. Nevertheless, the number of the ministers, namely seven out of 13 chosen in May 1948 to the first National Assembly of the Korean Republic is relatively high even by Korean standards. It shows that Roh tried to integrate different political groups into his government as president for all Koreans. Even members of the largest opposition party in the cabinet were represented from the end of 1948 until 1952.

**The Second Republic and the first cabinet of the military government**

- From August 1960 to June 1961

The second republic was led by a parliamentary form of government.
Parliamentarians therefore represented the majority of ministers. The number of ministers with parliament experience during this time is therefore bigger than the number of ministers with experience as vice-ministers as can be seen in figure 6.

In the first government of the military government which came to power in May 1961, only military officers were represented who were neither vice ministers nor parliamentarians before. The difference between the number of ministers with experience as vice ministers and the number of ministers with parliament experience in this first cabinet of the military government is therefore zero.

Figure 6: Difference between the proportion of ministers with experience as Vice minister and the number of ministers with parliament experience before their assumption (in 1948-2001) (in %)

The era of Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil (June 1971 — December 1975)

- From June 1971 to August 1973
- From December 1973 to October 1975

A constitutional amendment in September 1969 had allowed a third term in office for Park Chung-hee. In regard to their support, the representatives of the government party were now allowed to be appointed as ministers.

With the presidency elections from April 1971, Kim Dae-jung had become a serious opponent with a 45.3% share of the votes. Furthermore, the National Assembly elections which took place in May 1971 showed a surprisingly good result for the oppositional new Democratic Party with a share of 44.4% of the votes. Demonstrations against the constitutional amendment and allegations of electoral fraud have shaken the country. The appointment of politicians to ministers is not a sign of greater democratization, but it is an indication for a stronger public and opposition with Kim Dae-jung as serious challenger in the political battle.

The pressure of the public as well as from the government party, urged Park Chung-hee to make concessions towards politicians within the cabinet formation. However, with the resignation of Kim Jong-pil’s as prime minister in December 1975 the administration won back lost terrain in the cabinet.
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The period of democratization from February 1985

- From February 1985 to August 1985
- From August 1986 to July 1987
- From May 1988 to December 1990
- From February 1993 to October 1997
- From March 1998 to May 1999
- From March 2001 to January 2002

From February 1985 to January 2002 there were six periods in which the number of the ministers with parliament experience was greater or equal to the number of minister with experience as vice ministers. In the following the circumstances in which this was the case are described.

Prior to the elections of 12 February 1985, there had been some political relaxations and Kim Dae-jung was able to return from the USA on August 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 1985. The new oppositional Korean Democratic Party, which had only been founded on 18 January, 1985 won 29.26% of the vote; the government party received 35.25%. On February 18\textsuperscript{th}, 1985 a complete reorganization of the cabinet occurred. Six members of the ruling party became ministers on the grounds that the will of the people should be reflected in the administration.

The year 1985 counts as the beginning of the end of the military government. “The collapse of military rule began in 1985 two years after its leaders attempted to boost its legitimacy through a series of liberalization measures, including the lifting of the ban on political activities by purged politicians” (Shi and DohC, 1999, p. 1). However, the liberalization measures failed to make the government and ruling party more popular, but rather strengthened the opposition parties, trade unions, churches and student movements that worked together for democratization, gaining wide popularity among the South Korean population. The greater involvement of politicians is an expression of growing pressure from the opposition.

A further Cabinet reshuffle took place in August 1986 after a series of large anti-government demonstrations. Politicians were again involved more in the executive branch, and six members of the ruling party joined the Cabinet as ministers, which should also be seen as a consequence of discussions about the introduction of a parliamentary system. In July 1987, many politicians left the cabinet. In the run-up to presidential elections in December 1987 and the National Assembly elections in April 1988, a "neutral" cabinet was employed.

The number of politicians in the Cabinet during the initial phase of the Roh Tae-woo government, in 1987 was high. Roh was directly elected by the people in 1987 after the elections to the National Assembly in which the opposition parties gained the majority of the vote in April 1988. From November 1989 hearings were carried out regarding the Kwangju massacre of 1980 and other misdemeanors of the former fifth republic in which President Roh Tae-woo was involved as a minister. The involvement of members of parliament in the government seemed therefore opportune.

After the founding of the Democratic Liberal Party as a coalition of the ruling party with two of the three opposition parties represented in the National Assembly
in January 1990, the government had a clear parliamentary majority. This union of President Roh Tae-woo with Kim Young-sam and Kim Jong-pil was a disappointment for the democracy movement, and Kim Young-sam was seen as betrayer by many. “Enjoying over a two-thirds majority, this new ruling party was able to resort to the age-old authoritarian method of blitzkrieg tactics and enacted as many as twenty-three bills in the Nationwide\(\text{National}\) Assembly without the participation of the opposition members” (Shin and DohC. 1999, p. 5).

Then in December 1990, Roh-confidantes with a hard-liner image were appointed to the cabinet. The number of politicians among the ministers was reduced and in October 1992, ministers with representative's experience disappeared almost completely to create a “neutral” cabinet for the presidency elections in December 1992. Until August 1997, under President Kim Young-sam, six to nine of 21 or 22 ministers were individuals with parliament experience before their ministerial appointment. Thus, their number was steadily increasing or equal to the number of former Vice Ministers, but Kim also appointed a politically “neutral” cabinet shortly before his exit.

The number of politicians in Kim Dae Jung's first cabinet was very high. It was a kind of coalition government with the powers of Kim Jong-pil, who had (unsuccessfully) called to introduce a parliamentary system of government in the middle of the legislature period in exchange for his support of Kim Dae-jung during the presidential elections.

Twelve out of 17 ministers (71%) had parliamentarian experience before the ministerial appointment. At that time, when critics would have liked to see more administrative experts in the cabinet, Kim Dae-jung replied: “the minister should see the forest, the vice minister the trees”. But despite this plea for generalists in the Cabinet a year later, the politicians of the first cabinet were largely replaced by persons from the administration. The reason was the by-election to the National Assembly when ministers standing for elections had to resign their ministerial position.

In May 1999 only three out of 18 ministers (17%) were politicians with parliamentary experience. The year 2001 restored the collaboration between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-pil, which had waned temporarily. This led to an increase of the number of politicians of nine out of 19 ministers (47%) when the party Kim Jong-pil came to power in March 2001. But the ministerial reshuffles in January and in July 2002 reduced this number dramatically again in view of the upcoming elections in December 2002 to the presidency, for which a "neutral" cabinet was considered desirable.

**Summary: A democratization process subjected to fluctuations**

In general it can be seen that during the second half of Rhee’s government as well as under Park from 1963 on and Chun until 1985, cabinets were mainly filled with individuals from the administration. However, since 1985, an approach for balance between those with administrative experience those with experience in parliament is recognizable. In other words, the number of the politicians in the cabinet increased.
The growth in the number of ministers with parliamentary experience, and with experience in the executive at vice minister-level (see figure 6), reveals a development of egalitarian trends in politics and society, and thus a change in the political culture of South Korea since the mid-1980s. Currently, South Korea seems to be in a transitional phase from an authoritarian society to a more democratic one.

An interesting result of the dynamic consideration of the minister's dates is that there is no gradual trend towards fewer bureaucrats and more politicians, but that cabinets with a higher number of politicians and those with a higher number of bureaucrats alternate mutually. Therefore, a constant preference of politicians has not been visible. Table 2 shows the time and occasion of cabinet reorganizations which led to the formation of either a government with either a high concentration of politicians or bureaucrats.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Occasion</th>
<th>Increase</th>
<th>Decrease</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 1985</td>
<td>easing measures</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1986</td>
<td>demonstrations, sex-torture scandal</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1987</td>
<td>&quot;neutral cabinet&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1988</td>
<td>investigation committee, opposition majority (NA)</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1992</td>
<td>&quot;neutral cabinet&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1993</td>
<td>first cabinet YS</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1997</td>
<td>&quot;neutral cabinet&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1998</td>
<td>coalition DJ-JP</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1999</td>
<td>before NA-elections</td>
<td></td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2001</td>
<td>new pact DJ-JP</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2002</td>
<td>&quot;neutral cabinet&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In particular, the view that the government should be politically neutral has been revealed through the formation of so-called “neutral cabinets” before presidency elections. This aversion to politicians in ministerial positions relates to an authoritarian tradition. Neutrality and commitment towards the common good is at

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times expected from the state, bureaucracy and the ministers. Furthermore, the formations of politically “neutral cabinets” before elections show that the government tries to admit that separation of powers is of significant importance. However, the wish to recruit ministers from their own ranks within the ministerial-bureaucracy cannot be constantly ignored by the president. It is therefore apparent that politicians are appointed to cabinet positions merely in certain situations; however, these situations occurred more frequently recently.

The minister's background-data provides two indications regarding democratization processes in South Korea. First, the accumulation of situations in which elected representatives enter into cabinet can be seen as an indicator of successful long term democratization. Second, the constant alternation of political and administrative cabinets shows that the trend towards a Western-style democracy in South Korea is not linear. The attitude of the Korean people towards democracy is also subject to fluctuations, and experience has shown that authoritarian solutions, particularly in times of economic crisis, are often more effective than more democratic solutions.

5. Conclusion

South Korean political scientists have criticized the excessive focus on system theory, structural-functionalism and dependency theory in Korean political science due to the western, especially the American influence, arguing that approaches that emphasize stronger individual behavior have been neglected. Greater attention to Korea-specific aspects is thus desirable. In this respect, the method of dynamic analysis of minister data developed in the present paper contributes to the study of important aspects of political culture of South Korea. The paper has investigates important aspects of the political culture of South Korea using the background data of ministers who held office between 1948 and 1998. For this purpose, an innovation of the present paper is that the data of the ministers was processed by not only using more variables than previous studies, but also changes of the variables were studied in this sense in order to ensure a dynamic analysis. Thus, the investigations of the data on ministers released a lot of information that can be used as a basis or as complement to political and historical studies.

A large part of data and information on the Ministers and their recruitment was made available for further research on important aspects of the political culture of South Korea. The special features of Korean political culture are therefore of particular importance as they have been proved to be relevant in political recruitment processes. The most important results of this research on political culture include answers to specific questions, which are associated with major aspects of the political culture of South Korea, like regional antagonism and the process of democratization.

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Chosŏn Ilbo 6.8.1968
What makes a social movement possible?
A case study of Korea’s 2012 Candlelight movement

Jeongim Hyun*

South Korean society has experienced a thrilling history since the 1980s in terms of its pro-democracy movement. Thanks to the uprising of June 10, 1987, a twenty-five-year-long authoritarian regime finally gave way to democratization. Fifteen years after this movement, an important mass mobilization took place during the 2002 presidential election. The way this mobilization broke out caught many analysts’ attention: an Internet user proposed a demonstration with candles to pay respect to two middle school girls who were accidentally killed by an American tank. Even though the visible factor of this mobilization appeared to be the Internet, attributing too much weight to the Internet would be inappropriate. This article focuses on the question: through which process could what the protestors did online lead to getting them into the streets, and thus raking offline action? Exchanging information, reading, and expressing opinions on the Internet are one thing; acting in the real world is another. They could have stayed in front of their computers, just clicking or writing comments anonymously, so why did they bother taking to the streets? To search for an answer, this article studies three objects: actors (social network, organization, over the Internet); frame alignment (creation of a collective identity and collective memory); and political opportunities.

1. Introduction: Back to the familiar but essential question: Why study social movements?

Social movements, though a relatively recent field in sociology, have been studied through both theoretical and practical work, mostly based on Western European and North American societies. This can be explained by historical reasons: Starting in the end of the 1960s, many big social movements broke out and made major changes in these societies: The Civil Rights Movement in the United States and the May ‘68 movement in Western Europe are good examples. However, social movements which caused important changes in a society are not monopolized products of developed countries. As André Malraux, the French minister of culture in the period of the May 1968 protests, has remarked, ‘It is not only France that confronts a huge tide of protests but the whole world does’. In developed countries, protests have been initiated and organized mainly by young people against the patriarchal authorities of society, whereas in developing countries, the main character of protests was against foreign powers.

As history shows, once a society has experienced a big social movement, the concerned society become completely different. This is we call a power of movement. It can bring a profound change and continue to influence the grand

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1 I borrowed this expression from the book of Tarrow and Sydeny (1998).
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orientation of society, what Touraine terms ‘historicité’ (Touraine, 1978, p. 40). We could go even further to qualify a power of movement like: ‘Only social movements can bring “real” changes in the society’. In fact, from its beginning, social movements bear this real changing character: In most cases, actors organize social movements once after they have failed to realize or express their claims within the established institutions. However, that does not mean that every failed collective attempt would have eventually transformed into a social movement. In reality, actors can easily realize that mobilizing a certain amount of people is already difficult, and even though they succeed in creating sustained and concrete collective actions for or against certain issues, most social movements end up in failure or seem to be a failure. This kind of negative or defeatist view about social movement is prevalent in the power-holders’ eyes; especially for cynical ones, social movements look like a pathetic social phenomenon.

However, if we examine carefully the genesis of social movement, we can easily realize that a social movement is a powerful social phenomenon. There are at least three elements needed to create a social movement.

First, it needs passionate actors and their commitment: they have completely different characteristics from a crowd, which was often described as impulsive, manipulated, unpredictable, and uncontrollable by scholars in the early 20th century (Gustave, 1895; Tarde, 1890). If mass has volatile attitudes, actors in a social movement have continuous action. Second, a social movement needs claims, not complaints. Indeed, there is a fundamental difference between two actions: If you claim something, you have an object; to achieve an object you need to think or calculate your eventual choices before you take an action. On the other hand, complaining does not necessarily imply this process; complaining is rather a spontaneous, non-calculated action. Claiming is a powerful action too, because it has an insubordinate nature: actors do not accept actual conditions as granted but want to change. Therefore to claim something is an important step to affirming themselves as a subject, not an object, in the society. Third, to create a social movement, actors should act in accordance with a certain moment and in a certain place; that demands the actors’ strong commitment, especially if they are surrounded by politically and culturally oppressive environments. Considering these three elements, a social movement is not a pathetic but a powerful social phenomenon, and as this article noted before, only a social movement could bring a genuine change in a given society, we could not find more powerful social phenomenon than social movement. Therefore, studying social movements gives us an opportunity to understand the dynamics of society: how the given society did function, is functioning, and will function.

Given these factors, studying South Korea’s social movements is one of the best ways to understand Korean society. Furthermore, since the 1980s, several important social movements have taken place in East Asia: Taiwan, China, the Philippines, and especially the democracy movement of June 1987 in South Korea. These brought unprecedented changes in most sectors of each society: political, social, and cultural. One of the most important was political change as an authoritarian regime gave way to democracy.

Then fifteen years later, another important social movement broke out in South
Korea. That time protestors held candles instead of stones and Molotov cocktails, which had become customary for protestors in the 1980s. Netizens (net+citizens) encouraged peaceful but powerful mass mobilizations were organized by many NGOs, students, and spontaneous participants against the United States ‘not-guilty’ decision about the American soldiers’ responsibility for the death of two middle-school girls. This could be seen as spontaneous, volatile, and emotional reactions provoked by an angry mass. Indeed, some journalists and politicians, most of them right-wing, used such an interpretation to provoke more angry reactions from participants. But for me as a social movement scholar, the Candlelight movement of 2002 has multiples elements to be analyzed; it is far from a simple reaction by an angry mass. First, this case study allows us to analyze three classic questions, or genesis elements, of social movements:

- who the actors are,
- what they want, and
- why (how) they mobilize at that specific moment, not another.

Second, this case allows us to examine what role the internet played in these protests. The Internet has become an increasingly important tool in social movements, especially to exchange information and mobilize people’s conscience and actions. Some scholars have rushed to say that Internet is a revolutionary communication tool that will speed up the world’s democratization. While I do not dispute that it can be a revolutionary communication tool, I have reservations about claims that it will speed up democratization. The Internet is used mostly for commercial purposes and much less for enhancing democracy. The 2002 Candlelight movement was nearly a first case of large-scale mass mobilizations organized and influenced by Internet users in South Korea. No wonder many researchers were blinded by this new communication tools’ fancy look. That’s why they were content to show how many clicks hit certain articles and Internet forum discussions or how many SMS were exchanged by cellular phone users etc. rather than finding out why users clicked on certain articles and through which process “on-liners” became “off liners”. In other words, how did ‘mouse holders’ become ‘candle holders’? Exchanging information, reading, and expressing one’s opinions on the Internet are one thing; acting in the real world is another.

The remainder of this article is composed by two parts: a discussion of theory and the case analysis. The following part discusses the appropriate theoretical base and tools to apply to the case analysis.

2. Remembrance theories compatibles

The one-size-fits-all theory that would be well-suited to any society does not exist. The most fruitful theories are those that can apply to several societies, so this analysis will try to identify those that are compatible for the case study of South Korea. I am inspired by aspects of resource mobilization theories mostly developed in North America. A grievance alone is insufficient to make a social movement rise because there is no society without grievances. That is why resource mobilization theories concentrate on analyzing how efficiently the actors mobilize resources to create, to continue, and to succeed in a movement. Also I will use the lens of new
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**social movement theories** developed in Western Europe. New social movement theorists found the causes of social movements in the dysfunction of post-industrial societies. They focused their analysis to find out how the actors make their collective identities and tried to understand rather than calculate why and how the social movements occur.

Before A. Oberschall, most theories that tried to explain why social movements broke out were based on the psychological perspective, irrationality of a crowd\(^2\). Thanks to Oberschall, resource mobilization theories developed in North America, giving a great deal of importance to organizational aspects and their strategies. In Western Europe, new social movements theorists have explained the causes of social movements by focusing on changes of social structure, mainly malfunctioning post-industrial societies, and emphasized the cultural factors involved in social movements. Both theoretical currents can bring insight in the context of this study of the Candlelight movement\(^3\).

A social movement is by its nature a complex phenomenon. Thus, for an analysis to be fruitful, a scholar must fine tune between working on one aspect and working on all of them, and that balance differs from one kind of movement to another. Though any movement *is* political because it demands change in the power structure, it is possible to distinguish three kinds of dominant protest: political, economic, and cultural. Using that categorization, student movements in the 1980s in South Korea were essentially political as they were aiming at political democratization. Since then, the country’s political environment has changed a lot. In 1993, after a long period of military dictatorship, a civilian became president through a democratic process. However, politicians and officials from the former regime remained in key positions in the government and the administration. One could therefore assume that a social movement in 2002 was a logical resurgence of those of the 1980s since, in a sense, these former democracy movements have not been a complete success. However, as one of the main ideas of resource mobilization theories, the grievance (uncompleted political democracy) is an insufficient condition to make a social movement possible. Thus the question remains: ‘What made the 2002 Candlelight movement rise?’ To find the answer, I chose three objects to study: actors (social network, organization, over the Internet), frame alignment (creation of a collective identity and collective memory), and political opportunities.

### 2.1. Who were the actors?

The actors who led the mobilizations were not only the organizers, but also the

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\(^2\) There is much more than this perspective in these theories; looking at them in detail broadens our scope.

social networks that played an important role to facilitate people’s participation. This article distinguishes between ‘former’ and ‘new’ networks; these networks may or may not have a physical organizational form - like NGOs-, remaining just virtual (or more precisely, ‘real’ in the sense of mobilizing through virtual support – Internet). That cyber mobilization can speed up and raise the size of a mass mobilization.

2.2. Why did they mobilize? Frame alignment

The Candlelight mobilizations occurred during the presidential election of 2002. At first, one could assume that these mobilizations were one of the standard pre-election movements that occur frequently during an election period. Indeed, such a period typically is a precious opportunity for any activists to push their claims. However, it is not enough that an opportunity is there to make a movement possible; it has to be seized, and for that, it has to be perceived as an opportunity by the participants. Considerations in terms of opportunities and constraints imply, therefore, that one must look at the cognitive activity of each agent, even if it differs a lot from one actor to another (Chazel, 2003, p. 124). Starting from there, and with the political dimension, the formation of interpretation schemes and shared cognitive structures must be seen as a key factor for collective actions to emerge (Chazel, 1993, p. 158). My previous work tries demonstrating that in the student movements of the 1980s in South Korea, tangible resources were not the key point in the emergence, continuation, and eventual success of a social movement (Hyun, 2005). That’s why this study examines the way people aligned with the available frames which would be old or new.

To proceed, the article looks at the underlying elements: symbols, pictures and songs that are already familiar to people, and to which people can react spontaneously. It focuses on pre-existing symbols - perceived as independent from any current organizational purpose - but also at new symbols intentionally created or reinterpreted. For instance, a candle and a black ribbon are traditional mourning signs in South Korea but they moved from the real world to the Internet, and netizens started to add a picture of them with their emails. They have demonstrated with those symbols not only in the real world’s weekly demonstration, but also every time they sent emails. It also carefully looks at the songs people sang in the 1980s and then in 2002.

What were the political opportunities?

Under Tarrow’s meaning, political opportunities are consistent - but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national - dimensions of the political environment that either encourage or discourage people from using collective action (1994, p. 18). There are four most salient changes in opportunity structure: the opening of access to participation; shifts in ruling alignments; the availability of influential allies; and cleavages within and among elites (Tarrow, 1994, p. 86). Among the four, the opening of access to participation seems to be an obvious change in recent Korean society, as this article will explain.
3. **The 2002 Candlelight movement: 100,000 candles to win back ‘national sovereignty’**

3.1. **A quick history**

On 27 November 2002, an Internet user called Angma (devil in Korean) called for a demonstration on the following Saturday at Kwanghwamun (the main gate of Kyeongbok palace, on the City Hall plaza one of the most important landmarks in Seoul and a place symbolically essential for the democratization of the country in the 1980s). The purpose was to mourn two teenage girls, Hyosun and Miseon, who were accidently killed by an American tank in June. Beyond mourning, the called-for demonstration wanted to protest the American Military Court that had acquitted the soldiers involved in the incident.

This message appeared on the Internet public forum of one of the main South Korean newspapers, Hankyoreh. Until then, only eighty people had read the post; although around 10,000 gathered with a candle. A week later, there were 50,000 and then 100,000 the following week, plus similar demonstration in other cities. The pictures of the demonstrations were in every newspaper and even reached world media coverage. Just a few months earlier, for the football World Cup, the same place was full of people supporting the national team. And fifteen years earlier, in June 1987, the same place was full of people protesting the military dictatorship. For the South Korean people, the similarities among these three pictures were obvious and heavily commented on, as were the differences: from Molotov cocktails, stones, and fights for democracy to red T-shirted football fans partying for a public celebration, and to fragile tiny candles and songs protesting American injustice.

In a span over less than twenty days, the protest took two forms: peaceful street marches without any major violent incident (which was not necessarily usual in South Korea), and the Internet display with a picture of a candle and a black ribbon on a website, as part of an email, or on a cellular phone message. An interesting question is whether one form could have been possible without the other, with the same intensity and speed; did one form impact the other, and vice-versa? To study that question, we will first look at the actors.

3.2. **Who were the actors? Generation 3-8-6 and Generation 20-30**

The so-called “3-8-6” is a shortcut to describe the generation in their late 30s, born

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4 This name has no relation to the fan club of 1 Korean national football team, *Red devil*.
5 According to an American – Korean agreements called SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement) signed in 1967 when South Korea was under a military dictatorship, American soldiers based in Korea cannot be detained by Korean justice and must be judged by American military courts.
6 One of the leftist newspapers.
7 In May and June 2002, South Korea and Japan co-hosted the Football World Cup. A national team fan club called *Bulgu Angma* (red devil) counting around 120,000 members used the Internet to organize street celebrations; the celebrations took place all over the country, in particular in that place.
8 This expression appeared in newspapers at the end of 1990s, so now they became 4-8-6, but this term is still employed as a fixed expression for people who finished university degrees in the 1980s.
9 Nowadays, this term is used simply to indicate the age of 20-30s, people 20-30 in the 1990s are now
in the 1960s and experiencing college in the 1980s. They had played a major role in the democracy movement; after ‘their victory’ in 1987 that led to step-by-step democratization of South Korea, they moved back to where they eventually belonged, in the middle class. Now as the leading forces of Korean society, most of them start to achieve executive positions in most sectors of society. One thing they did not forget is their past political and social engagement: the exploding number of NGOs in which they had taken part in beginning in the late 1990s would vindicate them. One possible explanation is that their career and family were now on a stable track so the 3-8-6 generation could devote time to various NGO activities.

The 2030 generation seems to be the exact opposite: in their 20s or early 30s, Democracy is for them a given, and they are often considered non-politically engaged and rather egotistical. It may seem that Angma (the web user of the initial Internet public forum) belongs to that generation. But compared to the older generation, one characteristic of the 20-30 is that they are very familiar with and well-connected to the Internet: in December 2001, the Internet experience of the 20-30 generation was 73 percent, compared to 53 percent for the whole population (KRNIC, 2001). Beyond that figure, they rely on Internet devices much more for communication than the previous generation. As Kornhauser said, ‘The capacity for horizontal interpersonal communication, to rebroadcast a news article with personal commentary, enhances the capacity for discussion, engagement, and the two-step flow that serves as the critical antidote to anomic mass communication (DiMaggio et al., 2011, p. 320)’.

Reading blogs and Internet forums usually finds criticism about social issues, but not necessarily an action. Posters have used the Internet to express their opinions anonymously; but then, they eventually took candles to the street. To see why this happened, the article now looks at the shared interpretation schemes and signification structures that help mass mobilization (Chazel, 1993, p. 158).

3.3. Why did they mobilize? The frame alignment process: Anti-Americanism and national identity affirmation

Before the Candlelight movement, other incidents in recent years generated public discontent against the continuing residence of American troops in South Korea. One in particular is worth mentioning: an American soldier had murdered a bar hostess and at first escaped justice through the Status of Forces Agreement between United States and South Korea (SOFA) agreement. The public reacted to what was seen as an unfair situation and enabled anti-American activists to get heard. They underscored how unfair that agreement was, in particular the difficulties for residents living near American military camps where noisy and dangerous exercises are frequently run without the right to claim damages in case of accidents or injuries. Other abuses were made public, as when an American military base discarded toxic chemicals despite repeated warnings from South Korean officials. When the death of the teenage girls occurred, that context provided a reference for anti-Americanism.

Here is, for instance, an Internet posting by a Korean living in New York, 30-40s.
expressing his reaction to the candlelight protest of the Hyosun and Miseon tragedy:

‘I am part of the 3-8-6 Generation. In 1987, I was in the protest after the death of Lee Han Yeol, one million people gathered. I was on the same city hall place you are now. We were so proud and enthusiastic... but with life going on, our dream blurred away, independence, justice, anti-Americanism, pride, these words lost their colours, and became tasteless... But today, when I see you on my screen, I am happy; it reminds me of our energy in June 1987. I myself also want to sing Achim isul (morning dew) and Gwangya (the vast plain) with you, at this place... I am so proud to be Korean! Let’s state our pride everywhere in the world!’

This reaction can be seen as nationalistic; but behind that reading, we see a shared interpretation scheme. Songs during social movements are important as they show a collective memory, very old or more recent, transmitted from one generation to another. In 2002, the protest songs were Arirang, Achim isul and Gwangya, which are all familiar to most South Koreans. Arirang was already known in the eighteenth century and became a protest song in 1926 during the Japanese occupation. Achim isul was used in the 1970s against the Park Jeong-Hee dictatorship, and Gwangya was written during the mobilization of the 1980s.

Not through the lyrics but though their symbolic significance on historical and political grounds, these songs present both insights into their shared representation of South Korea as less than a fully independent country. The occupation - although not as direct as that of the Japanese - grants impunity to American soldiers despite their crimes in a clear display of the relation between the two countries. Therefore, they want to get rid of the top political personnel, who were already there during the dictatorship and had too many connections with American power. For instance, two years earlier, an organization even published an anti-voting list of politicians for a general election.

They moved from anti-Americanism to affirmation of Korean identity and then to denunciation of old-time politicians still in office. They also went into mistrust of the major mass media. Indeed, as the old-time politicians were still there, so were the businessmen, in particular in the media. The Internet was both a convenient tool and an independent medium for the two generations, enabling the dissemination and sharing of their views. The move was all the easier than in usual cases since South Korea was in the midst of the presidential.

3.4. What are the political opportunities? The presidential election

Despite the anti-vote mobilization in 2000, the conservative Hannara party was still in control of the parliament. It was run mostly by old-politicians from the

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10 The student who died during the demonstration against the military government in 1987 became one of the icons of the democracy movement in the 1980s with Park, Jong-Chol. We can compare it with a similar example in Eastern Europe, like Iyan Palach of Czechoslovakia who immolated himself to protest against the invasion of Soviet military troops during the Prague Spring in 1968.

11 Oh My News, 14December 2002. This is an exclusive Internet news site that was founded in 2000. This Internet ‘newspaper’ is run by freelance journalists who are paid directly by readers who judged how much the article is worth paying for. The general characteristics of the articles are rather left.

12 The songs’ lyrics are in the appendix.

13 The Alliance of Citizen for the 2000 General Election at first published a list of 86 politicians who should not be nominated by their party; then, among the chosen candidates, they tried to maintain the protest. Their web site got 450.000 visits. In the end, 59 candidates got beaten out of the 86 from their list.
dictatorship era and seemed about to win the presidential election: its candidate - Lee Hoi-Chang - was leading in the opinion polls and it controlled the administration, mass media, and key financial and business networks.

Some supporters of the Liberal party challenger -Roh Moo-Hyun - decided to use the Internet as their main tool, such as the No-Sa-Mo\textsuperscript{14} organization. The members of this organization were mostly from the 3-8-6 and the 20-30 generations. Table 1 shows that those two generations represented around 50 percent of voters and were highly connected users.

\textbf{Table 1: Voters and Internet users’ percent in 2002\textsuperscript{15}}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>% population</th>
<th>% registered voters</th>
<th>% Internet users (Dec. 2001)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 et +</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus the 3-8-6 and the 20-30 generations were both Roh Moo-Hyun supporters and, apparently, those who organized and participated in the protest. That last point is not fully proven; however, because there was no survey made during the protest, but is based on a general consensus among observers.

Did the election play a role in the mobilization? The two leaders reacted in a very different manner: Roh Moo-Hyun refused to participate in the mobilization, as he did not want to try to get a benefit from it, but his opinion had been clear for a long time that he wanted a better balance in the relationship with the United States. Lee Hoi-chang at first depicted the protest as a manipulation by Roh Moo-Hyun; seeing its success, however, he stopped his criticism and ended up participating in the last event.

Through this presidential election campaign in 2002 we can understand in what political environment these mobilizations occurred and how the organizers and participants perceived the political opportunities. First, these mobilizations represent more than a simple anti-American protest. In the perspective of political opportunities, the mobilizations in 2002 qualify as a continuity of the 2000 mobilization, even though its goal was not secure votes for politicians but to demand apology from America and establish fair relations between the two countries. Second, the mobilizations in 2002 were a prelude to announcing a clear demarcation of political tendencies between two generations. Table 2 shows the preference

\textsuperscript{14} This organization had been founded by Lee, Jeong Ki, nicknamed “Old Fox “, 15 April 2000 just after the 2000 general election. See also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nosamo

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between the candidates according to voter age. The 3-8-6 and the 20-30 generations were Roh Moo-Hyun supporters, for he offered hope to them. As a former lawyer coming from the lower class, even with no university education Roh had become known for fighting against the dictatorship in defending the rights of workers.

Table 2: Vote spread by age at the 16 General Election, 2000 in %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Roh</th>
<th>Lee</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 et +</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To give an answer to the question ‘what made the 2002 Candlelight movement rise?’ this article analyzed three objects of study: actors (social network, organization, over the Internet), frame alignment (creation of a collective identity and collective memory), and political opportunities. Especially to see through which process “on-liners” became “off-liners”, the article analyzed how shared interpretation schemes and signification structures helped the mass mobilization. Using the Internet was ‘helpful’ to express and share the opinions and mobilize the conscience of public yet it was not alone decisive element for the Candle light movement; three elements, actors, frame alignment and political opportunities were combined to make rise Candlelight movement in 2002.

4. Conclusion

An important social movement often leaves deep changes in a society, as did the Civil Rights Movement in the United States, May ‘68 in France, and German reunification. Things cannot be as they were before, not only because of the changes in social and political fields, but also because individuals change their vision of the world.

I cannot judge where the Democratic Movement of June 1987 in South Korea was a true success or not, but it started the way to democratization, even if many think that way has not been deep nor fast enough. The anti-American protest in 2002 was a resurgence of the previous movement, and of the Alliance of Citizens for the 2000 General Election.

The newcomers of the 20-30 generation protested with the veterans of the 1987 movement through the Internet, has been a tool for cyber-protest, a tool for sharing and building opinions, and a tool for mobilization and organizing in a quick and efficient manner. These generations perceived a need to protest for democracy by protesting against an external power that blocks the way. The injustice perceived after the court decision provided a trigger, and the approaching presidential election deadline was an excellent opportunity to mobilize the public. As long as South

16 Source: Survey the day of the election (MBC-TV- Korea Research Centre): Korea Research Centre (2003, p. 12).
Jeongim HYUN

Koreans think democracy is not fully installed, a mass mobilization is likely to happen when a political opportunity coincides with an injustice trigger. In that light, the May 2008 protest against a contract to import suspicious American beef to South Korea is no surprise, and not the last of its kind.

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Internet Sites

http://www.ccej.or.kr/
http://www.peoplepower21.org
http://www.greenkorea.org/
http://www.ngokorea.org
http://www.stat.nic.or.kr/ (Korea Network Information Center)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nosamo
Chronology

1989 Creation of the Coalition for economic justice (Gyeong Sil Ryeon)
1989 Creation of the national coalition of movements for Democracy (Jeon Min Lyeon) which replaces the Coalition of people’s movements for Democracy and Unification. (Min Tong Nyeon)
1989 Creation of the National Federation of teachers union (Jeon Gyo Jo)
1989 Creation of the National union for farmers (Jeon Nong)
1990 Normalization of diplomatic relations with Soviet Union, which had been interrupted for 86 years
1990 Creation of the Confederation of Union (Jeonguk Nodongjohap Pyeopoe) – actually only workers from industry
1993 Creation of the Korean Federation for Environment
1994 Creation of the Civic Movement Council (Hanguk Simindanche Hyeopoe)
1994 Creation of Solidarity of People for Direct Democracy (Chamnyeo Yeondae)
1995 Creation of National committee for the 18th May massacre trial and start of the petition that will collect 1 million signatories
1996 Inculpation of former Presidents ChunDou-Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo for numerous charges of corruption, insurrection and treason
1996 The ruling party passes a labor law and a national security law without opposition in session
1997 General Strike
1998 Solidarity of People for Direct Democracy proposes a movement for individual shareholders
1998 Solidarity of People for Direct Democracy starts a campaign to convince each person to buy 10 shares of the 5 main conglomerates to counterbalance their owner’s power
2000 Creation of the Alliance of Citizen for the 2000 General Election (Ch’ongson Simin yondae)
2002 100,000 people get together at Gwanghwamun for an Anti-American protest
2002 Roh Moo-Hyun is elected President

Appendix: Songs chanted during the protests

Arirang

Arirang, Arirang, Arariyo, you go beyond the Arirang hill…
But if you leave me, you will never move on your way…
Arirang, Arirang, Arariyo, you go beyond the Arirang hill
What makes a social movement possible?

Morning dew

As the morning dew, more beautiful as pearls,
Wetting each leave after a long night,
Sorrow drops work out in my heart;
I go up the hill and smile.
The sun blazes above the graves;
Is suffocating heat my ordeal?
And now I go into this harsh desert.
Grief behind me, now I go.

Vast plain

There are sobs
On this broken-hearted earth which had disappeared
There is the vein of the white clothes,
Bulging on the two embraced arms.
From the East Sea where sun rises
To the West Sea where sun sets,
From the heat of the South Islands to the immense Manchuria plain,
How could we be poor?
How could we be hesitating?
Oh! This warm soil we take in our hands,
Standing up again on that plain regained.
A Disparity between Faith and Actuality

A story of North Korean political defectors in Bulgaria

Soyoung Kim* and John Harbord†

Dissidence between Communist countries was a rare phenomenon, and has thus largely escaped the attention of scholars. This paper examines the case of four North Korean students in Bulgaria who sought asylum in the early 1960’s following Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin and the break between North Korea and the Soviet Union. Using archival documents, including correspondence between the students and the Bulgarian authorities, the paper shows how the four students became a pawn in the ideological conflict between the Moscow and Pyongyang, and how the Bulgarian Communist Party’s decision to grant asylum and thus cause a diplomatic scandal with North Korea was predetermined by the need to maintain a common front with the Soviet Union.

Keywords: East-East dissidence, North Korea, asylum, Soviet Union

1. Introduction

During the Cold War, dissidence and asylum from East to West was a popular topic, particularly in the case of those who fled to the West for ethical rather than purely economic reasons. A great deal has been written about such cases and the ways they were used in the propaganda war between the two sides. Instances of those who sought asylum between communist countries, in contrast, are much rarer during the mid-1950s and early 1960s, not least because the nature of political alliances in the communist bloc made it highly likely that such requests would be accepted. This paper examines one such rare case, the defection of four North Korean students to Bulgaria at the beginning of the 1960s.

Because of the direct and indirect influence of the August Faction incident¹ in 1956 and the criticism of the political line of Stalin and others, many North Korean students who studied in the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc rebelled against Kim Il Sung, refusing to return to North Korea and chose exile. At the end of the 1950s North Korean students in the Soviet Union collectively refused to go back to North Korea. In the mid-1950s, North Korean students escaped from East Germany to West Germany. There is also a case of North Koreans joining in the Hungarian resistance to Soviet rule in the 1956 revolution. However, this cannot be considered the same as the Bulgarian case as a relevant example of East-East asylum because the student in question first obtained South Korean nationality and the government of Hungary worked very closely with the embassy of North Korea in Budapest to

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¹ There was a political struggle for power in North Korea in August 1956. When Kim Il Sung embarked on a tour to the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc countries, deputy prime minister Choi Chang Ik, Park Chang Ok and others tried to overthrow him.
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give him asylum. The North Korean citizens in this case hoped to become part of the West.

In the Bulgarian example, the four students sought and ultimately received asylum in communist Bulgaria, where they spent most of the rest of their lives. The diplomatic snub involved in refusing to return North Korea its own citizens was quite considerable. Why therefore did Bulgaria decide to take this risky step to protect these four students despite a serious diplomatic problem with North Korea? This paper addresses this question, looking behind the individual drama of the students’ efforts to resist repatriation to the political alliances that made this unusual case of East-East asylum possible. Based on the analysis of secret documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria and the Political Bureau, as well as interviews with those directly involved, it will be shown that the ideological conflict between the Soviet Union and North Korea had an important impact on the granting of asylum to the four students in Bulgaria.

2. The aftermath of World War II and relations in the Stalinist period

In the aftermath of World War II, the Japanese protectorate of Korea was divided into two occupied zones, with the North under the control of the Soviet Union, who installed Kim Il Sung as chairman of the Interim People's Committee in 1946. North Korea and Russia first established diplomatic relations on 12 October, 1948 after the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was proclaimed. North Korea then quickly established diplomatic relations with the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. Relations with Bulgaria were established on 29 November 1948.

At this point Bulgaria was closely politically subordinated to the Soviet Union and its diplomatic policy with other countries was quite dependent on Soviet directives, with the country being led by the hardline Stalinist Chervenkov. During the Korean War from 1950-53, Bulgaria supported North Korea and the two countries had a good relationship.

Following the outbreak of the war on the first of July 1950 the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of BCP called a meeting and made a decision to support North Korea as a socialist brotherhood against the “aggression of American imperialism.” A document from the Bulgarian State Agency Archives minutes the decision of the Central Committee to “organize a campaign all over of the country in support of a fight of Korean nation for the national unification.” It also notes the decision for Todor Zhivkov to “express completely national unity of BCP and laborers in Bulgaria with fighting Korean nation and against the impudent aggression of the American government.”

There was a national campaign to support North Korea and Bulgaria provided food, clothes, shoes and military supplies to North Korea. In March 1952 a medical brigade of 26 doctors was sent. Subsequently the new Bulgarian Medical Service was dispatched again to North Korea and 55 doctors and 50 nurses were sent with medicine and equipment necessary for a hospital with 400 beds. These medical staff in fact remained in the northern part of Pyongyang until 1956.

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2 Bulgarian State Agency Archives. Number: F. 1 B; op. 6; a.e. 949. Date: July 1, 1950. Decision ‘A’ № 23.
After the end of the War in 1953 the governments of the Eastern European countries organized campaigns to accept orphans from North Korea, who were first educated in China. Although the largest group went to Romania, about 500 children were sent to Bulgaria, starting as early as June 1952, when two hundred, to be followed later by three hundred more. They were settled in the cities of Purvo Mai and Bankya, and were brought up and studied in the Bulgarian schools with Bulgarian children.

The Bulgarian government accepted not only children from North Korea, however, but also students and wounded soldiers. Kim Il Sung sent many students to various Eastern European countries to receive training for reconstruction of the country. These students came not only in the immediate aftermath of the Korean War but well into the 1950s.

A year after Stalin’s death, in 1954, Chervenkov was removed as General Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) under pressure from Khrushchev. His place was taken by Todor Zhivkov, although Chervenkov retained some of his powers as prime minister. On 25 February 1956, at the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Khrushchev famously denounced Stalin's dictatorial rule and his cult of personality as inconsistent with Communist and Party ideology. Following Khrushchev's de-Stalinization, a BCP Central Committee plenary meeting was convened in the beginning of April 1956 which denounced Stalinism. In addition, Chervenkov was criticized as a disciple of Stalin and removed from the post of Prime Minister, to be replaced by Anton Yugov. Todor Zhivkov was confirmed as the leader of BCP and subsequently associated with "April Line", which had anti-Stalinist credentials. The new 'local' communists, who were faithful to Khrushchev, assumed power and Bulgaria remained loyal to the Soviet Union. Under Zhivkov, Bulgaria began to follow the more liberal line of Khrushchev. At the 8th Congress of BCP in late 1962, Zhivkov accused Yugov of anti-Party activities, suspending him from BCP Central Committee and dismissed him. Zhivkov, as General Secretary of the Central Committee, pushed his opponents aside and in November 1962 became Prime Minister, thus holding the two most important posts of Bulgaria (Kalinova and Baeva, 2010, pp. 126-147).

This period also led to a sudden political change in North Korea, however, of a rather different nature. In 1956 during Kim Il Sung's absence, Choi Chang Ik, Yoon Kong Heum, both of whom belongs to the Yanan faction, and Pak Chang Ok of the Soviet faction devised a plan to seize power. In August 1956 in the plenum of the Central Committee, opposition forces, encouraged by de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union had criticized Kim Il Sung and demanded reforms. The incident became known to Khrushchev and a delegation was dispatched to Pyongyang to urge Kim to reverse the decisions of the August plenum. He had to agree because of North Korea’s dependence on Soviet aid. In September 1956 he reinstated the leaders of the Yanan and Soviet factions. In the same year, however, after a period of hesitation, Kim Il Sung purged the opposition, executing some and driving others into exile, and consolidated his position as supreme leader. The August Faction Incident gave Kim Il Sung the opportunity to eliminate the opposition completely, and take complete control. While Khrushchev denounced Stalin's dictatorial rule and his cult of personality and initiated the political reform in the Soviet Union,
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Kim Il Sung sought personal admiration and formed a system of dictatorship. His criticism of Khrushchev as a modern revisionist brought the two into conflict. In the beginning of the 1960s Kim Il Sung formed a political thesis *Juche* (later called Kimilsungism) presented as his own version of Marxism-Leninism.

It was against this political backdrop of shifting political alliances that four students from North Korea in Bulgaria asked for political asylum. In 1955 Choi Dong Sung arrived in Bulgaria and in 1956, Choi Dong Jun, Lee Jang Jik and Lee Sang Jong, joined him, with other students (Choi and Kim, 2013). They had the chance to study abroad thanks to their excellent results from the high school or because they were descendants of good families; for example, their relatives were anti-Japan fighters. In a letter addressed to the First Secretary of the BCP, Lee Jang Jik and Lee Sang Jong mentioned the family history of the four students. Choi Dong Sung’s father died in a Japanese prison when his mother was pregnant with him. Lee Jang Jik’s father was sentenced to life imprisonment and died in prison, while his brother also died in the Korean War. Lee Sang Jong’s father similarly fought in the Korean War.

Before coming to Bulgaria, the students underwent a certain amount of cultural and political preparation which suggests that the North Korean Communist Party already entertained the possibility that some might be tempted to stay in Bulgaria. One day before leaving North Korea, they had to take a solemn vow that in return for kindness of the Communist Party of North Korea they would study hard, that they would not make friends with Bulgarian girls, and that they would return home from studying abroad.

Choi Dong Jun, Lee Jang Jik and Lee Sang Jong arrived in Sofia on 7 September 1956, just after an official visit of Kim Il Sung to Bulgaria. Park Sung Chul, the ambassador of North Korea assembled the visiting students and lectured them on appropriate behavior while studying in Bulgaria, reminding them of the need to study hard, never forget their country, and once again steer clear of the siren attractions of Bulgarian girls.

Choi Dong Sung, who had arrived one year earlier, learned Bulgarian at Sofia University for a year, as did the others when they arrived. Foreign students lived with Bulgarian students in one dormitory, so as to learn the language more easily. Interestingly, Choi Dong Sung shared a room for 8 months with Zhelyu Zhelev, later the first non-communist president of Bulgaria, who at that time was studying philosophy, and they formed a firm friendship. Later, when he became an influential Bulgarian politician after 1989, this friendship was to have a decisive impact on the lives of these four students. Every evening the students studied “the history of an anti-Japan fighter, Kim Il Sung” in the embassy of the North Korea and during the lessons of “the Fighting history of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK)” they were learnt that “there is no the cult of personality in WPK and Kim Il Sung was a respected and loved leader of the Korean nation.”

3. The turn away from Stalinism

It was at this point that the great change in the communist states of the world in terms of de-Stalinization occurred. In Bulgaria following Khrushchev, the BCP denounced Stalinism and Chervenkov’s authoritarianism. In October 1956 the
Hungarian Revolution started as a spontaneous nationwide revolt against the Communist government of Hungary and its Soviet-imposed policies, an uprising that was rapidly suppressed with Soviet tanks and troops. After the revolution many Bulgarian students were expelled from universities and some were sent to do for forced labor as a penalty for showing sympathy to the Hungarian revolution. Some of the North Korean students were ordered to return home after interrogation to test their faithfulness to the state ideology and thought.

The four students learned about the incidents and epoch-making changes of the communist system over the world. They were suspicious of freedom and democracy in the communist countries: the state claimed that there was no suppression, but the four students began to doubt this, and to suspect that reality was being obscured and falsified. In September 1956 Choi Dong Sung, who had entered the chemical and industrial college, began to doubt the essence of the communism and of the movement of de-Stalinization. His perception of the divergence between ideal and real communism troubled him to the point where he suffered a partial nervous breakdown. To disguise his confusion and disillusionment, he had himself admitted to hospital for an appendectomy, subsequently taking leave of absence on the grounds of medical treatment, and went to a sanatorium.

North Korea now aligned itself with the People's Republic of China, criticizing the USSR and other communist countries for “modern revisionism.” As a result of these changing political allegiances, the trust of the North Korean state in its citizens studying in European communist countries declined visibly. Students were ordered to keep watch on each other for evidence of politically suspect thought or action. They had to return to their dormitories directly after the lectures and spend the evenings studying the memoirs of Kim Il Sung, the history of Korean Workers’ Party and ‘The report of Kim Il Sung’. Sometimes the North Korean students had to watch the film for educating the ideology in a cinema of a dormitory. The basic guideline was ‘The east wind overcomes the west wind and Europe must not have an influence on North Korea.’ Marxism-Leninism disappeared and it was replaced by ‘Juche Idea’. Kimilsungism was used instead of Leninism. The authorities frequently checked on the students and those who showed problematic tendencies were forced to go back to North Korea.

The four students returned to North Korea in 1959, when all visiting students went back to their home country by special train. Ostensibly they were returning visit, family and friends, but in reality, the journey was arranged by the order of Kim Il Sung to bring the students to Pyongyang to check their faithfulness to the regime. They were kept in a school building, unable to communicate with each other, and required to perform self-criticism and to describe their life abroad in detail. After testing and interviewing, about one third of the students were refused the right to Bulgaria, because they were considered to be seriously affected by Europeanism.

When the four students visited their hometown, they realized the bitter reality: food, clothes and other basic living essentials were in short supply, and people lived in hardship. They felt sorrow instead of delight, when they saw misery of their families and friends. When visiting a concentration camp, where antiparty activists were imprisoned, Choi Dong Sung met his father’s friend, Kim Eul Ku, who had participated in the anti-Japanese movement as commander of the North Korean
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People's Army. Choi Dong Sung was hugely disappointed by the contradictory reality.

It seems that it was at this point that the students separately decided to seek asylum on their return to Bulgaria. At the beginning of 1960s they realized that they all had conceived the same plan and made a pact to escape together. They began collecting information on the relations between Bulgaria, the USSR and North Korea, and saved money for their escape.

As part of their plans, the students approached the official authorities. Choi Dong Sung first tried to meet the ambassador of USSR, but was refused. Then in June 1962, Choi Dong Sung and Lee Sang Jong turned to the BCP for help. A report from the department of External Relations and Foreign Affairs of the Central Committee of the Party documents their request. The two students “declared that they did not agree with the position of the Central committee of Workers’ Party of Korea with regard to the decision of the twentieth and twenty-first Party congresses. They felt that the international policy of Kim Il Sung led an isolation and breaking off of Korea from USSR and the Socialist nations.” The report notes the ground of their appeal, namely that “returning to Korea, they will be arrested immediately, as it happened with the students, who went back returned from other Socialist countries... They asserted that recently there had been such case in the USSR.”

In fact this was more or less the case. According to Hungarian diplomatic achieve documents (NAH Roll №: 53694. Frame №: 2008 0000 2320) in 1959 in Moscow, a North Korea student, Lee Sang Ku, who was studying at the Moscow Conservatory, asked the authorities of the Soviet Union to protect him. At the same time the North Korean embassy in Moscow asked the Soviet Union government to deliver him to the North Korean embassy. Although the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had already made a decision to accept the demands of the North Korean Embassy, the Embassy didn't wait for an answer. They hastily kidnapped Lee Sang Ku and smuggled him out of the country by the diplomatic route. Khrushchev was informed and immediately expelled the North Korean ambassador (Bogook, 2013, pp. 172-173). Choi Dong Sung and Lee Sang Jong may have believed that this incident would work to their advantage, and therefore mentioned it at the meeting with Dichev from the Department of External Relations and Foreign Affairs of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party.

The students complained in their appeal, which they attached to the report that they were not allowed to read the newspaper ‘Pravda’ or to watch the films from the USSR. They were afraid of the fact that citizens from the European socialist countries (mainly Russians) had been expelled from Korea. They also asserted that one month earlier all engineers, technicians and specialists who had studied and graduated in the European socialist countries were called to Pyongyang after the 22nd Congress of CPSU, where they had to undergo ideological tests and interrogation. At the end of their expose, Choi Dong Sung and Lee Sang Jong declared that they did not agree with the criminal policy of Kim Il Sung. They refused to leave for North Korea, as long as the dictatorial regime of Kim Il Sung remained, and they asked for a political asylum from 15 June 1962.

At this stage, however, the authorities did not look favorably on the students’
appeal. The report notes “Our department considers that their stay in Bulgaria has an adverse effect on the relationship between our two countries” and goes on to suggest that the students “be informed that after being called home by their government, they should not stay in Bulgaria” (Dichev, 1962).

According to a statement issued by the four students just before graduation, the Korean ambassador Im Chun Chu ordered them to go to the airport on 28 June 1962. After returning to their dormitory, the four students immediately fled to Mountain Vitosha, where they hid in a mountain cabin. That evening they wrote a political declaration, prepared by Choi Dong Sung, in which they gave no reason for refusing to go back to North Korea. A friend from USSR was asked to send this document to several institutions, including the Central Committee of the BCP, the Red Cross, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and others. While the North Korean embassy initiated a search, sending a declaration for their arrest to Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the students continued to hide in the forest. By now, however, the Bulgarian government was apparently no longer cooperating with the North Korean officials, and in due course a meeting was arranged between the students and the second secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Boyan Vulgaranov, who unexpectedly treated them supportively.

The students continued to hide in a friend’s apartment until an official from the Ministry of Public Security took them to a mountain cabin, where they remained for a month, after which they were told that the problem was solved and they could go to Sofia and prepare for graduation. Unfortunately, however, when the students returned to the city, staff from the embassy of North Korea were waiting for them. In the tussle the students were injured, tied up and dragged to the embassy of North Korea.

In the protocol of the Bulgarian politburo on 29 August 1962 the decision was recorded that "the minister for foreign affairs, Karlo Lukanov, would call the ambassador of North Korea and to make a strong protest against kidnapping of the four students and warn him of releasing them immediately" and then "if North Korean embassy did not release them, the ambassador and military attaché of North Korea in Sofia would have to leave Bulgaria within 24 hours.3 The Bulgarian government then indeed expelled the two diplomats on 5 September, and the day after North Korea reciprocated, and the deputy minister of foreign affairs of North Korea "informed all ambassadors in Pyongyang of the case of the four students and the decision of the government of North Korea to expel the ambassador of Bulgaria, Bogdanov" (Stoichkov, 1962). Despite these quite severe diplomatic frictions with North Korea, however, Bulgaria continued to support and protect the students.

For several days the students were denied food and sleep, and urged to withdraw their request for political asylum, but remained firm. Shortly after, Lee Sang Jong and Lee Jang Jik succeeded in escaping from the embassy, thanks to careless surveillance procedures. On 4 October 1962, Lee Sang Jong and Lee Jang Jik wrote a letter to Todor Zhivkov, explaining why they wanted political asylum in Bulgaria, and how they had been tortured in the embassy of North Korea. Their letter states that they “were bound with a wire and later they bound our hands, feet and waist

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with a rope,” and that “after long torture they were forced to sign a promise of return to North Korea” but that they still hoped to escape by some means. They asked Zhivkov for help and vowed to work for Bulgaria for the rest of their lives.

Two months later the embassy of North Korea organized a party for Choi Dong Sung and Choi Dong Jun to celebrate their return to the home country. Seeing that Lee Sang Jong and Lee Jang Jik were not present, the other students realized they had escaped, and made a plan to escape at the airport. On the morning of 19 October, Choi Dong Sung and Choi Dong Jun were taken to Sofia. Diplomats from other countries in Bulgaria were invited to watch and see how they returned to North Korea voluntarily. However, when the embassy staff gave them their passports, the two students tore them up and threw them in the air, shouting “Objection to Kim Il Sung, objection to going back to Korea,” whereupon they fled. Bulgarian friends who had arrived earlier showed them an escape route across the airport into a building where some unknown Bulgarians were waiting for them. They were taken to the office of the Ministry of Public Security, and after writing a report about their escape they were reunited with Lee Sang Jong and Lee Jang Jik. The four students sent a letter to the Central Committee of the BCP in thanks for saving them from the regime of Kim Il Sung.

From 5-14 November 1962, the 8th congress of the BCP was held, where a representative of KWP also participated. He raised the issue of the four students, but the Bulgarian government answered that the students had gone back to Korea, and they knew nothing about them. Although the archives do not contain any official acknowledgement to that effect, the Bulgarian government was almost certainly obeying a direct order from Khrushchev, for whom a break with the Stalinist past and thus with North Korean and the hardline Stalinist policy of Kim Il Sung was essential. Khrushchev ordered Zhivkov to allow the students to live in Bulgaria, because they protested against Kim Il Sung, who had imposed a cult of personality on his people. Zhivkov could not but obey an order from Khrushchev, because of opponents who still held leading positions in the BCP and in the Ministry. He needed Khrushchev's concrete support to eliminate his opponents and retain power.

The kidnapping of Lee Sang Ku in Moscow in 1959 also had effect on Khrushchev's positive reaction to the Bulgarian students. An article in the Bulgarian newspaper “24 hours” on 29 January 2014 about the death of Choi Dong Sung suggests why Bulgaria granted them asylum “Because of the four political refugee students in Bulgaria there was a diplomatic scandal. Todor Zhivkov asked the advice of Khrushchev and he ordered that the students from North Korea stay in Bulgaria, finish their studies and find work in Bulgaria. And also to be protected.”

In December 1962, the four students were settled in Stara Zagora. Choi Dong Sung and Lee Sang Jong worked in a chemical fertilizer factory, and Lee Jang Jik worked at the furniture factory. Choi Dong Jun worked for an architect of the city until his graduation, when he became a mining expert. Except for Choi Dong Sung, who remained single, all of them married Bulgarians. After the establishment of

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4 At the beginning of November, 1962 Todor Zhivkov visited Khrushchev in Moscow for receiving his approbation so as to overthrow the Prime Minister of Bulgaria, Anton Yugov. On 14 November, at the 8th congress of BCP Yugov resigned and Zhivkov was selected as the new Prime Minister (http://www.decommunization.org/Communism/Bulgaria/1956-70.htm).
diplomatic ties with the Republic of Korea, Lee Jang Jik and Lee Sang Jong gained South Korean nationality, while the others took Bulgarian nationality.

This political event caused diplomatic troubles between North Korea and Bulgaria until 1967. In this period student exchanges between two countries stopped and diplomatic relations were not easily repaired, although Bulgaria made efforts to normalize diplomatic ties. The protocol of a meeting of the Politburo on 18 July 1967 for normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries, recommends that: "the Bulgarian government should apologize for expelling the ambassador of North Korea of the time and to suggest an exchange of ambassadors. The Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to inform the socialist states about our position and to ask them for cooperation in normalizing of relations with North Korea. To be published more materials about the development of North Korea and also materials against South Korea."5 From 5-16 September, the Bulgarian government and Communist Party delegation took a part in a celebration of the 20th anniversary of the founding of the Workers' Party of Korea.6 During the visit they discussed future exchanges of different delegations for economic and cultural cooperation. Eventually, relations were thus more or less restored.

4. Conclusions

The stories of the four North Korean fugitives offers valuable insights into the political conflicts between the Soviet Union and North Korea in the period of a political reform in the Soviet Union in the 1950s. Bulgaria, as a Soviet satellite, was under the close political, economic and military influence and control of the Soviet Union. As has been shown above, the diplomatic policy of Bulgaria was thus heavily dependent on and subordinate to that of the Soviet Union. Although initially the BCP showed itself hesitant to intervene, advising the students to return to their country, faced with the choice of damaging relations with either North Korea or the Soviet Union, the Bulgarians were inevitably going to stand by Khrushchev, seeing a diplomatic conflict with North Korea as the lesser evil. Just as Western countries attempted to use asylum seekers from Eastern Europe as an indicator of the moral superiority of their cause, so Khrushchev too seized the opportunity to make political capital out of the North Korean asylum seekers in Bulgaria.

Acknowledgments

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5 Bulgarian State Agency Archives. Number: 1 B; op. № 6; a.e. № 6770. Date: July, 18, 1967. Protocol ‘А’ № 272.

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Reviews
As the overall number of democracies has started to decrease (Kurlantzick, 2013) and many states that have embarked on the democratic quest have either stopped somewhere between autocracy and democracy or reverted back to autocracy (Carothers, 2002; Göbel, 2011), it becomes crucial to revisit some success stories of countries that have managed to consolidate their democratic system. One of them is the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea). Students looking at democratization indices in 2014¹ might even be surprised at South Korea’s history as a highly autocratic, militarized state on the Asian continent. During the Cold War, functioning first and foremost as a bulwark against Communist expansion from the north, democracy on the Korean peninsula was always a secondary concern for Washington’s policy makers. It is in the context of these events and debates that turning to Gregg Brazinsky’s highly interesting ‘Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of Democracy’ (2007) sheds light on the complex process that is regime change and the factors leading to successful democratic transition.

Why did South Korea democratize? And what role did the U.S. play in this process? In his effective analysis of American and Korean sources (interviews as well as newspaper articles), Brazinsky convincingly uncovers how the ROK became one of the most successful endeavors of U.S. nation-building since 1945. Moreover, his focus lies on the question of American and Korean agency in the overall process; thus, not only on how the U.S. influenced Korean political developments, but also how Koreans reacted to it. Contrary to regime transition literature, the exposure to the U.S. does not automatically lead to a more democratic society or regime, but can have undesired and unanticipated consequences. Indeed, the common theme that runs through the book is the often greater than desired or anticipated gap between intention and outcome. As Brazinsky analyses different sections of the Korean state in detail, it becomes apparent how U.S. efforts to ‘Modernize’, ‘Americanize’ or ‘Westernize’ Korea was met along with embrace as well as open hostility. At the outset, American foreign policy in Korea had the goal of establishing a ‘Free World’ bulwark against communist expansion, even at the expense of democracy on the peninsula. The cost for an anti-communist South was actually “a type of state building that mocked U.S. claims of promoting democracy

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¹ The Economist Intelligence Unit, for instance, ranks ROK as the 20th most democratic country worldwide (Davidson, 2013).
and preserving a Free World” (Brazinsky, 2007, p. 40). While the U.S. was forced to accept the presidency of Rhee and a more autocratic state in the short run, it tried to undermine his support and build up democratic appeal in the society in the long run. In this horse-trade, the U.S. tried to balance between the objectives of regional stability – which meant support for the ROK regime – and supporting a truly democratic state. While paying lip service to the regime, policy planners in Washington sowed the seeds for future democratic development through the shaping of South Korean institutions.

Brazinsky dedicates considerable parts of his book to describe the interaction between U.S. and South Korean society. Among others, he traces this interaction within civil society, the military, and Korean youth organizations. The developments are always contrasted with the political development of the entire state, from the establishment of Rhee’s regime in the end of the 1940s, to the fall of Korea’s last autocrat in 1987. While the U.S. tried to shape Korean perception towards democracy, capitalism, and the U.S. favorably, the success was always limited. Well-received U.S. economic and technological superiority did not lead to an uncritical acceptance of its behavior or moral foundations. For instance, Brazinsky tells the story of a Korean lieutenant general traveling with his contingent to the U.S., who based on their experience in and position towards the U.S. were “divided into three groups roughly the same size […] one ‘extreme pro-American’ and one […] ‘anti-American’; the members of the third group ‘maintained their distance’” (2007, p. 94). This is but one example of a reaction observed in different strata of South Korean society. The book is full of accounts of U.S. efforts not only to shape Korean perceptions, but actually mold a new, pro-American identity in the population, as well as create a new pro-American and pro-democratic elite in the country; efforts, that more often than not resulted in the exact opposite of its intentions. With such diverging reactions one might question whether U.S. intervention really mattered that much in Korea. Brazinsky dedicates the concluding chapter of his work to answering this conundrum. While he concedes that this influence has been ‘smaller’ than usually assumed, he identifies three crucial junctures in which U.S. intervention shaped (and determined) the political trajectory of the country: “1945-48, 1960-61, and 1979-80” (2007, p. 251). Each time, the Western power sided with autocratic power holds in ROK in favor of the democratic one.

The reader of his book might, however, be surprised by Brazinsky’s reasoning. For instance, he acknowledges that a left-leaning, civil government encompassing the entire Korean peninsula would have been the likely consequence of U.S. non-interference. This would have been critical since he considers it “extremely unlikely that a Korea unified by the left would have enjoyed the same level of prosperity and freedom that exists in South Korea today” (2007, p. 251). Next to the speculative nature of this claim, the economic dimension of his argument cannot outweigh the hundreds of thousands of Koreans (and Americans for that matter) who lost their lives fighting in the Korean War, nor justify the suppression of basic human rights under the military junta of Rhee. If one considers the current political crisis surrounding the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea this argument becomes even more spurious. Additionally, the core of this work is descriptive in nature and
lacks theoretical foundation. To give two examples: Brazinsky uses the terms nation-building and democratization almost interchangeably. These are, however, two separate things and the relationship between nation-building and regime creation is far more complex than implied here (c.f. Bunce, 2000). Moreover, the process of democratization is in reality always blurry, but in order to make analytical sense, we need to prescind. As shown above, there are multiple possible reactions to external influence and pressures, which makes one wonder to what extent an outside power can shape the democratization process. The U.S. invested considerable resources for the establishment of a democratic, anti-communist state on the Korean peninsula, but more often than not, these investments were misappropriated to help a regime that only enjoy limited U.S. support. The questions whether external influence is a meaningful category for democratization literature and how it can be conceptualized are unfortunately circumvented by Brazinsky.

The strengths of ‘Nation Building in South Korea’ are the ambitious and remarkable collection of Korean and American sources used to retell the story of South Korean democratization during the Cold War. Brazinsky succeeds in giving a nuanced account of the interaction between U.S. and Korean forces. He tells the story how South Korea struggled for democracy, how a nation was built out of the debris of Japanese occupation, how one of the great superpowers of the Cold War was more often than not contained in Great Power games at the cost of its moral values, and how limited U.S. power was in achieving the desired outcomes. While one can question the moral judgments underlying his work, it is an influential contribution to area studies, American and Korean history, and democratization theory. It is thus, a recommended read for students and academic professionals in these fields and anyone interested in the interaction between these two countries.

References


A cursory glance into modern economics and development theory provides a wealth of examples of policies made in favor of free markets, free trade, and openness to foreign investment. Such policies have become standard in recent decades, particularly as powerful, wealthy countries have begun to encourage such tactics. These developed countries dominate economic theory and practice, although author Ha-Joon Chang proposes that these countries themselves did not practice what they preach throughout the course of their own development, and that the application of free market, neoliberal economic thought to developing economies endangers their prospects for growth. Chang’s work, *Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism*, published in 2008, provides a systematic approach to breaking down these current paradigms and creating a new environment in which developing countries can foster growth within their own industries, without fear that they cannot survive the levels of competition that a free market requires.

In writing *Bad Samaritans*, Ha-Joon Chang seeks to tackle the widespread perception that neo-liberal economic tenets should be followed religiously in order to achieve economic growth and development. Thus, the underlying theme throughout *Bad Samaritans* is that the countries that now benefit from neo-liberal economic policies, the eponymous "Bad Samaritans," foist such policies on developing nations, forgetting their own use of protectionism and emphasis on particular industries during their own periods of development.

Chang provides both fictitious and factual anecdotes illustrating that while neo-liberal economists advocate free markets and total competition in order to fuel development, developed countries were successful because they protected their budding industries from external competition and focused on supporting more high-tech industries, then opened their markets once these firms could withstand competition. This reality is what Chang means by “The Secret History of Capitalism.” Chang separates neo-liberal economic theory into its constituent parts, devoting a chapter to critiquing each of these aspects. These chapters focus on free trade, the presence of foreign companies, investment in slow-growing companies, state-ownership of companies, intellectual property, monetary policy, corruption, democracy, and cultural theories of development. Through this systemic analysis, Chang argues that developing countries must be allowed to foster and protect their industries, adapting to the global manufacturing industry without threat from outside competition in order to be successful. He ends with the suggestion that by acknowledging the folly of their current economic paradigm, the Bad Samaritans

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1 Chang, Location 273.
2 Chang, Location 335.
3 Chang, Location 335.
4 Chang, Location 363.

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can revise their approach and encourage policies that provide real, sustained development throughout the world.\(^5\)

On the whole, Chang provides a strong case against the domination of neoliberal economic policy in development. As a contribution to existing literature, \textit{Bad Samaritans} is both theoretical in its scope, analyzing neoliberal tenets on an individual basis, and empirical in its evidence, taking proof from historical record. His proposals, though in opposition to much of the modern popular economic thought, are by no means extreme. He provides an apt metaphor in saying that his proposals merely “‘tilt the playing field’ in favor of weaker countries.”\(^6\) One of the main strengths in Chang’s narrative is the use of accounts of growth in numerous countries in order to provide a historical basis for his claims. However, this occasionally works to his detriment, as he provides so many of these anecdotes that at times the text seems bogged down and in danger of digressing from the theoretical topics at hand. The fictitious anecdotes he provides can also be somewhat overly simplistic and sensational. For instance, in comparing infant industry to a young child forced into the labor pool, he reduces nuanced arguments of neo-liberalism into a story meant to offend the reader’s sense of decency.\(^7\) Nevertheless, for his purposes, such generalizations and blunt messages can be quite effective, as \textit{Bad Samaritans} does not seem to be written for an audience with a strong background in economics. Certainly, a reader with such a background could also glean much from Chang’s work, but part of the appeal of \textit{Bad Samaritans} is its ability to break down economic concepts, explain them succinctly, then argue against them. Such a narrative style appeals not only to academics but to readers who have a more casual interest in international development. Undergraduate students can also benefit from Chang’s style of writing, as it is clear, interesting, and includes minimal technical jargon that can intimidate a reader in an introductory course.

While certainly not perfect in its execution, \textit{Bad Samaritans’} colorful, succinct approach to the topic of development merits its inclusion within the subject’s discourse. Chang provides an easy-to-follow, systematized rejection of neoliberalism that both casual readers and academics alike can enjoy. Although a previous knowledge of neoliberalism is helpful in understanding \textit{Bad Samaritans}, it is not necessary. Naturally, Chang’s work cannot effectively constitute an individual’s knowledge of development theory, but it is a powerful addition and commentary to the ongoing discourse of how development should be carried out. In 2005, Ha-Joon Chang received the Leontief Prize, which “recogniz[es] outstanding contributions to economic theory that address contemporary realities and support just and sustainable societies.”\(^8\) Given the accessibility of his work, it is not difficult to understand why.

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\(^{5}\) Chang, Location 3980.

\(^{6}\) Chang, Location 3958.

\(^{7}\) Chang, Location 1210.

REVIEW ARTICLE ON AMITAY ACHARYA (2009): “WHOSE IDEAS MATTER? AGENCY AND POWER IN ASIAN REGIONALISM”

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The title of the book, Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism by Amitav Acharya, successfully ignites the reader’s curiosity regarding its topic and therefore, regarding the message within. The title seems clearly connected to the traditional IR tenets of norms, power, and agency as well as to the oft-repeated claim that ‘ideas matter.’ However, the author’s enquiry (Whose Ideas Matter?) seems to imply that, in fact, not all ideas matter. This apparently implicit argument in the title effectively engages the reader’s interest and thus motivates him or her to read on.

The book begins with an investigation of two empirical puzzles cited on the very first page: “Why didn't a regional multilateral security organization take root in Asia in the aftermath of WW II?” and “Why do Asia's regional institutions remain soft and resist demands for reform and change since the end of the cold war?” (2009, p. 1) Acharya explores the answer to these questions by taking into account, ideational forces, pre-existing norms and beliefs that he claims formed a "cognitive prior" within the Asian region at the time (2009, p. 3). Through this perspective, the book claims to successfully contribute to our understanding of the regional spread of external norms and ideas (2009, p. 4). The author uses the framework of "constitutive localization" by which he refers to the process that enables cohesive fusion of external norms with locally existing beliefs. He does so, taking into account various realist, constructivist and mixed explanations for the phenomena. Katzenstein's influence on the author is clearly visible when he cites the former's warning against applying Eurocentric criteria while studying Asia, illustrating the theoretical foundations of his thought process (2009, p. 167).

The book is structured into six chapters with the first two providing contextual information regarding the concepts discussed. Acharya provides a coherent frame of reference and clearly identifies the gap in scholarship examining norm assimilation circa the Asian region (2009, p. 27). This successfully lays a foundation for his research and arguments. This is done in a way that is helpful for those readers who may not possess significant background in the field. The second chapter delves deeper into the ideas of "constitutive localization" and "moral cosmopolitanism" and contains illustrations that track the trajectory of the local acceptance of, as well as responses to transnational norms (2009, pp. 18-20). Chapter 3 and 5 respectively detail the two post war "waves" of constitutive localization and reconstruct Asia’s historical first steps towards regional institutionalism. Chapter 4 traces the regional cognitive priors and mechanisms affecting institutionalism and the last chapter

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contains the author's review of his own findings and extensions to his arguments.

While covering the first phase of constitutive localization of the 1950s, the book details the Asian leaders' normative choice between non-intervention and collective defense. The choice of non-intervention gaining clear acceptance has been clearly explained by Acharya, to be connected to the Asian countries’ strong normative beliefs against colonialism which made them country highly protective of their sovereignty. Acharya attributes this cognitive prior as the primary reason for the failure of SEATO (2009, p. 62). He does this while persuasively positioning his argument against alternative explanations claimed to account for the absence of a NATO-like organization in Asia (2009, pp. 62-68).

Acharya devotes significant analysis to the factors that led to Asian “soft” institutionalism, to the formation of ASEAN in 1967 and addresses the second puzzle regarding Asia's resistance to institutional change. In doing so, he successfully sheds light on the extent of legitimizing influence that different regional groupings have on each other while in their early evolution (2009, p. 110). He continues this investigation in Chapter 5, which he devotes to the second wave of constitutive localization of the 1990s. This was when regional leaders were confronted with a new selection of external norms: common security and collective intervention (2009, p. 112). The larger consensus, the author documents, was in favor of common security. Acharya illustrates ASEAN's significant role in representing this regional choice by relating how it continued to steer clear of any conception of multilateral collective defense whilst still evolving since its inception in 1967. This distinct ideational force is described by the author as the “ASEAN way” (2009, p. 142).

It is reasonable to agree with his premise that norms and institutional frameworks cannot simply be exported or replicated in another locale. This premise is shared in some way by Lee Kuan Yew when he talks of the imprudence of "foisting" a system indiscriminately on societies where it will not work and where values differ (Zakaria, 2004).

The last chapter contains the author's reviews of his findings regarding the two puzzles laid out in the outset. He links them to the present and proposes implications on the future direction of Asian regionalism. Extending the argument to other regions and global issues, he claims his research relevant for those that may have other regional foci (2009, pp. 152-166). The author mentions the framework's possible applicability to the Middle East but stops short of elaborating further (2009, p. 168). This particular regional application is intriguing and is perhaps one of the few aspects that could have borne closer scrutiny and illustration by Acharya.

In his conclusion, Acharya readdresses the question in the title and persuasively justifies his view of norm diffusion as being contingent on localization and how when viewed as such, “... it shifts the focus on norm diffusion from whether ideas matter at all to which and whose ideas matter” (2009, p. 168). This work significantly bridges the gap in norm-diffusion analysis and opens the door for the hypothesis (norms being more likely to succeed when they provide opportunities for localization) to be applied to diverse regions and disciplines.

This publication is highly concise, well-structured and well researched. It is therefore ideal for a diverse readership. Experienced scholars and graduate students
Archana CHATURVEDI

in the field of political and social science alike will find it instructive while engaging with topics of regionalism, institutionalism; and can prove helpful for interdisciplinary research. Acharya's use of primary historical evidence is strong throughout the book but is most effectively used in the section where he shares official correspondence between world leaders and features historic archival documents (2009, pp. 52-53). These lend additional credibility to the scholarship while imparting a sense of history to the book.

Overall, the author has achieved his objectives by proving that the spread of norms and ideas cannot be considered to be a one way process and is reminiscent of an old Indian proverb that says, "A clap can only be produced by the action of two hands and not one."

References

In their book “Monetary and Financial Integration in East Asia: The Relevance of European Experience,” Park and Wyplosz seek to examine the process of monetary and financial integration in East Asia by recounting the efforts made on economic policy cooperation in the region. In order to assess these developments; the authors base their comparison on the European experience. The book, published by Oxford University Press, stems from a report published by the European Commission in the wake of the 2008 Asia–Europe Meeting. The main difference with that report is that the lessons from the global financial crisis are included.

The book begins by outlining East Asia’s response to the 1997 crisis, both in terms of economic policy and interstate dynamics. Park and Wyplosz argue that the crisis was a main turning point in the way East Asian countries approached the issue of economic cooperation. The chapter questions the effectiveness of the peer pressure mechanism of economic policy surveillance in the region. The authors argue that, though soft cooperation seems to work in the case of Europe, this is only due to the existence and specific prerogatives of the European Commission. In the absence of such a highly institutionalized intraregional environment, peer surveillance seems unlikely to yield any further benefits.

Chapter two presents a review of the current literature on financial and monetary integration in the region. Two main focus points are considered: a) the debate on the sequencing between financial market integration and a common currency and b) the lessons that can be drawn from the existing literature on Optimal Currency Theory to support the economic viability of full monetary integration. Though the authors do acknowledge that capital account liberalization will not likely lead to a common currency, they do not discard the positive correlation between those two variables as well as the potential benefits that could be attained from deeper monetary cooperation within the region.

Chapter three examines the “Initiatives for Financial Cooperation and Macroeconomic Surveillance” in East Asia as compared to those of Europe. Mainly, it exposes the dissonance between the drivers of the integration process in both regions and the mechanisms set to achieve it. Whereas in Europe cooperation on exchange rate stability was inward-looking, in East Asia, the export-led-growth model has made it more difficult to concentrate on regional bilateral exchange rate stability as opposed to efforts to reduce volatility with the dollar or the euro. The authors do stress that, as trade-flows increase within the region and the economic fundamentals shift accordingly, the mechanisms designed to harvest the gains of

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monetary cooperation –the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), the Asian Bond Market and the Asian Currency Unit (ACU) – may seem more fruitful.

In Chapter four, Park and Wyplosz examine the differences between the European and the East Asian approaches to financial integration in order to draw lessons from the former. The main point of divergence is the fact that in Europe, regional integration preceded integration into global financial markets. However, given the globalized nature of finance, it is unlikely that East Asia will have that option, that is, financial reform –namely capital account and exchange rate liberalization– will effectively cause greater integration directly with the global market. In any case, the region’s aversion to fluctuating exchange rates is the main obstacle to the process.

The fifth and final Chapter addresses the lessons of the global financial crisis. Despite the effort put into the design of the mechanisms described above, during the crisis most countries were left to fend for themselves against speculative attacks on their currencies. Park and Wyplosz thus conclude that no amount of reserves is enough, pooled or otherwise. Financial reform and strong mechanisms with international lenders are the only things that can contain speculative attacks on currencies. The authors therefore suggest two different scenarios: a) closer cooperation with international lenders of last resort, such as the IMF or bilateral swap agreements with reserve currency issuers, and b) a more multipolar international monetary system in which a broader currency swap network is put into place.

Prior to the 2008 global financial crisis, the prospects for deeper regional financial and monetary integration in East Asia seemed more promising. Though it is speculative at best to state that, given more time, the mechanisms put into place in the aftermath of the 1997 crisis (CMI and ACU) could have worked, the fact is that when put to the test they mostly failed. Park and Wyplosz provide the reader with a detailed and easy-to-follow account of why these mechanisms were proposed, how they were designed and ultimately why they did not succeed.

“Monetary and Financial Integration in East Asia” contributes to the greater debate on integration and the effects of globalization on regional dynamics. Likewise, it adds empirical clout to the relatively understudied field of the international political economy of finance. The lesson that can be extracted from the book is that the efforts to integrate (peer supervision and bilateral swap agreements) failed because, unlike Europe, they were not a part of a greater integration scheme. Whether the reasons for that divergence are mostly political or economic is up for debate. According to the authors, so long as these countries continue to see each other as competitors for European and American markets then the incentives to cooperate will be mild and ephemeral at best. However, due in part to the changes in the global economy produced by the crisis, that situation is likely to change.

The new role of China in the international monetary system, as well as its gains in the global share of total trade, may lead to the scenarios outlined by the authors (a multipolar international monetary system and a shift towards intraregional trade as internal consumer markets are strengthened). This book is an essential tool for understanding the impact that the rise of China, and its choice whether or not to
internationalize the Renminbi, will have in the region’s financial and monetary system. Graduate students and academics interested in comparative regionalism and financial integration will find this book invaluable.

References

Over the past few years, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has made world headlines through various acts of aggression. The DPRK is gaining attention through the development and testing of nuclear weapons, even going as far as attacking South Korean warships. Having a sizable army does present a threat to important global economic players such as South Korea and Japan. However, the country has also been ravaged internally by famine, poverty and serious human rights abuses. The international community has implemented sanctions for years, but it has not been able to change the attitude or direction of the North Korean regime. The question is how did we get into such a stalemate with this ‘zombie’ state, the DPRK? In the book *The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future*, Victor Cha explains how North Korea has maintained its existence. Through the cult of personality of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-Il, Juche and now Neo-Juche ideology, brutal oppression, and with support from China, North Korea remains a strong entity, despite being an internal nightmare.

The first part of the book begins with a thorough background on North Korean history after World War II, showing how the DPRK began as an economic powerhouse and industrialized society, benefiting from a large amount of aid, technological advances and military training from the Soviet Union and China. Cha describes the imposed Juche or ‘self-reliance’ ideology during this prosperous time, when North Koreans cooperated in a system of complete subordination to the state and to the god-like leadership of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-Il, which is surprisingly seen in defectors of the state as well.

The book then proceeds to illustrate the current hardships that this country has degraded towards. Cha describes one of the signs of stress showing the lack of support by the North Korean government in providing basic services to their citizenry, for example, North Korea is home to a derelict healthcare system, with hospitals having power shortages, and lacking basic supplies, sterilization, and clean water, to the point where, for example, hypodermic needles are reused.

The North Korean people continue to suffer, as absolute poverty is considered to affect around 30 percent of the population. Evidence of malnourishment is shown through the stunting of the population’s growth, as Cha mentions, a UNICEF report covering 2003-2008 found that 45 percent of children under five were stunted; 9 percent were suffering from wasting diseases; and 25 percent were underweight, 7 percent severely so. Malnourishment and starvation is pervasive throughout North Korean society.

This book reveals the severity of the humanitarian crisis that is occurring in the
country. Cha suggests that once North Korea falls, we will uncover one of the worst human rights catastrophes in modern history. Cha provides first-person accounts of the deplorable conditions within the Gulags, where inhumane practices of forced abortion, slavery and executions are a daily occurrence.

The second part of the book takes the reader through the status quo with North Korean relations. First we go through the current situation with deterrence and disarmament, then through a brief account of its relationships with adjacent neighbors. Cha then suggests the DPRK’s eventual downfall. Cha maintains throughout that we have hit a stalemate with North Korea in terms of security, but we must meet these random provocations with continuous showing of readiness and strength, specifically through the continuation of military exercises. This will maintain the stalemate we see today, where both sides are reluctant to start armed conflict for fear of heavy losses.

Throughout the book, Cha has suggested that it is only a matter of time before North Korea implodes, however as it stands now, it does not look favorable for any sort of bottom-up revolution because the North Korean people are not empowered enough to make change in this country. North Korea under the new leadership of Kim Jong-un is following a path of Neo-juche revivalism, where the leadership is looking to bring society ‘back to the future’, or back to the glorious days of the Cold War. Finally, Cha proposes five steps in dealing with North Korea. First, he suggests that China should stop sending North Korean defectors back to the DPRK and simply allow the UNHCR to determine who political refugees are. Second, South Korea, regardless of the government in power, must look to establish an inter-Korean agenda, specifically for human rights. Third, we must let North Korean defectors settle in the West. Fourthly, we must encourage North Korea to fix their human rights issues and reward them with integration into the international community. Finally, we must not overshadow North Korean human rights violations with security and nuclear threats, as we will regret not fixing this once we finally uncover the atrocities occurring within the country.

Victor Cha, former Director of Asian Affairs at the National Security Council, fills the book with many anecdotes related to his position as advisor to the President. However, the problem with North Korea, as Cha highlights to an extent, lies in the fact that no tangible change will ever occur in this region without the explicit consent and cooperation of China, which, I suppose, for power balancing reasons vis-à-vis the West, are not interested in removing complete support. Cha has excellent suggestions on the next steps to securing the North Korean threat; however, probably cooperation with China is the only way to make any tangible progress in dealing with North Korea.

In terms of the humanitarian mess that Cha outlines, wider support for the few NGOs and their associated campaigns in helping North Korean refugees is an idea he does not reference. Nor does he go into detail about the part that they play in the relationship with North Korea.

The greatest accomplishment this book delivers is the depiction of the serious human rights abuses occurring in North Korea. News around the world is filled with the security issues, but the ongoing humanitarian crisis is often neglected. At the same time this should not take away from the current focus of disarming the DPRK.
It is becoming clear that one day after the fall of North Korea, we will witness the aftermath of the worst humanitarian crisis of modern history. If we are looking to mitigate this, we need to take more action to stop the humanitarian atrocities occurring in North Korea, and we need to do so sooner rather than later.
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